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Abstract
Game-theoretical analysis of network formation and drug
pricing
Noémie Cabau, Ph.D.
Co-tutelle between Concordia University & Université Paris Dauphine PSL
2020
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 offers a model of en-
dogenous network formation where agents form connections strategically
to maximize information diffusion in their group. The model builds on
the idea that groups of individuals who are better informed take better
collective decisions. The equilibrium and efficient networks have simple ar-
chitectures: e.g., loops and flowers that may or may not include all agents.
If frictions happen during information transmission, optimal architectures
centralize the connections around a single agent. Chapters 2 and 3 aim
at rationalizing the use of secret rebates during the negotiations on drug
prices. Secret rebates enable to hide the price a country pays for a phar-
maceutical product from other countries. Two models of the interactions
between public payers (countries) and a monopolist pharmaceutical firm
are presented to rationalize the use of secret rebates. We reach the follow-
ing conclusions. Manufacturers benefit from secret rebates because they
avoid price interdependencies across markets; and reference countries gain
from hiding the details of their deals when other countries would otherwise
iii
base their offers to the supplier on the prices they observe other countries
pay. However, the use of secret rebates has mitigated social effects. In
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1.1 Background common to all chapters
Coordination for achieving efficient outcomes is the unifying theme of this
research. The coordination of economic activities can be seen as a harmo-
nious arrangement of various individual plans to avoid inefficient interfer-
ence, which would result in Pareto dominated outcomes. Coordination is
a source of mutual benefits when there exists a common ground between
the agents. All economic problems approached in this thesis are instances
where agents have mixed interests : typically, these instances allow for sev-
eral Pareto optimal outcomes, and agents disagree on their preferred one.
A coordination failure occurs when agents do not regret their individ-
ual choice (the action profile is an equilibrium), however they regret the
collective outcome produced by these choices (they miscoordinate on an
equilibrium that is Pareto dominated by another equilibrium). Potential
1
sources of coordination failures are the impossibility to communicate prior
to taking a decision, or the existence of different ways of achieving the com-
mon interest. In static non-cooperative games, coordination failures may
arise in a Nash equilibrium because of the strategic uncertainty caused
by the simultaneity in decisions. Incorporating dynamics in the players’
decision process (such games are called dynamic games) may change the
incentive structure. This can be done by making the same set of players
play a game repeatedly (repeated games), or by making different players
move at different times (sequential games). As decisions are made over
time, players may get the incentive to coordinate on a cooperative strategy
profile that produces a Pareto optimal outcome. Assuming that they are
farsighted and have perfect recall of all previous moves, cooperation can
be sustained in an equilibrium only if the players can credibly commit to
punish those who adopt a non-cooperative behavior, and reward those who
behave cooperatively. Indeed, credibility is required in an equilibrium, as
a player is deterred by a threat of sanction only if he believes that it is in
the others’ best interest to punish him, should he not follow a cooperative
strategy. (The same goes with rewards.) A player moving at some time t
then takes into account the reactions of those who will move later in time to
his own action. The former reasons backwards, considering all scenarios for
the rest of the game starting from the decision node he is currently at (this
reasoning is called backward induction). When agents have perfect recall,
a strategy profile forms an equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of the
game that satisfies the property of subgame perfectness: in every subgame,
players’ decisions must be part of a Nash equilibrium of the subgame.1
1A perfect equilibrium is defined by Selten (1975, [64]) as a combination of mixed
strategies, and each strategy is affected a strictly positive probability, such that if i’s
2
In some finite dynamic games, players are not expected to take a stand
for the collective interest. For the players who move last, defecting does
not have any consequence, as there is no subsequent subgame in which a
punishment can be carried on. The players moving in the second to last
subgame anticipate this, and may be reluctant to adopt a cooperative be-
havior knowing that the favor will not be reciprocated in the next subgame.
This reasoning can be stretched up to the very first subgame, and coordi-
nation on a cooperative strategy profile may not be achieved in a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.2 A remedy is then to make the chain of decisions
infinite: as there is no last subgame where defection can go unpunished,
players may sustain cooperation in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
In a game, coordination failures can be avoided if players have access
to a commitment device. In cooperative games, agreements on a cooper-
ative strategy profile can be made fully binding (through the making of
a contract, for example). The focus is on the stability of these coalitions
of players who cooperate in achieving a certain outcome, and not on the
details of the procedure via which the outcome is achieved (as it is the case
for non-cooperative games).
strategy s′i is not a best-response to s−i, then the weight on s
′
i in i’s mixed strategy
is infinitesimally small. (Players’ strategies are affected a non-infinitesimaly probability
weight only if they are best-responses.)
2In the centipede game for example, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is
such that the first player to move keeps all the money for himself. The outcome of the
centipede game is Pareto dominated by that which would be produced if players were
(cooperating on) waiting until the end of the game. A similar problem arises in finitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
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1.2 Specific background and Overview on Chap-
ter 2
Chapter 2 studies a static non-cooperative game of network formation. I
offer an overview on game-theoretic models related to networks. I then
introduce Bala and Goyal’s (2000, [6]) seminal work on the topic, which
is of particular importance for understanding my objectives as well as my
contribution to the field.
1.2.1 State of the art on strategic games in network
economics
Networks have interested economists because of their impact on socio-
economic outcomes. Many economic activities are influenced by social ties:
the crafting and passing of legislations (Canen, Jackson and Trebbi, 2019
[16]), persisting "silver-spoon" effect across generations (Joshi, Mahmud
and Sarangi, 2020 [51]), the structure of criminal organizations (Ballester,
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2006 [7]), job search (Lalanne and Seabright,
2016 [54]), research output (Ductor, Fafchamps, Goyal and van der Leij,
2014 [26]), and R&D collaborations (Goyal and Moraga, 2001 [39]) among
others. Game-theoretic models about networks can be divided into two
groups: games of network formation, to which Chapter 2 belongs, and
games played on networks.
Games of network formation study the specific instances where the nodes
in a network (the players) form connections strategically. Examples of such
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instances can be alumni and professional networks, labor markets, political
networks, etcetera. The objectives of these models are usually twofold: to
characterize the equilibrium networks that stem from the nodes’ decisions
in link formation, and to compare them with the efficient networks of the
game.3
Depending on the environment studied, a link between two agents can
be two-sided, i.e. the link is formed only if the two agents consent (as it
is the case with friendship and professional collaborations), or one-sided if
consent is not required (a researcher can cite a peer without his consent).
One of the first formalizations of a strategic network formation game
is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, [48]).4 Their connections model is
based on the idea that the personal connections of an individual are a source
of benefits, however forming and maintaining a relationship is costly. Their
model is a static game where players can form two-sided links: a link is
paid by the two players who agreed on forming it, and allows access to any
player who is reachable from that link. An indirect connection to another
agent, through a sequence of links, is supposed to be a source of benefits
that deplete with the distance (a friend of friend may be less helpful than a
direct friend.) Jackson and Wolinsky define an equilibrium network as one
which is robust to one-link deviations: no two players must want to form
a link nor a player must want to sever one (severance can be unilateral).
This solution concept is called pairwise stability. Bala and Goyal (2000, [6])
take on the model of Jackson and Wolinsky, and study it in a context where
3For the sake of clarity, I review the most influential static models of network for-
mation. Jackson (2005, [47]) has a survey of strategic games of network formation that
encompasses dynamic games.
4In the economic literature, Aumann and Myerson (1988, [5]) were the very first
to model network formation as a game. Theirs is an extensive form game, where the
network serves as a communication device for forming coalitions in a cooperative game.
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links are one-sided: a player can form a link with another agent without his
consent and pays for all links he initiates. This change allows to formulate
the network formation game as purely non-cooperative. As Bala and Goyal
consider, like Jackson and Wolinsky, that the players’ decisions in links are
simultaneous, an equilibrium network of their model is a structure in which
the players’ decisions in links form a Nash equilibrium.
When games are played on a fixed network, the focus shifts on the rela-
tion between the players’ best responses and the network structure. Two
instances are worth distinguishing: pure complementary in the players’ ac-
tions (which presupposes the existence of peer-effects: investment games,
technology adoption), and pure substitutability in the players’ actions (like
private contributions to a public good).
In static games played on networks, two features of the network are of
particular interest: the eigenvalues of its adjacency matrix, and the play-
ers’ respective Bonanich centralities.56 Bonacich’s (1987, [12]) approach to
centrality is related to the influence of a node (i.e. player) in the network.
It is measured as a function of the number of paths that pass through
a node, and the relative contribution of each path depends on its length
(longer paths accounting for less). The strength of externalities in equi-
librium actions and payoffs between two players depends on their relative
location in the network: direct neighbors having the largest influence; and
as themselves are impacted by the decisions of their own direct neighbors,
a player’s equilibrium action depends as well on that of its second de-
gree neighbors, and so on. In other words, an exogenous perturbation on
5See Bloch, Jackson and Tebaldi (2019, [11]) for a detailled review of centrality
measures in networks.
6The adjacency matrix of a network is a (0,1)-squared matrix with zeros as diagonal
elements, and whose (i, j)th entry is equal to one if there exists a link between i and j.
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a player’s equilibrium action propagates along the paths in the network
that starts at this player’s position, and impacts potentially all players’
choices of action. The absolute values of the largest and lowest eigenval-
ues of an adjacency matrix capture the strength of complementarity and
substitutability in the network, respectively. Existence and uniqueness of
a stable Nash equilibrium is guaranteed only for low magnitudes of these
eigenvalues, thus for relative small network effects.7 When this is satis-
fied, a player’s Nash equilibrium action depends on his Bonacich centrality
(Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2006, [7], Bramoullé, Kranton and
D’amours 2014, [14] and Allouch 2015, [1]).
1.2.2 Aims and objectives
The aim of Chapter 2 is to apply network formation à la Bala and Goyal to
an environment where the network is a source of common benefits. In some
practical contexts, the value of informational exchanges is gauged by the
collective outcomes they produce. Examples could be a group of researchers
co-writing an article, a committee of experts working on a report, or even
team workers collaborating on a joint project. In these environments, what
is a source of benefits to each individual is the return from their joint
endeavour. My modeling approach builds on the idea that individuals with
a good ability to diffuse information in their community can achieve better
collective outcomes.
7In the context of games played on networks, the criterion of stability refines the set
of Nash equilibria and select those that are robust to small changes in agents’ actions.
In games with continuous actions, a Nash equilibrium a is stable if, starting from a and
changing the players’ actions by a little bit, the best responses lead back to the original
vector a.
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My model is a static non-cooperative game of network formation. The
set of players is thought of as a group of individuals who are involved in a
collective action. I assume that the success of their joint endeavour depends
on the group’s ability to share information. Prior to taking their collective
action, the agents get the possibility to form one-way directed links. As
in Bala and Goyal, every player pays for the links he initiates, and the
players choose their links simultaneously. Once formed, the network serves
as communication platform: a player can talk to any other player he can
reach in the network, i.e. there exists a path (a sequence of links) that
connects the former to the latter. Once communication is over, the agents
take their collective action. Its return is the same for all, and it depends
positively on the number of interactions that each of them had during
the communication stage. The distinctive aspect of my model is that the
network is a public good: every agent receives the same return from the
collective action, regardless of his private contribution in links to building
the network.
In this game, both coordination and cooperation problems may arise in
an equilibrium. Because links are a source of positive externalities (one’s
own links may help connect an agent to another one, like j’s link to k allows
i to access k in the network on the left of Figure 1), the problem that the
players who invest in links face is to arrange them in a way that maximizes
the common benefit from the network. This is a pure coordination problem.
Figure 1 provides an example.
i k ji j k
Figure 1: Two consecutive links versus two links pointing towards the same
agent
8
For simplicity, assume that the return from the collective action is given
by the number of ordered pairs of players such that the first player in the
pair can reach (the latter has a path to) the second one. The network on
the left hand side allows i to reach j and k, and j to reach k; hence, its
return equals 3. The network on the right hand side allows i and j to reach
k, and its return equals 2. In the network on the right, agent i can increase
the collective return by one unit if he redirects his link towards j (which
would give the network on the left side). Because the network produces
non-excludable benefits, agents may have the incentive to free ride on the
others’ contributions in links. In Figure 1, player k enjoys a return of 3
and 2 in the networks on the left and right, respectively, without having
contributed to building the network.
The objectives of this first chapter are threefold. First, I seek to charac-
terize the network architectures that are supported in a strict Nash equi-
librium, and to identify the differences between the equilibrium networks
in my game and Bala and Goyal’s. Throughout, I refer to a strict Nash
network as a network that is shaped by a strategy profile in link formation
which is a strict Nash equilibrium. In my model, each player trades off the
social benefits of his links and the costs he incurs for forming them: taking
the network on the left side of Figure 1 as an example, j maintains his
link towards k if the worth from him reaching k, and i reaching k, makes
up for the cost of the link and if there is no better link to form.8 Sec-
ond, I investigate if coordination problems and free riding arise in a strict
Nash equilibrium. The problem of free riding is particular to my game, as
8In Bala and Goyal’s set-up, benefits from links are private: the network benefit to
player i is the number of players he can reach. Therefore, if we go back to the example
provided in Figure 1, j would disregard the positive externality his link has on agent i
in the computation of his benefit from maintaining the link towards k.
9
I suppose that the network produces non-excludable benefits. Coordina-
tion failures happen in a strict Nash network if, given the cost of forming
links, the players could have formed another strict Nash network that gives
each of them a larger payoff. In my game, coordination failures in equilib-
rium may be caused by the players’ incentive to free ride. Third, I seek to
characterize the network architectures that are efficient.
1.2.3 Contribution
Chapter 2 is a direct contribution to the literature on endogenous network
formation. A body of works studies specifically the provision of public
goods on an endogenously formed network. This literature was initiated
by Galeotti and Goyal (2010, [32]), who combine a local public good game
played on a network built from the players’ strategic decisions in link for-
mation. Galeotti and Goyal’s paper extends the literature on local public
good games played on fixed network structures (Bramoullé and Kranton
2007, [13] and Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours 2014, [14]) by endoge-
nizing the network on which the game is played. In Galeotti and Goyal’s
set-up, homogeneous agents choose to acquire costly information and to
form links with others to access the information they acquire. In equilib-
rium networks, the authors find what they call the law of the few : a small
set of agents, the influencers, acquire information for the entire network,
and the rest free-ride on their efforts in information acquisition (they sim-
ply connect to one of these well-informed influencers). This result seems
robust even when players are heterogeneous in terms of their efficiency in
producing the public good or their valuation of the public good (Kinateder
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and Merlino 2017, [52]). In my model, the network can be understood as
a public good which is produced from every agent’s private contribution
in links. In the models in line with Galeotti and Goyal’s, an agent’s con-
tribution to the public good generates positive externalities on his direct
neighbors, exclusively. In my set-up, an agent’s contribution in links gen-
erates positive payoff externalities on all players in the network, not just
on his direct neighbors. For example, the benefits of a publication in a
prestigious journal are common to all authors, while maybe just some have
actively contributed to writing the article; on platforms like Discord, the
knowledge created by discussions between the members of a group is pub-
licly accessible to all of them, etc.
My model is the closest to Bala and Goyal’s. Both of our games of net-
work formation are static and non-cooperative. A distinctive feature of my
game compared to theirs is that the network generates non-excludable ben-
efits. This causes one major difference in the architectures of our equilib-
rium networks: in my model, some strict Nash networks are disconnected,
with some players who free ride by not forming any links at all. Such a con-
figuration never happens in a Nash equilibrium of Bala and Goyal’s game.
Apart from this difference, the patterns of links in our equilibrium networks
are the same. When the network benefit does not depend on the distance
between the agents, the links in an equilibrium network form wheels; and
when it does, equilibrium networks have the architecture of flowers.
From a technical point of view, Chapter 2 is related to the literature on
network formation and potential games (Tardos and Wexler 2007, [66]). In
my game, a maximum of the potential has the property of being a Nash
equilibrium with an efficient architecture. When the network benefit does
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not depend on the distance between the agents, I find that the set of max-
ima of the potential coincides with the set of strict Nash equilibria in which
no player free rides.
1.3 Specific background and Overview on Chap-
ters 3 and 4
This section aims at introducing the theoretical analyses of Chapters 3 and
4. Both chapters are co-written with my co-supervisor, Sidartha Gordon.
1.3.1 State of the art
Chapter 3 and 4 study two theoretical models on the negotiations of drug
prices. The focus of this research is on drugs listed for reimbursement.
The aim of these chapters is to understand the outcomes of negotiations.
Despite their lack of transparency, the three well-known facts listed below
provide some information on the negotiation procedure and the particular-
ities of drug pricing.
Secret rebates
Drug manufacturers and payers, whether they are private insurers
like in the US or public health officials, negotiate two prices. There
is first the official price at which the drug is listed for reimbursement,
called the list price. This price is made public as soon as the drug
is ready for launch on the domestic market, and what patients pay
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out of their pocket (in case the drug is not fully reimbursed by their
insurance plan) is a percentage of the list price. The second price ne-
gotiated is a secret rebate: money that the manufacturer gives back
to the payer, and whose amount is known to no one but the payer and
the manufacturer. Rebates vary in terms of schemes and magnitudes.
Rebate schemes seem to be mostly volume-based, and the rebate may
be applied on a bundle of products (Valverde and Pisani 2016, [68]).
About the magnitude of rebates, Morgan et al. (2017, [60]) estimate
that they range from 40% to 70% for specialty pharmaceuticals, and
from 10% to 50% for primary care drugs across North America, Eu-
rope, and Australasia. These figures suggest that a list price may be
completely uninformative about the real price a country pays for a
given drug.
Price interdependencies
There are price interdependencies between certain countries. These
are driven by two phenomena. The first one is the use by some insti-
tutional payers of international price referencing in their negotiation
with a drug manufacturer. International price referencing (IPR) is
a price cap for a medicine that is calculated as a function of the list
prices of similar treatments in other countries. According to Vogler,
Paris and Panteli (2018, [69]), the majority of European countries,
China, Japan, Canada and Brazil, among others, apply IPR for some
drugs. The second phenomenon is the possibility of parallel imports
between countries in a same economic community. In the EU, the
parallel import of a medicine involves importing the product into one
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member state from another, and distributing it outside the distri-
bution network set up by the manufacturer. The rationale behind
parallel imports is to arbitrage away international price discrimina-
tion on medicines. Danzon (1997, [20] and 2018, [21]) notes that for
the EU members, contracts with differential list prices and no re-
bate were replaced by confidential contracts including a rebate off a
common list price because of parallel imports.
Strategic timing of negotiations
In the EU, drug manufacturers need first to obtain a market autho-
risation from the European Medicines Agency. Once granted, each
country negotiates a price with the manufacturer. These negotiations
between countries and manufacturers are sequential. The empirical
studies by Danzon et al. (2005, [23]) and Kyle (2007, [53]) suggest
that, among European countries that use IPR, manufacturers launch
their products first in higher-priced markets.
These three facts have been subject to different research questions. A
first body of research studies the implications of price interdependencies
between markets. Jelovac and Bordoy (2005, [50]) look specifically at the
effect of parallel imports on countries’ welfare, and find that the effect
is positive only if the trading partners have needs for different types of
drugs. Marinoso, Jelovac and Olivella (2011, [33]) study instead the relation
between IPR and list prices in reference countries (i.e. these countries that
come first in the order of the negotiations). The authors find that a country
benefits from using IPR when the co-payment it offers is relatively larger
than that of a reference country, and that the benefit is lower the larger
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the country’s market size.9 Houy and Jelovac (2015, [46]) study the effect
of IPR on the launch dates across countries. The authors find that the
firm chooses a timing of launches that follows the ordering of the countries’
willingness to pay and market sizes, where countries which represent higher
sources of revenues get access to the medicine earlier.
Another part of the literature studies the relation between list prices
and social insurance policies. Jelovac (2002, [49]) focuses on the effect of
co-payment levels on list prices. The author predicts that list prices are
negatively correlated with the degree of coverage, and highlights a series of
implications that rationalizes this result: first, lower co-payments imply a
relatively more inelastic demand for the drug, thereby increasing the firm’s
opportunity cost of failing its negotiation; this reinforces (endogenously)
the country’s bargaining power to influence the outcome of the negotiation
towards its preferred one; namely, an agreement on a low list price.
1.3.2 Aims and objectives
The joint aim of Chapters 3 and 4 is to provide rational justifications for the
use of secret rebates and IPR, and to highlight possible functions of secret
rebates. From a supplier’s perspective, the benefits of secret rebates are
straightforward: given that countries negotiate in turn and use IPR, secret
rebates allow to isolate each negotiation from the others. For countries,
the impact of secret rebates on welfare is not clear at all. Our approach
consists in proposing hypotheses that rationalize an offer of secret rebate
9A co-payment is a fixed amount that a healthcare beneficiary pays for medical
expenditures covered by his or her health insurance plan. The remaining balance is paid
by the insurance company.
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by a country.
In Chapter 3, we take as given that countries which do not come first
in the order of the negotiations will use IPR. For simplicity, we suppose
that these countries never agree on paying a price larger than the list price
they observe in other countries. We seek to understand how this affects
the Pareto optimal outcomes of the negotiation, in terms of list price and
rebate, between a reference country (i.e. one that negotiates first) and the
manufacturer. In particular, we want to identify necessary and sufficient
conditions for which a Pareto optimal and individually rational (PO-IR)
contract has a strictly positive rebate, and a reference country prefers a
PO-IR contract with a large rebate.
To this end, we propose a model with two countries and a monopolist
pharmaceutical firm. The first of our assumption is that the firm accepts
to include a rebate in a deal only for concealing the real price a country is
paying to countries that negotiate later. Second, we assume that the coun-
try which negotiates first sets up a social insurance plan for reimbursing
the drug. Specifically, the country chooses the level of social contributions
it will levy on its population for funding the expenditures tied to the re-
imbursement scheme, given the deal with the manufacturer. We take the
reimbursement scheme as a fixed parameter of the model, and it consists
of the percentage of the list price that is covered by the social security.
We refer to a contract between the reference country and the firm as a
list price - rebate pair, where the list price is the component of the contract
that the second country can observe, while the net (rebated) price (i.e., the
price paid by the country to the firm) is unknown to the second country.
As mentioned earlier on, we assume that the second country to negotiate
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applies IPR: it never agrees to pay a price larger than the list price it ob-
serves in the first country.
Our objective is to characterize the set of PO-IR contracts between the
firm and the first country. From the analysis of this set, three results stand
out. First, the relative profitability of the two markets has an incidence on
the occurrence of secret rebates in the PO-IR contracts, as well as on the
possibility of mutually advantageous trades between the reference country
and the firm. In particular, we find that strictly positive rebates are part
of PO-IR contracts where the net (rebated) price is relatively low. As the
firm would never agree on leaving such a low net price propagate in the
second negotiation, the net price that the first country pays is hidden by
a secret rebate off the list price. Second, in the set of PO-IR contracts
with rebates, larger list prices are associated with larger rebates and lower
rebated prices. Meaning, the first country and the firm trade large secret
rebates against high list prices. Third, the country’s payoff is the largest
for the contract that has the largest rebate, the largest list price and the
lowest rebated price. Therefore, large rebates should be expected when the
negotiating power of the reference country is important.
In Chapter 4, we propose to rationalize the use of IPR and of secret
rebates by an asymmetry of information between the countries and the
manufacturer. The hypothesis we put forward is that a monopolist phar-
maceutical firm may have knowledge about the time-lapse before the mar-
ket release of a superior substitute: meaning, the latter has some private
information that affects its willingness to accept low offers from the coun-
tries against earlier deals. To the end of rationalizing the use of secret
rebates, we compare the optimal list prices in two regimes: an opaque
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regime, where the transaction price negotiated by each country with the
firm is confidential; and a transparent regime, where countries can observe
the prices that others pay. By comparing the equilibrium transaction prices
in both regimes, we can assess if a reference country benefits from negoti-
ating a secret rebate.
The model takes the form of a sequential game with asymmetric informa-
tion between two countries and a monopolist firm. The private information
held by the firm, which is the launch date of a superior substitute, is inter-
preted as the firm’s type. We assume that the two countries have the same
willingness to pay for the drug, and share a prior belief about the firm’s
type. The two countries negotiate in turn; and within a same negotiation,
there are two rounds of offers: a country is the first to make an offer, that
the firm either accepts or rejects; and in case of rejection, the firm makes a
counter-offer to the country, that the latter either accepts or rejects. A deal
is sealed as soon as one party accepts the offer of the other. In this game,
the firm’s decision to accept or reject an offer releases information about its
type. Low types, which believe in the imminent entry of a substitute, have
the incentive to seal a deal as soon as possible; while high types, confident
in the duration of their monopoly, prefer to wait until the second round of
the negotiation to extract a greater surplus from a country.
When negotiations are transparent, the second country to negotiate ob-
serves the price paid by the first country. This price is informative about
the firm’s willingness to accept a low price against an earlier deal. Altough
partial, this information provides some indication about the firm’s type.
Because of this, the subgame that starts at the first decision node of the
firm, where the latter decides whether to accept or reject the first country’s
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offer, is a signaling game between the firm and the second country. The
firm sends a signal about its type to the second country, through its deci-
sion regarding the first country’s offer, and the second country formulates
an offer that is optimal given the signal. When negotiations are opaque,
the price paid by each country to the manufacturer is kept secret; there-
fore, the second country in the order of the negotiations does not learn any
additional information about the firm’s type than the information its prior
belief provides it already.
We characterize the set of weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), for
both opaque and transparent regimes. When negotiations are transparent,
we find that the second country uses a form of IPR in equilibrium: it for-
mulates an offer that depends positively on the transaction price in the first
country. If it is farsighted, the firm is therefore more inclined to reject a
same offer made by the first country than in an opaque regime, where the
second country would not observe the price the first country pays. In our
model, the combination of the firm’s farsightedness and the use of IPR by
the second country penalizes the country which negotiates first. Confiden-
tiality about the transaction price through secret rebates are a means for
the first country to cancel out this penalty, and to get the same payoff as
in the opaque regime.
1.3.3 Contribution
In the theoretical literature on drug pricing, no model has yet proposed
a rationalization of the use of secret rebates and of IPR. Importantly, we
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propose hypotheses under which a country initiates an offer of secret re-
bate. The empirical literature suggests that the appeal of secret rebates
to countries is mostly budgetary, in the sense that rebates help contain
public expenditures on pharmaceuticals (Vogler et al. (2012, [72])). Re-
garding this point, we find in Chapter 3 that a country prefers contracts
with large rebates, because they are associated with low net prices (i.e.
the net price is the price the country pays the manufacturer) and a large
quantity traded. Still in this chapter, we conclude that the firm uses a
secret rebate to hide the price a country pays from those which negotiate
later. When the market in the country which negotiates last is sufficiently
profitable, we further find that the variation between the list prices that are
PO-IR for the firm and the reference country is low, however the variation
between the net prices is high. This suggests that the negotiation between
a reference country and a pharmaceutical firm is mostly about the secret
rebate.
Chapter 4 contributes to the ongoing discussion on price transparency
on pharmaceuticals and its potential effect on countries’ welfare. Scholars
seem to be divided on the matter. Transparency entails the use of differ-
ential pricing, which is opposite to the current system based on a uniform
pricing (comparable list prices) and price discrimination among countries
through confidential rebates. Danzon and Towse (2003, [22]) argue that
differential pricing is unsustainable, and may be detrimental to poor coun-
tries for the following reason. As countries use IPR and might engage
in parallel trade, manufacturers may have the incentive to charge a sin-
gle price between the rebated prices that the countries would have gotten,
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had markets been separated and secret rebates allowed.10 This would ul-
timately benefit high-income countries and hurt low-income ones. Based
on the results in Chapter 4, where we assume that countries are identical
in terms of market size and willingness to pay, we find that transparency
has mitigated social effects: it is detrimental to the countries which nego-
tiate first and beneficial to the countries which negotiate last. Vogler and
Paterson (2017, [70]) disagree with the conclusion of Danzon and Towse,
and believe that transparency can enhance both the accessibility and the
affordability of medicines. They argue that the abolition of secret rebates
in favor of differential pricing might lead countries to collaborate in leading
joint negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.11
Chapters 3 and 4 contribute to the theoretical literature on quantity
discount pricing and rebates. Rebate schemes are used in other industries
than the pharmaceutical one, notably in the automobile, wholesale and
electronics industries. For these industries, the literature identifies coupons
and rebates as ways through which the manufacturer can price discriminate
among end consumers and control retailers’ incentive to hoard inventories.
See Lee and Rosenbalt (1986, [55]), Gerstner and Hess (1991 [35], 1995 [36]),
Ault et al. (2000, [2]) and Chiu, Cho and Tang (2011, [18]) among oth-
ers. For the case of pharmaceuticals, the function of secret rebates that is
mostly put forward by the literature is their preventing price interdepen-
dencies across countries, and therefore benefit manufacturers. We are able
10In the EU, the parallel import of a medicine involves importing the product into
one member state from another, and distributing it outside the distribution network set
up by the manufacturer.
11Examples of such collaboration is BeneluxA (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg and Austria and formed in 2015), as well as the Nordic Pharmaceuticals Forum
(Sweden, Norway Iceland and Denmark). For more details, see the policy brief by Espin
et al. (2016, [30])
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to rationalize this function of secret rebates in Chapter 3, as we find that
the firm agrees on making the first country pay a low price only if it is




Collective action on an
endogenous network
2.1 Introduction
In collective actions, coordination is key for achieving better social out-
comes. The ability of a group of activists to speak with one voice is crucial
for their credibility and political influence. A team working on a joint
project is more efficient if tasks are clearly allocated, and the workers are
given feedback and updates on a regular basis. The types of collective ac-
tions that will interest us in this chapter are those that are communicative
in nature, in the sense that their outcomes are shaped by the interpersonal
interactions of the group members.
Collaborative networks that promote information sharing have aspects
of a public good. Forming links, through which information is transmitted
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to others, costs the individual agent time, resources and efforts, while their
benefits (the outcome from the collective knowledge generated by interac-
tions) are publicly accessible. As with any public good, the ability of people
to free ride on the efforts of others poses a threat to its provision. Theoret-
ical development is needed to understand (i) Which network architectures
stem from non-cooperative decisions in link formation? (ii) What network
features make groups better or worse at generating common knowledge?
I propose a non-cooperative model of network formation where the net-
work allows a group of agents to exchange information prior to taking a
collective action. It is assumed that the success of the collective action de-
pends positively on how well informed the group is. To this end, the players
get the possibility to form a communication network.1 The network forma-
tion stage is a one-shot game: every player decides for himself the links he
wants to establish in the network without observing the others’ decisions,
and pays for all links he initiates. The network that is built from these
decisions then serves as communication platform. An agent can talk to all
those he can reach in the network; specifically, agent i can talk to agent
j only if there exists a path (a sequence of links) from the former to the
latter. The return from the collective action is the same for all agents (i.e.,
the network produces both non-rival and non-excludable benefits), and it
is a function of some network statistics.
I consider two assumptions regarding the relation between the network
and the collective return it produces. Under the benchmark assumption,
the collective benefits from communication depend solely on the number
1In this paper, communication is not strategic. Papers that study strategic in-
formation sharing and persuasion in networks are those by Hagenbach and Koessler
(2010, [42]), Bloch, Demange and Kranton (2018, [9]), Egorov and Sonin (2019, [28])
among others.
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of interactions that each agent has in the network. The alternative as-
sumption is that the collective return depends positively on the number of
interactions, and direct interactions generate higher benefits than indirect
(i.e. distant) ones. This second assumption accounts for possible infor-
mational distortions during retelling, transmission delays, etc. For this
reason, the benchmark assumption is synonymous with frictionless com-
munication, while the alternative assumption presupposes the existence of
frictions during information transmission.
When communication is frictionless, the network structures that are sup-
ported in a strict Nash equilibrium are all wheels, that may or may not
include all agents (See Figure 2). The interactions in any of these struc-
tures are exclusively reciprocal: agent i talks to agent j if and only if j talks
to i. Some agents free ride on the efforts in link formation of some others
when the wheel does not encompass all agents, and the occurrence of free
riding in a strict Nash equilibrium depends positively on the group size. I
show that these network structures where free riding happens, namely all
wheels that do not include the entire group of agents, are sub-efficient from
a utilitarian perspective. Yet, these network structures that allow certain






Figure 2: A wheel on all agents and a non-exhaustive wheel
The existence of frictions during communication gives the players an
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additional incentive to form links. Links are established primarily for con-
necting individuals to others, but also for cutting distances that would
otherwise be too long. When the number of agents is relatively small, I
find that some equilibrium candidates have a flower structure, that may or
may not encompass all agents. (See Figure 3.) A flower is characterized by
a cyclic pattern of links: links are organized in wheels, and the wheels com-
municate among each other through the central agent in the flower. This
result suggests that optimal communication structures are highly central-
ized, which seems particularly efficient for shortening distances. Another
result that stems from this analysis is that an efficient network architecture
balances the benefits from shortening distances against the benefits from
including more agents, for a fixed total number of links. In Figure 3, the
network on the left allows every agent to interact with the rest of the group;
in the network on the right, fewer agents can communicate, however the
benefit from an interaction is higher (the distances between the agents who









Figure 3: For 5 agents and 6 links, two possible efficient architectures
The paper contributes to the literature on network formation games. In
the earliest models on the topic, it is assumed that the sole concern of the
players is the number of agents they can reach via their own connections
(Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, [48] and Bala and Goyal 2000, [6]). Participa-
tion in link formation has also been studied in a continuous model, where
agents choose how they allocate fixed resources on several links (Bloch and
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Dutta 2009, [10]) instead of choosing a discrete set of links. My set-up is
close to Bala and Goyal’s because we model network formation as a static
non-cooperative game. In their model, as in mine, the Nash equilibrium is
too permissive an equilibrium criterion, and motivates a stronger equilib-
rium concept: the strict Nash equilibrium. This stronger concept is very
effective for narrowing down the set of network structures that arise in an
equilibrium. A marked difference between our two models is the way in
which the agents value their links. In Bala and Goyal, a player trades off
the private benefits of his links (the number of agents a player can reach
from his links) with the costs he incurs for forming them. In my set-up,
a player trades off instead the social benefits of his links (the number of
agents one’s own links help connect across the network) and their costs.
This difference affects our results about the connectedness of equilibrium
networks: in Bala and Goyal, a strict Nash network that is not connected
(i.e. it is connected if a player can reach any other player in the network) is
necessarily empty, which is not the case for my game. As I consider that the
network produces non-excludable benefits, disconnected networks happen
in equilibrium because of the players’ incentive to free ride. Apart from
this difference, we find similar patterns of links in equilibrium networks:
wheels when the network benefits do not depend on the distance between
the agents, and flowers when the network benefit depends negatively on
the distance.
A body of works studies network formation embedded within a coordi-
nation game (Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2005, [40], Herman 2014, [43]), an
anti-coordination game (Bramoullé et al. 2004, [15]), a local public good
game (Galeotti and Goyal 2010, [32], Kinateder and Merlino 2017, [52]), or
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a cooperative game (Dutta et al. 1998, [27], Slikker and van den Nouweland
2000, [65]). A player’s links in the network influences his behavior and may
determine his partners in the game subsequent to the network formation,
as well as potential externalities in actions and payoffs. When the game
that follows network formation is cooperative, the players’ strategic deci-
sions in link formation determine which coalitions they can or cannot join;
and when it is non-cooperative, the network structure determines the scale
of interdependencies between the players’ equilibrium actions.
Related to collective action and networks, Chwe (2000, [19]) studies a
model where agents’ decisions to participate or not in a collective action
depend on what their direct neighbors in a fixed network choose to do. My
approach is markedly different from his because I consider that the network
structure is endogenous. However, Chwe offers a richer analysis of the col-
lective action problem. In my model, the outcome of the collective action
is directly derived from the communication network the agents form.
This paper also contributes to the literature on potential games in the
context of network formation (Tardos and Wexler 2007, [66]). Usually,
when a game is a finite potential game, the strategy profiles that are po-
tential maximizers can be used as an equilibrium refinement (Monderer
and Shapley 1996, [58], Sandholm 2010, [62]). In my game, the argmax
set of the potential function consists of networks that have a socially effi-
cient architecture: they optimize the social cost of building the network, by
maximizing the network benefit (in the context I study, the network bene-
fit is the return from the collective action) per link. When communication
is frictionless, these networks are the wheels that encompass all agents; if
instead the benefits from communication decline with the distance, these
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networks are flowers (this is proved only for a small number of agents).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 features the
benchmark model where communication is frictionless. Section 2.3 charac-
terizes the set of strict Nash equilibria of the game. Section 2.4 character-
izes the set of efficient networks and contains a discussion on equilibrium
refinements. Section 2.5 features an alternate version of the model where
the network benefit depends on the distances in the network. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 The model under frictionless communica-
tion
I first introduce the model, then I review some key properties of the network
formation game.
2.2.1 Set-up
There is a group of individuals, N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3. At some
point in the game, the n individuals will take a collective action. Its return
is determined by the communication network the agents form first. A
communication network is a strategy profile g = (g1, . . . , gn), where gi
denotes player i’s strategy in link formation. A strategy gi for player i
gives the set of agents towards whom i forms links, and it is a subset of
N \ {i}. In this model, a link is directed, i.e. it is an ordered pair ij of two
players, represented as i → j, and it allows the first player in the pair, i,
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to talk to the second one, j. A link has a fixed cost c ≥ 0, and a player
pays for all links he initiates.2 I restrict attention to pure strategies. The
set of all pure strategies for agent i is denoted by Gi, and the space of pure
strategy profiles is G.
The n players choose their strategies simultaneously. Once the network
formation stage completed, agents communicate. In a network g, an agent
talks to all those he can reach in the network. Meaning, i talks to j if and
only if there exists a path from i to j in the network g. A path from agent
i to agent j is a sequence of links i → i1 . . . → ik → j along which all
agents are distinct. A path is interpreted as a communication channel. An
interaction of i with j can be direct, if there exists a link from i to j, or
indirect, if i has a path to j that includes at least two links. I assume that
communication is frictionless: the worth of i’s communications depends
solely on their number, κi(g), which is referred to as i’s reach, and it is an
integer between 0 and n−1. Note that κi(g) = 0 if and only if gi = ∅, and
κi(g) = n− 1 if i can reach all other players. In Section 2.5, I consider an
alternative version of this model where the benefits from communication
decline with the length of a path.
Once the network formed and communication is over, the players take
their collective action. The network influences their collective decision, and
groups that communicate well achieve better social outcomes.3 The return
from the collective action, v(g) in some network g, is a reduced form of a
2In my model, a link is one-way, i.e. i does not need j’s consent for establishing the
connection i → j.
3One could think that the agents who can communicate elaborate a social norm,
and those who did not participate in its elaboration are unaware of it, and thus they
may cause miscoordination in the collective action. Or more simply, agents use the
communication network for exchanging social-relevant information that affects positively
the outcome of their collective action.
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possibly complicated decision process. The return is written alternatively
as a function of the vector κ(g) = (κ1(g), . . . , κn(g)) of reaches in the
network g:
v(g) = Φ(κ(g))
where Φ is symmetric and strictly increasing in all players’ reaches:
Φ(κ(g)) > Φ(κ(g′))
if κi(g) ≥ κi(g′) for all i ∈ N , and there is at least one player j ∈ N
for which the inequality is strict, for any j ∈ N . The payoff of player i in
some communication network g ∈ G is the return from the collective action
minus i’s expenditure in links:
ui(gi, g−i) = v(g)− c|gi| (1)
where |gi| is the cardinality of gi, and it corresponds to the number of links
that i forms in the network g. Note that the network is a public good: all
agents get the same collective return from the network.
I shed light on two properties of v, which are direct implications of the
assumptions on Φ.
Remark 2.2.1. The function v is increasing in strategies:
gi ⊆ g
′





i ∈ Gi, g−i ∈ G−i, ∀i ∈ N , and it is anonymous (it is invariant under
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permutations of the players’ labels):
v(g) = v(gπ)
∀g ∈ G and for any permutation π of N , where g and gπ are two isomor-
phic networks, and are said to have the same architecture.4
Anonymity implies that the collective return is determined by the pat-
terns of links and not by the labels of the players who are in given positions
in the network.
2.2.2 Equilibrium and efficiency concepts
In the remainder, I solve for the strategy profiles g that are strict Nash
equilibria of the network formation game. I refer to such networks as strict
Nash networks. In Section 2.3.3, I justify my choice of equilibrium concept.
Definition 2.2.1 A strategy profile (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n) is a strict Nash equilibrium












i } with g
∗
−i ∈ G−i. The network g
∗ is strict Nash if (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n)
is a strict Nash equilibrium.
4Two networks g and gπ are isomorphic if there is a permutation π of the set of
players N such that any link i → j exists in g if and only if the link π(i) → π(j) exists
in gπ.
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The players’ non-cooperative decisions in links can be studied in an exact
potential game. A game is an exact potential game if there exists a function
P : G → R such that:
P (g′i, g−i)− P (g) = ui(g
′
i, g−i)− ui(gi, g−i)
∀i ∈ N, ∀gi, g
′
i ∈ Gi. The game presented in Section 2.2.1 is an exact
potential game, whose potential function is:




and it can be re-written as:




As the potential function is only different from a player’s payoff by a con-
stant, its argmax set refines the set of Nash equilibria of the network for-
mation game. In the potential game, all players optimize the potential
function in (2). A game that is an exact potential game admits the exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, as the potential maximizer
is a Nash equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley, (1996, [58])). Furthermore,
a potential maximizer has the property of being the Nash equilibrium that
is the most robust to possible perturbations of the game. In this game, we
shall see (in Section 2.4) that the argmax set of the potential refines the set
of strict Nash equilibria, and selects the architectures in which no player
free rides on the others’ contributions in links.
Let an efficient network be a network that maximizes a utilitarian social
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welfare function of the agents’ payoffs. The welfare function is given by:




which can be re-arranged as:









Therefore, g is a maximum of the potential for some value c of the cost of a
link if and only if g is efficient for a value of the cost that is n times larger
than c.
2.3 Strict Nash networks
In this section, I characterize the set of strict Nash networks, and I justify
my choice of equilibrium concept.
2.3.1 Strict Nash candidates
Consider the strategy gi of any player i ∈ N in some network g. I distin-
guish between two kinds of deviations:
Type I deviations: all strategies g′i ∈ Gi for player i such that g
′
i 6= gi
and |g′i| = |gi|. If i deviates to such strategies, then his expenses in
links remain constant, however the collective return may change.




and |g′i| 6= |gi|.
In this section I propose a test on the strategy profiles in G. The test
consists of checking, for a given strategy profile g, if there is a player who
could deviate by forming fewer links, and the deviation weakly improves
the reach of every agent in N . If the test is positive, then the strategy
profile is never strict Nash; if the test is negative, then the strategy profile
may be a strict Nash equilibrium. This test allows me to restrict attention
to four possible architectures for a strict Nash network. Lemma 2.3.1 opens
the ways, with a result about the properties of the paths in a strict Nash
network. First, I need to introduce a definition.
Definition 2.3.1 A path ρi0→ih : i0 → . . . → ih from i0 to ih is included
in the path ρj0→jm : j0 → . . . → jm if there are integers k such that
0 ≤ k ≤ m− (h+ 1), and for all q with 0 ≤ q ≤ h, iq = jk+1+q. Meaning,
j0 → . . . jk → i0 → . . . → ih → jk+h+2 → . . . → jm
The relation between the two paths is denoted as ρi0→ih ⊆ ρj0→jm .
Lemma 2.3.1. If g ∈ G is a strict Nash network, then any two paths ρi→k
and ρj→k directed towards agent k satisfy either ρi→k ⊆ ρj→k or vice-versa,
with i, j 6= k.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the strategy profile g =
(g1, . . . , gn) is a strict Nash equilibrium, and there are two paths directed
towards some player k that are not included in one another. Let me set
ρi→k : i0 → . . . il → k, where i = i0 and k = il+1. And ρj→k : j0 → . . . jm →
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k, where j = j0 and k = jm+1. If the conclusion of the lemma is false, then
there exist two players, ih along ρi→k and jf along ρj→k, such that: ih 6= jf
yet ih+1 = jf+1 ∈ gih , gjf . Take any of these two; I will procede through
the proof by considering ih. (1) If ih does not have a link towards j0, then
consider the deviation g′ih = gih \ {ih+1} ∪ {j0}. (2) Otherwise, consider
the deviation g′ih = gih \ {ih+1}. In case (1) g
′
ih
costs the same as gih while
in case (2) g′ih is strictly cheaper than gih . Let me set g
′ = (g′ih , g−ih). It
is immediate that any player a who has a path to any player b in g still
has a path to b in g′. (If the path was including the link ih → ih+1 in g,
then the path from a to b in g′ now inlcudes the sequence ih → j0 . . . → k.)
If ih does not have a path to j0 in g, then there are ordered pairs ab of
players such that a can reach b in the network g′, and a cannot reach b
in the network g. Therefore the deviation is at least weakly profitable. A
contradiction to the fact that g is strict Nash.
Lemma 2.3.1 has strong implications on the architectures of the strict
Nash candidates. These implications are stated in the three corollaries
below.
Corollary 2.3.1. If g ∈ G is a strict Nash network, then there is at most
one path from i to j in g, for any i, j ∈ N .
Proof. Recall that all players along a path are distinct. The result is im-
mediate by setting i = j in Lemma 2.3.1.
The next corollary characterizes the architecture of a component of a
strict Nash network. A set C ⊆ N is called a component if for every
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ordered pair ij of agents in C, i has a path to j and there is no strict
superset C ′ of C for which this is true. A singleton is a component that has
one element. A network that has one component is said to be connected ;
and a network that has strictly more than one component is referred to
as disconnected. Consider a component C and denote the agents in C as
{j0, ..., jm}, where n ≥ m > 1. A wheel component has an architecture that
is defined by the sequence of links j0 → j1 . . . jm → j0, i.e. C ∩ gji = ji+1
for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and m + 1 = 0. See Figure 4 below for a wheel
component on three players.
1
2 3
Figure 4: A wheel on three agents
Corollary 2.3.2. A component of a strict Nash network is either a single-
ton or a wheel.
Proof. To avoid trivialities, consider a component C formed by at least 3
distinct agents, i, j and k. By the definition of a component and Corollary
2.3.1, any of the three agents has one path to any of the two others. Thence,
either (a) the path from i to j passes through k or (b) the path from i to
k passes through j. If (a) is true, then by Lemma 2.3.1 the path from j to
k passes through i. If (b) is true, then by Lemma 2.3.1 the path from k
to j passes through i. Iterating the process for all agents in C, the result
follows.
An immediate implication of Corollary 2.3.2 is that all connected strict
Nash networks are wheels that encompass the whole set of players. The
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next corollary gives a property on a relation between the components in
a disconnected strict Nash network. I use the relation R for comparing
the components of a network, where C R D is read as: "any player who
belongs to the component C has a path to any player in the component D".
In short, C has access to D. The next corollary provides a key property of
the partial order on the components in a strict Nash network.
Corollary 2.3.3. If g ∈ G is a strict Nash network and (1) g has two
components C and D such that C R D, then D is a singleton; (2) g has
three components C,D and E such that C R E and D R E, then either
C R D or D R C.
Proof. For statement 1, assume by contradiction that D is not a singleton.
Hence D is a wheel by Corollary 2.3.2. Take any i ∈ C, k ∈ D; and let
j ∈ D such that j ∈ gk. By Lemma 2.3.1, there is one path from i to k
in g; and one path from j to k in g. But note that neither ρj→k 6⊆ ρi→k
nor ρi→k 6⊆ ρj→k. Therefore g is not strict Nash by Lemma 2.3.1. For
statement 2, set i ∈ C, j ∈ D and k ∈ E. Again, if the conclusion is false,
then neither ρj→k 6⊆ ρi→k nor ρi→k 6⊆ ρj→k. Which contradicts that g is
strict Nash by Lemma 2.3.1.
In the next lemma, I further narrow down the set of disconnected archi-
tectures that qualify for strict Nash. The result complements the statement
in Corollary 2.3.2.
Lemma 2.3.2. If g ∈ G is a strict Nash network, then there is at most
one wheel component in g.
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For further details, see Appendix A.1. From Lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2,
we can identify another class of strict Nash candidates, that I will refer
to as disconnected flat architectures. Networks that belong to this class
have several components, none of them are comparable via R, and they
have at most one wheel component and the rest are isolated singletons. A
component C = i is an isolated singleton if i has no link adjacent to him,
i.e. gi = ∅ and i /∈ gj for all j ∈ N . (See agent 4 in Figure 5.) Note
that the wheel component in a disconnected flat architecture must count
at least three agents if it is strict Nash.5 The empty network of no links is
a special case of these architectures. The rest of the networks in this class
are nonempty, and I call them non-exhaustive wheels. Any non-exhaustive
wheel has one wheel component on nw agents, with 3 ≤ nw < n, and n−nw




Figure 5: A non-exhaustive wheel, with nw = 3 and one isolated singleton
The last lemma of this section complements Corollary 2.3.3, and high-
lights a key property of the partial order on the components in a strict
Nash network. In a network g, the greatest element of the partial order is
a component C such that C R D for all components D in g.
5If g has 1 wheel component on 2 players i and j, and the rest of the components are
isolated singletons, then i (or j) can profitably deviate by severing his link to j (i) and
adding a link towards any k 6= j (or any k 6= i). i’s expenditure stay constant, however
the latter improve his reach by one, and the other players’ reach remain unchanged. A
contradiction that g is strict Nash.
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Lemma 2.3.3. If g ∈ G is a strict Nash network and g has two components
C and D such that C R D, then the partial order on the components of g
has a greatest element. Furthermore, the greatest element is a wheel if g
has strictly less than n components.
Proof. The second statement follows directly from Corollary 2.3.3 state-
ment 1 and Corollary 2.3.2. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose g is
strict Nash. Let C and D be maximal and minimal elements of the partial
order on the components of g, respectively, and C R D. Assume further
that the partial order does not have a greatest element. Then there exists a
component E such that C and E are not comparable via R. By Corollary
2.3.3 statement 2, E and D are not comparable via R either. Let iC be any
agent in C, and let iE be any agent in E. As C is a maximal element, no
agent who has a path to iC in g has a path to iE, and the converse is true.
Assume that κiC (g) ≥ κiE(g). If further κiE(g) > 0, then iE has a profitable
deviation such that iE severs any one of his links and adds simultaneously
a link to iC . A similar argument holds for the case where κiC (g) < κiE(g)
(as C R D, note that κiC (g) > 0 always holds). If κiE(g) = 0, consider any
player j who has a link towards D. Note that as C R D, D is a singleton by
Corollary 2.3.3 statement 1. Thus player j has a payoff equivalent strategy
such that j severs his link to D and adds simultaneously a link towards iE.
A contradiction that g is strict Nash.
Lemma 2.3.3 reveals another class of disconnected strict Nash candidates:
the out-trees of components, or out-tree networks for short. An out-tree
network is a directed rooted-tree whose vertices are the components of the
network and whose edges, which each connects one component to another
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one, are oriented away from the root. The root of an out-tree network
is the greatest element of the partial order on the components. The root
of a strict Nash network is a singleton if the network has only singleton
components, or else it is a wheel. The rest of the vertices of the out-tree
are all singletons. Note that an out-tree network implies a hierarchical
ranking of the components. At the top of the hierarchy are the players in
the root, who can reach everybody in the network; belong to the second
layer of the out-tree the players who can reach anyone but those located
in the root, and this reasoning can be stretched down to the bottom layer
of the out-tree, which consists of players who cannot reach anyone. See







Figure 6: Two out-tree networks
Proposition 2.3.1. A network g ∈ G is strict Nash only if it has the
architecture of one of the below:
1. a wheel network gw (connected)
2. the empty network ge (disconnected, flat)
3. a non-exhaustive wheel gn.e.w (disconnected, flat)
There is one wheel component on nw agents, with 3 ≤ nw < n; the rest of
the components are all isolated singletons.
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4. an out-tree network (disconnected, hierarchical)
The root component is a wheel or a singleton, and the rest of the components
are all singletons. Each agent has a link adjacent to him, i.e. either gi 6= ∅
or gi = ∅ and there exists j ∈ N such that i ∈ gj.
In an out-tree network, any of the root members can reach anyone in the
network. Starting from the root and progressing down the tree, the larger
an agent’s reach, the fewer agents can reach him. Interactions between the
components in an out-tree network are exclusively unilateral: if agent i in
some component C can reach agent j in some other component D, then j
cannot reach i. While in all other architectures, interactions are exclusively
reciprocal: agent i can reach agent j if and only if j can reach i.
2.3.2 Existence of strict Nash networks
This section is devoted to proving the existence of strict Nash networks.
Let me consider the following assumption on the collective return.





with φ strictly increasing concave in all agents’ reaches.
Note that the function v associated with any function Φ that satisfies
Assumption A is both anonymous and increasing in the players’ strategies.
In what follows, I show that Assumption A rules out the out-tree networks
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from the set of strict Nash candidates.
Lemma 2.3.4. (1) If Φ is additive separable, then an out-tree of singletons
(i.e. the root is a singleton) is never strict Nash. (2) If further φ is concave,
then no out-tree network is strict Nash.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. For statement 1: Assume g is an
out-tree network, g is strict Nash, and the root component is a singleton,
i. Thus i is the greatest element of the partial order on the components
of g. If g is strict Nash, then any of i’s links is worth maintaining: c <
v(g)−v(g′i, g−i) ≤ φ(n−1)−φ(0), for g
′
i = gi\{j} for any j ∈ gi, and the last
inequality holds only if g′i = ∅. Let k be any minimal element of the partial
order on the components of g; hence gk = ∅. Consider g′k = i the deviation
of player k such that k forms a single link towards the root, i. Note that:
uk(g
′
k, g−k)−uk(g) = v(g
′
k, g−k)−v(g)− c ≥ φ(n−1)−φ(0)− c > 0. Hence
k has a strictly profitable deviation, a contradiction that g is strict Nash.
For statement 2: assume that the root of g is a wheel on nw agents. Let me
first define the height of component C has the length of the longest path
from C to a leaf, where a leaf is a minimal element of the partial order on
the components (i.e. any agent who does not have any link). Consider any
leaf k; and let j a player who has a link towards k. The link from j to k
allows anyone along the path from the most distant player in the wheel to
k to reach the latter. If g is strict Nash, the link is worth maintaining: for
g′j = gj \ {k},






The last inequality holds for the following reason. Because φ is concave,
the largest variation φ(κl) − φ(κl − 1) obtains for the lowest value of κl
which is hl, the height of agent l in the out-tree. The maximum number
of agents who access k in g is n − 1. (This is equivalent to assuming that
all singletons are along the path from the root to k.) The above inequality
can be re-written in a more compact way as:
c < nw[φ(n− 1)− φ(n− 2)] + φ(n− nw − 1)− φ(0) (∗)
Consider leaf k; by the definition of a leaf, gk = ∅. Let k deviate to
g′k = i, where i is any agent in the root. Then uk(g
′
k, g−k) − uk(g) ≥
φ(n− 1)− φ(0)− c. Note that:
uk(g
′
k, g−k)− uk(g) ≥[φ(n− 1)− φ(n− nw − 1)] + [φ(n− nw − 1)− φ(0)]− c
> [φ(n− 1)− φ(n− nw − 1)]− nw[φ(n− 1)− φ(n− 2)]
≥ 0
where the first strict inequality holds by (∗), and the last weak inequality
because φ is concave. Therefore g′k is strictly profitable; a contradiction
that g is strict Nash.
Next, I show that in the rest of the networks featured in Proposition 2.3.1,
there are deviations for the players that could never be best-responses to
the strategies of the others. The next lemma yields information about the
properties of these inferior deviations.
Lemma 2.3.5. Let g be a network whose architecture is that of a non-
exhaustive wheel. Under Assumption A, if g′i ∈ Gi is a deviation for player
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i such that:
|g′i| ≥ |gi| and g
′
i 6⊆ gi
then g′i is never a best-response, for any i ∈ N .
See Appendix A.2 for the proof. Note that Lemma 2.3.5 is trivially

















Figure 7: Type II deviations in a non-exhaustive wheel
important results in this lemma. The first one is that no deviation of type
I is weakly profitable for any player in a wheel or a non-exhaustive wheel.
If a player in a wheel component deviates to a strategy of type I such that
the latter redirects his link towards another agent in the wheel, then the
reach of only one agent stays constant, and all others’ strictly decreases.
As for the rest of the deviations of types I and II in the non-exhaustive
wheels, the intuition goes as follows. Suppose that any player in the wheel
component of a non-exhaustive wheel considers switching strategy to one
that has weakly more links (say x links, with 1 ≤ x ≤ n − 1). A best-
response can only be one of the following: to direct all x links towards
isolated singletons, like in the network on the left of Figure 7; or to direct
6Note that no player in a wheel network gains from adding links, as the reach of the
players cannot be further increased (the reach of any player is n − 1 in any connected
architecture); and no deviation of type I can be profitable, as such deviations disrupt
the components (hence the collective return from the network strictly declines).
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only x− 1 of them towards singletons, and maintain the link in the wheel
component, like in the network on the right side. The proof in Appendix
A.2 shows that, when φ is concave, the second deviation always yields a
larger payoff than the first one. The next lemma completes the analysis of
type II deviations.
Lemma 2.3.6. Let g be either the empty network or a non-exhaustive
wheel, and let gi be the strategy of any player i in g. Consider the set of
deviations for player i:
G+i = {g
′
i ∈ Gi : gi ⊂ g
′
i}






⇒ |ĝi| = |gi|+ 1
See Appendix A.3 for the proof. Gathering the results in Lemmas 2.3.5
and 2.3.6, it follows that the wheel, the non-exhaustive wheels and the
empty network are strict Nash if (i) the link that, if added in the network,
maximizes the increase in the collective return is not worth forming; and (ii)
the link that, if removed from the network, minimizes the decrease in the
collective return is worth maintaining. This allows me to find a parameter
range for c such that for any cost within this range, no agent can profitably
deviate towards a strategy of type II. These bounds are presented in the
next proposition.
Proposition 2.3.2. Let the payoffs be given by expression (1), with v given
by expression (4). A strict Nash network is either a wheel network, the
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empty network or a non-exhaustive wheel. In particular,
1. the wheel network gw is strict Nash if and only if:





2. the empty network ge is strict Nash if and only if:
c > φ(1)− φ(0) = ce
3. a non-exhaustive wheel network gn.e.w on nw agents is strict Nash
if and only if:
c ∈
(






= (cnw , cnw)
and this interval is never empty, for any 3 ≤ nw < n.
The bounds can be directly verified. The parameter range for c in state-
ment 3 is non-empty when φ is concave. All intervals of values in statement
3 are strictly included in the interval of values for which the wheel and the
empty network are both strict Nash. Meaning, if any non-exhaustive wheel
is strict Nash for some value c of the cost, then so are the wheel network
and the empty network. Note that each of the bounds in statement 3 is an
increasing function of nw, and that the length of the interval is increasing
in nw when φ is concave. Finally, the intervals of values for which the
non-exhaustive wheels on nw and nw + 1 agents are strict Nash overlap if
nw > 3. The results in Proposition 2.3.2 can be summarized as below. (The
superscripts and subscripts of the bounds cnw and c
nw give the number of
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agents in the wheel component of a non-exhaustive wheels: e.g., c3 is the
lower bound on the range of costs for which the non-exhaustive wheel on
nw = 3 agents is strict Nash.)
Corollary 2.3.4. Consider the parameter ranges of the cost c of a link in
Proposition 2.3.2. Assume for simplicity that c3 ≥ c4, i.e. φ(2) − φ(1) ≥
φ(4)−φ(2). (1) If c ≤ ce, then the wheel network is the unique strict Nash
equilibrium. (2) If c ∈ (ce, c3]∪ [cn−1, cw), then only the wheel network and
the empty network are strict Nash equilibria. (3) If c ∈ (c3, cn−1), then the
wheel network, any non-exhaustive and the empty network are strict Nash
equilibria. (4) If c ≥ cw, then the empty network is the unique strict Nash.
2.3.3 Discussion on the equilibrium concept
If I am less restrictive and use the concept of the Nash equilibrium, the
test that I should have run instead is the following: given a strategy profile
(g1, . . . , gn), is there a player i who could play an alternate strategy that
costs the same as gi and that weakly improves the reach of each agent,
and improves strictly the reach of at least one them? Or, is there a player
who could switch to a strategy that entails strictly fewer links and that
weakly improves the reach of each agent? If the test is positive, then it is
immediate that the strategy profile is never a Nash equilibrium; and if the






Figure 8: A Nash equilibrium candidate that is not strict Nash
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An example of a network that may be Nash but that is never strict Nash
is provided in Figure 8. Note that this network satisfies Corollary 2.3.1.
In particular, no player can deviate by forming strictly fewer links without
disrupting the component (which would therefore decrease the collective
return from the network). However, this architecture violates Corollary
2.3.2. Corollary 2.3.2 restricts the architecture of a component in a strict
Nash network to that of a wheel. In the network in Figure 8, player 3 is
indifferent between maintaining his link with agent 1 and replacing it by a
link directed towards either 4 or 5. These strategies are payoff-equivalent
for agent 3: they imply the same costs of link formation, as well as the
same collective return (regardless of whether 3 has a link towards 1, 4 or 5,
the resulting network is connected i.e. all agents have a reach equal to 4).
The refinement of strictness is very effective in my setting, for two rea-
sons. First, almost all network architectures are eliminated by considering
just a few deviations. The strict Nash concept also eases the highlight on
the out-trees and the non-exhaustive wheels, which raise richer questions
regarding the relation between the components in an equilibrium network.
Second, the strict Nash concept eliminates the architectures in which play-
ers have multiple best-responses to the others’. Such architectures are less
stable, as some agents may be tempted to switch to a payoff-equivalent
strategy.
Generally, any Nash equilibrium that forms a connected network exists
for some positive values of the cost of a link, i.e. c ≥ 0. Indeed, adding
links in any connected architecture is worthless, as the players’ reach can-
not be further increased. Consider the network in Figure 8 and a wheel
network on 5 agents. Suppose that the cost of a link is almost null, yet
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strictly positive. Note that if there exists a function v for which both ar-
chitectures can be supported in a Nash equilibrium for this cost, then the
wheel Pareto-dominates the architecture in Figure 8: players 2, 3, 4 and 5
get the same payoff in both networks, however agent 1’s payoff is strictly
larger in a wheel network.
2.4 Equilibrium selection and efficient networks
Recall that this game is an exact potential game, and that a network that
is a maximum of the potential for some value c of the cost is efficient for
a cost n times larger than c. Below, I characterize the argmax set the
potential function, for all values of c.
Proposition 2.4.1. Consider the expression of the potential function in
(2), with v given by expression (4). A maximum of the potential function
is either a wheel network or the empty network. (1) If c < φ(n− 1)−φ(0),
then the maximum of the potential is achieved in a wheel network. (2) If
c ≥ φ(n− 1)− φ(0), then the maximum of the potential is achieved in the
empty network.
See Appendix A.4 for the proof. An important result in Proposition 2.4.1
is that the non-exhaustive wheels never maximize the potential function.
Note that if the cost of link formation is below the threshold in Proposition
2.4.1 (and this threshold is lower than the upper bound cw on the range of
costs for which a wheel network is strict Nash), then the wheel network is
both strict Nash and maximum of the potential. Hence, any architecture
that can be supported in a strict Nash equilibrium for values of c less than
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the threshold in Proposition 2.4.1 and that is not a wheel network is sub-
optimal, in the sense that it is under-connected (the wheel network offers
a higher collective return per link than any other nonempty strict Nash
network). On the contrary, if the cost of link formation is strictly above
the threshold in Proposition 2.4.1, then the empty network is strict Nash
and it is the unique maximum of the potential function. Any nonempty
strict Nash network that exists for such values of the cost is sub-optimal,
in the sense that it is over-connected.
Corollary 2.4.1. Let the welfare function be given by expression (3), with
v given by expression (4). An efficient network is either a wheel network or
the empty network. (1) If c < n (φ(n− 1)− φ(0)), then the wheel network
is the unique efficient network. (2) If c > n (φ(n− 1)− φ(0)), then the
empty network is the unique efficient network.
Proof. Recall that the argmax set of W (g) for c′ = nc is the same as the
argmax set of P (g) for c.
The argmax set of the potential function refines the set of strict Nash
equilibria, and it sets aside all strict Nash networks in which some players
free ride (these players are the isolated singletons in the non-exhaustive
wheels). Yet, these architectures may be Pareto optima of the network
formation game. A non-exhaustive wheel never Pareto dominates a wheel
network, because any agent in a wheel component is always strictly better-
off in a wheel network than in a non-exhaustive wheel regardless of the
value of the cost. However, a wheel network may Pareto dominate a non-
exhaustive wheel, if an isolated singleton would rather pay for a link in a
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wheel network. Below, I propose to refine the set of strict Nash equilibria to
those that are Pareto optimal. Abusing language, I refer to a payoff domi-
nant network as a network that is associated with a strict Nash equilibrium
that Pareto dominates all other strict Nash equilibria.
Proposition 2.4.2. Consider the parameter ranges of the cost c of a link
in Proposition 2.3.2. (1) For any value of the cost c such that the wheel




both strict Nash, the wheel network Pareto dominates the non-exhaustive
wheel. (2) For any c ∈ (ce, cw), the empty network is strict Nash and it
is Pareto dominated. (3) There exists a parameter range for c and values
of nw between 3 and n − 1 such that a non-exhaustive wheel is both strict




(φ(n− 2)− φ(k)) ≥ n (φ(n− 1)− φ(n− 2))
Meaning, the largest payoff an isolated singleton can earn in a non-exhaustive
wheel is larger than the lowest payoff any agent can earn in a wheel network,
provided that both networks are strict Nash.
(4) If the above condition does not hold, then the wheel network is payoff
dominant whenever it is strict Nash, i.e. for any c < cw.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.5. The players’ incentive to free ride
on the others’ efforts in link formation may lead to coordination failures
in equilibrium: the wheel network is Pareto superior to the empty network
and to any non-exhaustive wheel that fails to encompass at least half of
the agents, provided that these networks are strict Nash. Also, note that
the maximum of the potential and the criterion of Pareto dominance refine
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the set of strict Nash networks differently: for costs in the range [φ(n −
1)− φ(0), c̄w), the empty network is a strict Nash equilibrium that is both
a potential maximizer and Pareto dominated.
2.5 When the distance matters
In many practical contexts, the distance between agents in a network plays
a role. Communicating with another person through many intermediaries
may cause delay or informational distortions. In this type of context, it
seems natural that a direct link from an agent to another one yields more
benefits than a lengthy path. Then how would the predictions change if the
benefits from communication decline with the distance? The remainder of
the paper offers a partial answer to this question.
2.5.1 Payoffs
In this section, I assume that there are frictions occurring during the com-
munication stage. Let me interpret a path as a communication channel
through which the first agent along the path talks to the last agent along
the path. Suppose that each time an agent relays a message, its informa-
tional content decays. I use the geodesic distance from an agent to another
one for measuring the worth of their interaction. The geodesic distance
from i to j in a network g is the number of links along the shortest path
from the former to the latter, and I denote this distance as d(i, j; g). If i
has a path to j in some network g and j 6= i, then 1 ≤ d(i, j; g) ≤ n− 1. If
53
i does not have a path to j, then I use the notation d(i, j; g) = ∞; and I
set d(i, i; g) = 0. In this version of the game, I suppose that the collective
return associated with a network is a function of its distance matrix. The
distance matrix is a n× n matrix, whose (i, j)th entry gives d(i, j; g), and
it is denoted as D(g) for some network g. Note that the reach of agent i
is given by the number of non-infinite entries on the ith row of D. The
collective return associated with some network g ∈ G is:
v(g) = Φ(D(g)),
and Φ is decreasing in each entry of the distance matrix. For some given
strategy profile g ∈ G, the payoff of any player i is written as:
ui(gi, g−i) = Φ(D(g))− c|gi|
The expression of the potential function is now:




In this version of the model, the closeness of the agents determines the
collective return.
2.5.2 Assumption
The aim of this section is to provide a criterion that allows to compare the
collective return in different networks. I first introduce a definition.
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Definition 2.5.1 The cumulative distance distribution Γ(g) of a network
g is a (1× (n+1)) vector, whose jth entry γj gives the number of distances
less than or equal to j − 1 in g divided by n2, for any 0 ≤ j ≤ n. The last
entry γn+1 is always equal to 1. The nth entry γn provides information on
the number of finite distances in g; and γn+1 − γn provides information on
the number of infinite distances in g.
Definition 2.5.2 For any two networks g, g′ ∈ G, g′ dominates g if the
cumulative distribution Γ(g) of distances in g first order stochastically dom-
inates the cumulative distribution Γ(g′) of distances in g′.
Note that if some network g′ dominates some other network g then, on
average, an individual is closer to the rest of the group in g′ than in g. The
next assumption is based on Definition 2.5.2, and it offers a criterion for
comparing the collective return in several networks.
Assumption B: If g′ dominates g, then v(g′) ≥ v(g).
Network architectures that bring the agents closer to each other yield larger
collective benefits. Assumption B implies that v is anonymous.









Figure 9: The network g on the left dominates the network g′ on the right
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According to Assumption B, we have that v(g) ≥ v(g′).
2.5.3 Analytical results
In this version of the game where frictions occur in the communication
stage, characterizing the strict Nash equilibria of the game is more diffi-
cult. The objective of the rest of the chapter is to give insight on how the
equilibrium predictions change when distances matter.
To this end, I change the equilibrium concept to the maximum of the
potential, for the expression of the potential function in (5). I refer to an
equilibrium network as a network that maximizes the potential function,
given a value c of the cost of a link. Recall that this game admits the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (because this game is a
potential game), and that a strategy profile that maximizes the potential
function is a Nash equilibrium. The analytical analysis of the argmax set
of the potential function is limited. I am only able to characterize a rela-
tion between the components in a disconnected equilibrium network. This
makes the object of the next proposition.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let the potential function be given by expression (5),
and assume that v satisfies Assumption B. If g ∈ G is an equilibrium
network, then there is at most one component C in g such that |C| > 1
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(i.e., C is not a singleton).
A formal proof can be found in Appendix A.6; the intuition goes as fol-
lows. Assume that a network g has two components that are not singletons.
1









Figure 10: Inefficient architecture with several components
Let the components be merged as follows: some player i in one of the two
components takes on the links of any player j in the other component,
and maintains those he already has in g. Player j severs all of his links.
Next, all players who have links towards j in g redirect them towards i.
The rest of the links in g stay intact. The operation has merged the two
components, except for j who is left with no links. Note that the resulting
network has weakly fewer links than g.7 See Figure 10: agent 3 takes on the
links of agent 5 in addition to the ones he has in g, and the agents who have
links towards 5 switch by connecting to 3 instead. Take players 3 and 5:
aggregating the distances from these two agents, we obtain the same thing
in both networks.8 The distances between agents 4, 6 and 7 do not change;
and the distances from them to 5 in g are equal to the distances from them
to 3 in g′. In g′, our three agents have access to agents 1 and 2. And agents
7The total number of links stays constant only if |gi|+ |gj | = |gi∪gj | i.e. gi∩gj = ∅,
and strictly decreases otherwise.
8Between the two of them, and in both networks g and g′ there are: 2 distances equal
to 0, 3 distances equal to 1, 2 distances equal 2; no distance equal to 3, 4, 5 or 6; and 7
distances equal to ∞.
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1 and 2 gain access to agents 4, 6 and 7. Aggregating the distances in both
networks, the network g′ dominates the network g. Therefore, g is never a
maximum of the potential. In this example, note that the two components
of g are not comparable via R. A similar argument holds when they are.
The second analytical result is related to the diameter of the equilib-
rium candidates that have many links. The diameter of a network g is the
longest geodesic distance in g.
Proposition 2.5.2. Let the potential function be given by expression (5),
and suppose that v satisfies Assumption B. If a strategy profile g = (g1, . . . , gn)
maximizes the potential function, and if further
∑
i∈N |gi| ≥ 2(n− 1), then
the diameter of the network g is at most equal to 2.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume g maximizes the potential
function, g has a number of links x such that 2(n − 1) ≤ x ≤ n(n − 1)
however the diameter of g is strictly larger than 2. Consider some network
g′ that has the same number x of links, and g′ has a subgraph that is a
star on all agents. See Figure 11: in a star, there is one central agent who
forms links towards all other agents; and any other agent than the center
has one link towards the center. Since such subgraph necessitates 2(n− 1)
links and x ≥ 2(n − 1), g′ exists. In g′, there are n distances equal to 0,
x distances equal to 1 and n(n − 1) − x distances equal to 2. But then g′
dominates g. As g and g′ have the same number of links, it follows that g
is not a maximum of the potential. A contradiction.
When the cost c of a connection is fairly low, an equilibrium network may
have many links. If the number of links is larger than 2(n − 1), then it is
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always possible to form an architecture whose diameter is less than 2. For
example, any network that has a subgraph which is a star on all n agents
satisfies this restriction on the diameter. In a star, there is one central
agent who forms links towards all others, and any agent who is not the
center has a link towards the central agent. A star network is represented




Figure 11: A star network
For low values of the cost, the set of equilibrium networks is restricted
to the architectures that have a certain diameter (by Proposition 2.5.2).
Consider relatively larger values of the cost c. Which architecture should
we expect a component of an equilibrium network to have? First, the ar-
chitecture of a wheel network may no longer be optimal for some values
of the cost, and adding links may be worthwhile for the sake of cutting
distances. Let me consider the group of n = 6 agents in Figure 12. Assume
that we are in an environment where communication is frictionless, and
that our agents have formed a wheel network. Suddenly, the benefits from
interactions slightly decay with the distance, and agent 1 forms an addi-
tional link towards agent 4. This gives the network g1. The architecture of
g1 does not enable the group to make the most out of the extra link from
agent 1 to agent 4. To see why, let agent 3 redirect his link towards agent
1; this gives the network g2. Agents 1, 4, 5 and 6 are not affected by the
change operated by agent 3, however the latter is now strictly closer to his
peers. Although the distances from agent 2 change, the average distance
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from this agent stays constant. Aggregating the distances, g2 dominates






















Figure 12: Starting from a wheel network, and adding links
By naively adding links into a wheel component, I just showed that the
resulting architectures are not stable because some players, like agent 3 in
the network g1 in Figure 12, have a strictly profitable deviation. However,
this is not possible in an equilibrium network, as a maximum of the poten-
tial is a Nash equilibrium of the game. The deviation that I just highlighted
leads to centralize communication around one central agent, like agent 1 in
the networks in Figure 12.
In the remainder, I characterize the architectures that belong to the
argmax set of the potential function, for fixed values of the cost c of a link
and for a small number n of agents. The results seem to validate the in-
tuition just presented: for a fixed value of the cost c, equilibrium networks
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all have a central agent, and they exhibit the same patterns of links as in
the networks g2 and g4 in Figure 12.
2.5.4 Results on the architectures of the equilibrium
candidates
By Assumption B, a network g∗ that has x links in total is an equilibrium
candidate only if no other network with the same number of links produces
a larger collective return. My objective is to provide a characterization of
the architectures of equilibrium candidates for this version of the game.
First, let me consider the following set:
Gn,x =
{





Given a number n of agents, this is the set of all networks in G that have
x links, with 0 ≤ x ≤ n(n− 1). Next, let me define the following subset of
Gn,x :
G∗n,x = {(g1, . . . , gn) = g ∈ Gn,x : ∄g
′ ∈ Gn,x s.t. g
′ dominates g}
Given a number n of agents, I refer to G∗n,x as the set of equilibrium can-
didates with x links. Note that:
(g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n) = g
∗ ∈ argmaxg∈G P (g) and
∑
i∈N









is a superset that contains all of the equilibrium networks of the game.
This section is devoted to characterizing the architectures of the equi-
librium candidates, and to identifying their key properties. Equilibrium
networks that have many links (i.e. more than 2(n− 1), so that there are
enough links to form a star on all agents) do not have any architectural
particularities except for their diameter. For this reason, I do not seek to
characterize them. Instead, I focus on the equilibrium networks that have
weakly less than 2(n− 1) links. In particular, I make explicit the elements
of the set G∗ for small numbers n of agents.
The results featured below are obtained through a computer assisted
proof. For n = 5, 6, I solve for the architectures in the sets G∗n,x, and I vary
the number x of links from 0 to 2(n− 1).9 Before introducing my results,
let me first give an informal definition of a flower network. (For a formal
definition, see Appendix A.7.) A flower network has one central agent,
and the rest forms wheels (that I will call petals) of roughly the same size
around the central agent. To be precise, either all petals have the same
number of agents or else the maximum difference is one. In Figure 12, the
networks g2 and g4 are flowers with 2 and 3 petals, respectively. The wheel
network and the star network are special cases of flower architectures (with
one petal and n− 1 petals, respectively).
Proposition 2.5.3. (1) If the network g ∈ G is an equilibrium network,
then there are at least 3 links in g. (2) For n ∈ {5, 6}, if the network g ∈ G
is an equilibrium network and g has x links in total, with 3 ≤ x ≤ 2(n−1),
then g has one component that has the architecture of a flower, and the rest
of the components (if any) are all singletons.
9For n = 3, 4, all equilibrium candidates with x links, for n ≤ x ≤ 2(n − 1) are
connected flowers. The analysis for n = 5, 6 players is richer in terms of results.
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For statement 1, the proof is the same as that given in Appendix A.4 (see
Claim 1). The proof of statement 2 is computer assisted (the software I use
is R), and the code is provided in Appendix A.8. In words, my approach is
first to fix a pair (n, x) for the number of agents and links in a network. For
this pair, I generate the set Gn,x of all networks on n agents with x links.
Then, I look for the networks in Gn,x that are not dominated by any other
network in Gn,x. These networks constitute the elements of the set G∗n,x of
equilibrium candidates that have x links. I repeat the same procedure for
all pairs (n, x) that I consider. See the figures below for the architectures
in the set G∗, for n ∈ {5, 6} and a number of links larger than n. In blue,
the flower component of each architecture.
The results suggest the following. First, that the optimal architecture
for a component is that of a flower. Flowers trade-off the higher costs
of more links (as compared to the wheel network) against the benefits of
shorter distances. Second, an equilibrium network may be disconnected,
although it has more than n links. Fixing the total number of links in
a network, there seems to be a trade-off between maximizing the agents’
reach and minimizing distances: in a connected flower, the reach of the
agents is maximized; in a disconnected flower, the agents who can reach
each other are relatively closer than in a connected flower that has the
same number of links. This shows at the level of the tails of the distance
distributions of the equilibrium candidates that have the same number of
links. Typically, in any set G∗n,x, disconnected equilibrium candidates have
distance distributions that put more weight on short distances and have
shorter tails than the distance distribution of the connected equilibrium
candidate. Third, the occurrence of disconnected architectures in a set G∗n,x
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increases as n gets larger. When the number of agents rises, it becomes
less likely that incorporating all the agents in one component is efficient.
In some disconnected equilibrium candidates, the singletons are linked to
the flower component via the central agent. A link to (or from) the central
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Figure 15: Architecture in G∗5,7
2.6 Conclusion
I presented a static non-cooperative game of network formation where the
network is assumed to generate non-excludable benefits. The network helps
connect a set of agents who use the network as a communication platform
prior to taking a collective action. The outcome of the collective action is





























































































































































































Figure 19: Architectures in G∗6,9
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the network structure. A network structure results from each individual’s
contribution in link formation, and an agent’s decision is shaped by the
trade-off between the social benefits of his links and the private cost he
incurs for forming them. This network formation game has the property of
being a potential game.
I studied two versions of the model. First, I assume that the return
from the collective action is increasing in all players’ reach in the network;
meaning, on the total number of agents with whom each player talks. This
implies that the benefit from an interaction of an agent with another one
does not depend on the properties of the path they use for communicating,
i.e. communication is frictionless. When communication is frictionless, the
social benefit from a link is measured by the number of agents across the
network that the link helps connect. In an alternative version, I assume
that the shortest distance, i.e. the length of the communication channel an
agent uses to talk to another one, affects the worth of an interaction. In
particular, indirect (distant) connections are supposed to contribute less to
the success of the collective action than direct ones. The social benefit of
a link in this case is measured by the number of shortest paths that pass
by the link, and longer paths account for less.
The objectives were to characterize the set of equilibrium networks and
to compare them with the efficient architectures of the game. For the first
version of the model, where communication is frictionless, I characterize the
set of strict Nash equilibria of the game. The corresponding equilibrium
networks have simple architectures: they are wheels that may or may not
include all agents. Among these equilibrium networks, only the wheel on
all agents and the empty network have an efficient architecture. In these
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structures, no player free rides on the others’ contributions in links: either
all contribute or none. For the second version of the game, where I assume
that frictions occur along a path, I study the maximum of the potential.
A maximum of the potential has the property of being a Nash equilibrium
of the network formation game, and I show that the potential function is
always maximized in a network that has an efficient architecture. I find
that the networks that have a flower subgraph all qualify as equilibrium
candidates (this is proved for a limited number of players). In a flower, the
higher costs of link formation are balanced against the benefits of shorter
distances, which is made possible by centralizing connections around one
single agent who mediates most of the communications in the network.
In this game where the network is a public good, I assumed that all
agents are homogeneous with respect to their valuation of the public good
and their private costs for forming links. A possible extension of this game








In the negotiations on drug prices between a pharmaceutical firm and in-
stitutional payers (countries), secret rebates conceal the price each country
effectively pays the manufacturer. For the case of a medicine listed for
reimbursement in a country, the price the country pays corresponds to the
list price of the drug (i.e. the official price at which it is listed for reim-
bursement, and this price is publicly observable), minus the secret rebate,
which is money that the manufacturer gives back to the payer, and whose
amount is kept confidential. During a negotiation are therefore determined
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two prices, the list price and a secret rebate. The use of a secret rebate
makes the price each country pays confidential, in the sense that it is known
to no one but the parties who negotiate it. The list price of a drug seems
to be a poor indicator of the real price paid: estimations of the values of
rebates range from 40% to 70% for specialty pharmaceuticals, and from
10% to 50% for primary care drugs across North America, Europe, and
Australasia according to the figures of Morgan et al. (2017, [60]).
From the supplier’s perspective, the use of secret rebates can be easily
rationalized. Given that countries negotiate deals in turn, and that many
of them apply international price referencing (IPR) (i.e. payers base their
price offers to the manufacturer on the list prices of equivalent medicines in
other countries), secret rebates makes it possible to isolate each negotiation
from the others, and to avoid a low rebated price to propagate in subsequent
negotiations.1 Another source of price interdependencies between countries
which also rationalizes the benefits of secret rebates to suppliers is the par-
allel import of medicines between countries in a same economic community,
like in the EU. This involves importing a product into one member state
from another, transacted at the list price in the exporting country.2 In the
related empirical literature, Danzon (1997, [20]) finds evidence of a strate-
gic use of secret rebates, with confidential contracts including a rebate off
a common list price replacing contracts with differential list prices and no
rebate in most European countries.
From a country’s perspective, the benefits of secret rebates seem miti-
gated. The main appeals are budgetary: rebates help in achieving financial
1See Vogler et al. (2018, [69]) and Towse et al. (2015, [67]).
2The possibility of parallel imports benefits countries, because it allows to arbitrage
away differences in list prices.
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goals and managing health budgets (see Scherer 1997, [63], Morgan et al.
2017, [60]). According to a recent work of Espin et al. (2018, [31]), rebates
accorded to the countries in the EU5 have enabled to cap the growth of
pharmaceutical expenditures to 2% over the past years. Yet, rebates are
generally resource intensive to implement, especially for complicated rebate
contracts; and they cause inefficiencies in terms of accessibility, as what in-
dividuals pay out of their pocket is a function of the list (unrebated) price
(see Morgan et al. 2013, [59]).
This chapter focuses primarily on rationalizing the use of secret rebates
from a country’s perspective, and on characterizing conditions under which
a country benefits from negotiating a secret rebate. To this end, we seek
to understand the relation between the value of a list price and that of its
associated rebate; and how these levels affect the demand and the health
insurance policies in a country. As far as we know, no theoretical model
has yet studied these relations. We offer a model where a monopolist firm
has the opportunity to sell its drug to two countries. A key feature of our
model is that we assume that a country and the firm agree on a contract
that is both Pareto optimal and individually rational for them. A trade
is settled through a contract that features two prices. The first one is the
list price, which is public information; the second price is a secret rebate,
known only to the parties who negotiate it. The countries are assumed to
be welfare maximizers, and they balance the benefits from the availabil-
ity of the drug on their respective market and the costs tied to acquiring
it. Once the first negotiation is over, the list price in the first country is
made public, and the second country starts its negotiation with the firm.
The only assumption we make about this second country is that it applies
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a simple form of IPR: it never accepts to pay more than the list price it
observes in the first country. As we consider that the firm is farsighted,
the latter anticipates that the list price in the first country will affect the
transaction price with the second one.
To understand how the outcome of price negotiations affects social in-
surance policies, we suppose that the first country to negotiate sets up
a reimbursement scheme for the drug. The social insurance is funded by
contributions levied on all citizens, and it reimburses a fixed share of the
list price to the patients who can afford the drug. The reimbursement rate
is fixed, however the social security charges are determined endogenously
based on the deal with the manufacturer. This choice of ours is inspired
by the French procedure through which the social coverage of medicines
is determined. In France, the reimbursement rate is chosen by the Union
des Caisses de l’Assurance Maladie (UCAM), which is composed of health
professionals. Their choice is based on the therapeutic value added of the
drug compared to already existing treatments within the same therapeutic
class, the severity of the concerned disease and the degree of undesirable
effects. The price of the product however does not appear to be a key
determinant of the reimbursement rate. Economic and financial consid-
erations (like the price, the finance scheme) are taken care of by another
institution, in France called the Comité Économique des Produits de Santé
(CEPS), after that the therapeutic benefit of the drug has been assessed
by the UCAM.
We seek to determine the optimal level of social contributions put in
place by the first country, and to characterize the set of Pareto optimal
and individually rational (PO-IR) contracts between this country and the
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firm. We find that the first country always redistributes the money of the
rebate towards lowering social charges, as this allows a maximum of pa-
tients to get access to the drug. Also, when social contributions are set to
their optimal level, the first country has preference towards low list prices
and low rebates for a fixed rebated price. These preferences are rationalized
by the deadweight loss associated with a contract that has a secret rebate:
the social security fund returns the money of the rebate to all citizens, even
to those who do not need the drug, which is less efficient than an analogous
decrease in the list price, which targets specifically the sick population. We
identify the relative market sizes in the two countries as a key determinant
of the outcome of the negotiation between the firm and the first country.
If the market size in the second country is sufficiently small, the firm and
the first country may find common ground on not using a secret rebate. In
this instance, the firm prefers to sell more in the first country, even if this
entails a low list price to propagate in the second negotiation. If, on the
other hand, the second country represents a large and profitable market,
then no deal is ever worth sealing with the first country from the firm’s
perspective. We conclude that the use of rebates in the first negotiation
is conditional on the two countries being more or less balanced in terms
of market sizes. If this condition is satisfied, the PO-IR contracts between
the firm and the first country all include a strictly positive rebate; specif-
ically, larger rebates are associated with larger list (unrebated) prices and
lower rebated prices. This result suggests that rebates are used as currency
between the first country and the firm. We reach the conclusion that the
deal that maximizes the country’s payoff is that with the largest rebate,
because this deal is associated with the largest quantity traded and the
73
lowest rebated price.
The work that is the most related to ours is that by Jelovac (2002, [49]).
Jelovac studies the relation between the patients’ co-payment for buying
drugs and the list price of a patented pharmaceutical.3 The author finds
that countries which offer good social coverage have more bargaining power
in their negotiation, and are able to obtain a lower list price from the manu-
facturer. Our paper contributes to this literature by giving a global insight
onto the dynamics between health budget related decisions and the levels
of both list prices and secret rebates: higher list prices and rebates are
associated with lower social contributions. This relation is rationalized by
the fact that contracts that feature higher list prices and rebates also cor-
respond to lower rebated prices; hence, the social security needs levy less
social charges. An interesting result is that overall, contracts with larger
list prices are associated with a greater quantity demanded (i.e., the mass
of individuals who can afford the treatment increases), which suggests that
the country succeeds in turning off the negative effect on the demand from
a larger list price with a lowering of social contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
model. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 feature our results about the PO-IR contracts
between the first country and the firm. Section 3.5 concludes.
3A co-payment is a fixed amount that a healthcare beneficiary pays for medical
expenditures covered by his or her health insurance plan. The remaining balance is paid
by the insurance company.
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3.2 Model
In this section, we present the model as well as the payoff functions of
the countries and the firm. We set clear the assumptions we use, and we
describe the social security system in the first country.
3.2.1 Set-up
Two countries, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, seek to purchase a drug sold by a
monopolist pharmaceutical firm, F . The two countries negotiate in turn.
We shall draw the attention of the reader on the fact that we do not assume
anything about how the countries negotiate with the firm, except that they
will choose a contract that is Pareto optimal and individually rational for
both of them, i.e. for country i and the firm. A successful negotiation
between country i ∈ {1, 2} and the firm results in a contract (pi, ri). The
contract specifies the list price pi of the drug in country i, which is pub-
licly observable. The contract may also include a unitary rebate ri, which
is money the firm pays back to the country on each unit purchased. The
amount of the rebate is only known to the parties which negotiate it, coun-
try i and F . We call the net price the rebated price paid by country i to
the manufacturer. It is equal to pi− ri, and we denote it by yi. We further
assume that the firm is farsighted: it anticipates that the outcome of the
first negotiation impacts the price at which it can sell its product in the
second country. We suppose that the firm initiates an offer a secret rebate
only for avoiding that a low net price propagates across markets. Thence,
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r2 = 0. From now on, we denote by r the secret rebate that country 1
obtains.
Given that the two countries negotiate sequentially with the firm, coun-
try 2, prior to sit at the negotiation table, knows the list price p1 of the
drug in country 1. However, the former does not know the secret rebate the
latter got. In the following assumption, we restrict country 2’s behavior
during its negotiation with the firm. We do not seek to rationalize this
behavior.
Assumption A
While negotiating with the firm, country 2 uses international price refer-
encing (IPR): it never accepts to pay a price greater than the list price in
country 1, i.e. p2 ≤ p1.
Assumption A can be understood as country 2’s participation constraint
in its negotiation with the firm.
3.2.2 Payoffs
Country 1
Country 1 has a population size normalized to 1, and a proportion α of
agents who would benefit from getting access to the drug. Every sick
agent is associated with a marginal disutility of one. This unit can be
recovered if the individual gets treated. We assume that individual
wealth ω is distributed according to some cumulative distribution
F on the support [0, 1]. Furthermore, we suppose that the country
sets up a social insurance plan for reimbursing the drug. The social
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security levies a contribution τ(p1, r) on all citizens. Its amount is
chosen endogenously by the country after that it knows its contract
with the firm. The social insurance reimburses some fixed share 1−
γ ∈ (0, 1] of the list price to a sick individual who can afford the drug.
We assume that all citizens can afford the contribution τ , however
not all can afford the payment of γp1 after reimbursement.4 If the
country has a deal with rebate, the total rebate (the unitary rebate
times the quantity traded) goes directly into the funds of the social
security. The demand function of the country is:
q1(p1, r) = α [1− F (τ(p1, r) + γp1)] ,
which is the share of the sick population who can afford the treatment.
The quantity demanded is decreasing in the share of the list price the
patient must pay, and it is increasing in the size of the sick population.
Holding the private contribution constant, the demand is decreasing
in the list price ( dq1
dp1
≤ 0); and for a fixed list price, the quantity
demanded is decreasing in the private contribution. Aggregating the
utilities of all citizens, the welfare in country 1 for a given contract
(p1, r) is:
W (p1, r) = q1(p1, r) (1− γp1)− τ(p1, r)− α.
4Meaning, the country rises τ of social contributions in total. All agents whose wealth
is greater than τ can afford the private contribution, which amounts to τ(1− τ). As for
the remaining τ2 that cannot be levied on those whose wealth is less than τ , we suppose
that the country levies it on healthy individuals who do not need to purchase the drug.
In other words, we assume the existence of a redistributive tax scheme that we do not
model here. Note that this redistributive scheme does not have any incidence on the
quantity demanded.
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This is the sum of all agents’ utilities: every sick and treated indi-
vidual has a utility of −γp1 − τ(p1, r); that of a sick and untreated
individual is −1 − τ(p1, r); and the rest has utility −τ(p1, r). Note
that the quantity demanded is strictly positive if and only if p1 < 1γ .
At last, we assume the following.
Assumption B
The social security fund cannot run a deficit:
B(p1, r) = τ(p1, r)− q1(p1, r) [(1− γ)p1 − r] ≥ 0 (6)
for any contract (p1, r).
The first term in the expression of the budget constraint gives the
total revenue from social contributions, and the last term is the net
reimbursement cost on the social security. Country 1’s payoff is de-
noted by v1, and equals the sum of the welfare and the balance of the
social security fund:
v1(p1, r) = W (p1, r) + B(p1, r)
If the negotiation with the firm is successful, the payoff corresponds
to the following expression:
v1(p1, r) = q1(p1, r)[1− (p1 − r)]− α (7)
The product of the two first terms is the net social gain from the
treated agents, and the last term is the social disutility from the




No sick agent gets the treatment, and no insurance mechanism is set
up. A first observation is that the country never accepts a contract
that has a net price greater than the social marginal gain of treating
an individual, i.e. y1 ≤ 1 must hold if the contract is individually
rational for the country.
Country 2
We do not specify anything particular for this country. Recall that
country 2 never obtains a rebate, and that it uses IPR. We do not
model the negotiation between country 2 and the firm. We simplify
the outcome of this negotiation along the lines described in the as-
sumption stated below.
Assumption C







where pM2 denotes the monopoly price in country 2.
The firm
We assume that the cost of producing the drug is null and that R&D
costs are sunk. The firm can earn a profit on each market. For
simplicity, let us write the firm’s payoff on the second market as:
θπ2(p̄2)
79
where p̄2 = min{p1, pM2 } is the maximum price the firm can charge
country 2, and θ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that gauges the firm’s negoti-
ating power in its second negotiation.5 Furthermore, we assume that
the profit function π2 is concave in the price. If trade happens with
the first country, then the firm’s total profit is written as:
π(p1, r, p2) = q1(p1, r)(p1 − r) + θπ2(p̄2)
Note that the last term is the firm’s profit on the second market,
and it is always weakly less than the monopoly profit in country 2,
that we denote by πM2 throughout. If no trade happens with the first
country, the firm’s total profit is simply:
π = θπM2
The firm makes no profit in country 1, and it earns a share of its monopoly
profit in the second country.
3.2.3 Timing
We present the timing. First, country 1 and the firm negotiate their con-
tract. If the negotiation succeeds, country 1 determines the level of the
private contribution τ(p1, r). If the negotiation fails, country 1 does not
get the drug and does not set up an insurance plan. At last, country 2
negotiates with the firm. If the first negotiation with country 1 succeeded,
then country 2 only accepts list prices lower than p1. If country 1 and the
5The parameter θ can be understood as a measure of the market size in country 2.
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firm could not reach an agreement, the list price in country 2 is less than
or equal to the monopoly price, pM2 .
3.3 Pareto optimal and Individually rational
contracts
We solve using backward induction. We first present country 1’s optimal
choice of private contribution for a given contract. Then, we characterize
the contracts that are both Pareto-optimal and individually rational for the
first country and the firm. Abusing language, we refer to these contracts
as PO-IR.
3.3.1 The optimal contribution
Consider some contract (p1, r) country 1 and the firm agreed on. Notice
that maximizing the country’s payoff in (7) is equivalent to minimizing the
private contribution τ . Yet, the social security fund is budget-constrained.
Therefore, the optimal contribution saturates the budget constraint in (6).
Its expression is:
τ ∗(p1, r) = α [(1− γ)p1 − r] [1− F (τ
∗(p1, r) + γp1)]
Note that the optimal contribution is negative (i.e., the country subsidizes
the drug) when the marginal reimbursement cost on the social security,
(1 − γ)p1, is less than the rebate, r. For a fixed list price, an increase
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in the rebate always leads to a decrease in the private contribution. This
further causes an increase in the quantity demanded. For a fixed rebate,
an increase in the list price has an ambiguous effect on the private contri-
bution. Two forces are at play. First, the net cost of treating a sick person
on the social security increases. Second, the rise in the list price impacts
negatively the quantity demanded by the sick population. Therefore, the
marginal reimbursement cost rises, however fewer individuals need a reim-
bursement. Depending on which effect dominates the other, the optimal
contribution may either increase or decrease.
What is certain is that the welfare of the country is larger with social
security than without.6 For a given list price, more agents get treated with
than without social security.
Remark 3.3.1. When private contributions are set at their optimal level,
country 1 is better-off with than without social security, for any net price
less than 1.
Proof. Recall that the country never accepts a contract that has a net price
greater than 1, irrespective of whether the country offers social insurance
or not. If the country does not offer social insurance, its payoff is given by:
v1(y) = α[1− F (y)](1− y)− α.
6In our model, as it is the case for countries like France, subscription to social insur-
ance is compulsory. We find that if the individuals were given the choice to enroll or
not, they would all choose to subscribe to the social insurance scheme, i.e. pay τ and
receive an expected reimbursement of αγp1.
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With social security, the country’s payoff is:
v1(p1, r) = α [1− F (τ
∗(p1, r) + γp1)] (1− y)− α
Therefore the statement in the remark is true only if τ ∗(p1, r) ≤ y − γp1
i.e., more sick individuals can afford the treatment with than without so-
cial security. Let us set y = p1 − r. The last inequality is re-arranged
as τ ∗(p1, r) ≤ (1 − γ)p1 − r. This always holds given that the quantity
demanded is less than 1 in the expression of the optimal contribution.
In the remainder, we set F to be the uniform distribution. The quantity
demanded is:
q1(τ









1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1
if p1 ≤ 1γ
0 if p1 > 1γ
(8)
which is always less than α. The numerator and the denominator of this
expression are positive. The demand is increasing in α and decreasing in
the share γ of the list price patients pay. Holding the list price constant,
the quantity demanded is increasing in the rebate and decreasing in the
net price; holding the rebate constant, the quantity is decreasing in the list
price. The optimal contribution can be written as:
τ ∗(p1, r) =
α [(1− γ)p1 − r] (1− γp1)
1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1
, (9)
When social contributions are at their optimal level, the country’s payoff
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is given by the following expression:
v∗(p1, r) =
α(1− γp1)
1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1
[1− (p1 − r)]− α. (10)
Holding the rebate constant, the payoff is decreasing in the list price; and
holding the list price constant, the payoff is increasing in the rebate, hence
decreasing in the net price.
For a fixed net price, the country has preference towards a low list price
and a low rebate. In fact, there exists a deadweight loss associated with a
contract that has a strictly positive rebate: the country returns the money
of the rebate to all individuals (even to those who do not need the drug),
which is less effective than an equivalent reduction in the list price. In other
words, for any two contracts that feature a same net price, the quantity
traded is always larger for the contract that has the lowest list price, thus
the smallest rebate.
We now study the firm’s profit. If the first negotiation is successful, the












1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1







1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1
(p1 − r) + θπ
M







For a fixed rebate, the firm’s profit is concave in the list price; and for a
fixed list price, the firm’s profit is increasing in the net price and decreasing
in the rebate.7 Also, the profit is increasing in α and decreasing in γ.
7To recover the result about the concavity of π∗ in p1, note that the sign of the second
derivative of the profit with respect to p1 is that of −γ (1 + α(1− γ)p1 − αr) (1−αγr)−





3.3.2 List price and rebate
The firm and country 1 must both gain from trading. In order to gauge
these gains, we shall first clearly describe the parties’ disagreement payoffs.
For the country, failure to reach an agreement implies that the drug is not
accessible. The country’s payoff is then −α. If the firm does not trade with
the first country, it does not make any profit on the first market and earns
some share of its monopoly profit in the second one. The disagreement
payoffs are then (−α, θπM2 ). Below, we provide a formal definition of a
PO-IR contract for both country 1 and the firm.
Definition 3.3.1 A contract between the firm and country 1 is PO-IR if
each party earns at least its disagreement payoff (individual rationality),
and there is no other contract that gives both parties a higher payoff (Pareto
optimality).
A party agrees on a contract only if it satisfies its participation constraint.
We make them explicit below.
Participation constraints
1. Country 1 has two participation constraints:
γp1 ≤ 1 and y1 ≤ 1 (12)
i.e., the marginal cost on an individual, γp1, and the maginal cost
on society, which is the net price y1, must be both lower than the
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marginal benefit from treating an individual, 1.
2. The firm’s participation constraint is:
r ≤ min
{
p1 , p1 −
θ[πM2 − π2(p1)](1− αγp1)
α[1− γp1 − θ(πM2 − π2(p1))]
}
(13)
i.e., the profit on the first market is positive, and this profit compen-
sates the loss of profit on the second market when p1 < p
M
2 .
Proof. For the country: the quantity purchased must be positive, which
is ensured by p1 ≤ 1γ ; and given this, v
∗
1 is larger than −α if and only if
y1 ≤ 1. For the firm, we show that the net price must be positive. By
contradiction, suppose that country 1 and the firm signed a contract with
y1 < 0. But then the firm’s profit is always less than its disagreement
payoff. The second expression is obtained by rearranging π∗(p1, r) ≥ θπM2
for the case where p1 < pM2 .
The indifference curve of country 1, expressed as the rebate in function
of the list price, is of equation:
r =
(v̄ + α)[1 + α(1− γ)p1]− α(1− γp1)(1− p1)
α[1− γp1 + (v̄ + α)]
, (14)
where v̄ ∈ [−α, 0] is a level of payoff for country 1. Note that when the
country’s participation constraint on the list price is satisfied, the denomi-
nator is positive. In the best scenario from the country’s perspective, and
given the firm’s participation constraint, all patients get access to the drug
and the net price is null. The above expression for the indifference curve is
increasing convex in the list price p1. See Appendix B.1 for the proof. Note
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that the country’s payoff increases for north-west shifts of its indifference
curve.8 The marginal rate of substitution between the rebate and the list
price is always negative: the country trades larger list prices against larger
rebates. Since the indifference curve is convex in the list price, the increase
in the rebate must be larger than the increase in the list price in order to
maintain the country’s payoff.
For any list price in country 1 that is less than the monopoly price in
country 2, the equation of the firm’s isoprofit curve is:
r = p1 −
(π̄ − θπ2(p1))(1− αγp1)
α[1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
(15)
where π̄ is some profit level in [θπM2 , α+θπ
M
2 ]. The lower bound guarantees
that the firm does not loose from trading with country 1. To obtain the
upper bound, note that the maximum quantity traded is α and that the
largest net price the country may agree on is equal to 1. Also, note that
both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio are positive when both
parties’ participation constraints are satisfied.9 The firm’s profit increases
when its isoprofit curve shifts downwards. If instead the price in country 1
is above the monopoly price in country 2, the equation of the firm’s isoprofit
curve is:





α [1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπM2 )]
(16)
with π̄ ∈ [θπM2 , α + θπ
M
2 ] for the same reason as aforementioned. The
numerator and the denominator of the ratio are both positive.10
8For a same value of the rebate, an indifference curve that passes by a lower list price
corresponds to a higher payoff. And for a same list price, an indifference curve that
passes by a larger rebate corresponds to a higher payoff.
9If all participation constraints are satisfied, then we have p1 ≤
1
γ
, r < p1, and
π̄ ≥ θπ2(p1) for any π̄ ∈ [π
M
2 , α+ π
M
2 ], and p1 ∈ [0, p
M
2 ].
10If all participation constraints are satisfied, then p1 ≥ r, p1 ≤
1
γ
and π̄ ≥ θπM2 .
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The profit that the firm makes on the first market is larger, given a
fixed net price, for lower list prices and rebates. However, a low list price
propagates on the second market and reduces the firm’s profit there. When
its monopoly profit in country 2 is sufficiently large, the firm may gain from
trading exclusively with this country. In the next proposition, we give a
sufficient condition on the demands of the two countries that precludes
trade between country 1 and the firm.
Proposition 3.3.1. Country 1 and the firm never trade if:










where q2 is the demand in country 2 and ε2 its price elasticity.
See Appendix B.2 for the proof. If the condition in the above proposition
holds, then the firm’s participation constraint is violated for all list price-
rebate pairs that satisfy country 1’s participation constraints. In other
words, no trade is worthwhile sealing with country 1 if the monopoly price
in country 2 exceeds the maximal list price country 1 may agree on.
The possibility of mutually advantageous trades depends negatively on
how profitable the second market is. In what follows, we focus on the
parameters of our model such that the firm serves both markets. Before
providing a characterization of the PO-IR contracts, we first study the
relation between a list price, its associated rebate and net price, and the
quantity traded. For this, we provide a series of lemmas that study each of
these relations separately.














1) ≥ γ (π̄ − θπ2(p
∗
1)) [1− α + α (π̄ − θπ2(p
∗
1))]
i.e., the firm’s isoprofit curve in expression (15) is increasing at p∗1.
Proof. If p1 such that p1 > pM2 is PO-IR, then country 1’s indifference
curve in expression (14) is tangent to the firm’s isoprofit curve. Let drC
dp1
be





γ (v̄ + α) [1− α (v̄ + α)]
α [1− γp1 + (v̄ + α)]
2
with v̄ ∈ [−α, 0] in a PO-IR contract. It follows that the numerator of the
ratio is positive. Therefore drC
dp1
> 1. Let drF
dp1
be the firm’s marginal rate of
substitution between list price and rebate. Since p1 > pM2 , the equation of



















in a PO-IR contract. Thus the numerator of the
ratio is positive. But then drF
dp1
≤ 1, and it is never equal to drC
dp1
. Therefore,
a contract (p1, r) is PO-IR only if p1 ≤ pM2 .
If (p1, r) with p1 ≤ pM2 is PO-IR, then country 1’s indifference curve in
expression (14) is tangent to the firm’s isoprofit curve:
γ(v̄ + α) [1− α(v̄ + α)]




(1− γp1)(1− αγp1)− γ (π̄ − θπ2(p1)) [1− α + α (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
[1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
2
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The term on the left side of the equality sign is strictly positive, as v̄ ∈
[−α, 0] if p1 is individually rational. Therefore, the right side of the equal-
ity sign must be positive. As the denominator is obviously positive, the
numerator must also be positive valued.
Note that a PO-IR contract between the firm and the first country en-
ables the second one to pay less than the monopoly price on its market,
thanks to IPR. Next, we highlight the relation between the list price and
the net price in a PO-IR contract.
Lemma 3.3.2. Consider some contract (p∗1, r
∗), and let π̄ the firm’s profit
for this contract. Let p̂1(π̄) be the list price that minimizes the net price
along the firm’s isoprofit curve π̄. If (p∗1, r
∗) is PO-IR, then:
p∗1 ≤ p̂1(π̄)
Furthermore, p̂1(π̄) is decreasing in π̄.
Proof. Consider a PO-IR contract (p∗1, r
∗) and let π∗(p∗1, r
∗) = π̄. The net
prices that give the firm the same level π̄ of profit are along the curve of
equation:
y(p1, π̄) =
(π̄ − θπ2(p1)) (1− αγp1)
α [1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
and (p∗1, r








(1− γp1)(1− αγp1) + γ(π̄ − θπ2(p1))[1− α + α(π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
)
α2[1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]2
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The sign is that of the numerator. The numerator is an increasing function







[1− γp1 − (π̄− θπ2(p1)) ≥ 0
The inequality holds because p1 ≤ pM2 by Lemma 3.3.1, r ≥ 0 in expression
(15) if and only if 1 − γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1)) ≥ 0, and we assumed that π2
is concave in the price. Let us go back to the numerator of dy
dp1
. We just




at p1 = pM2 . Also,
dy
dp1
≤ 0 at p1 = p∗1, by Lemma 3.3.1. Therefore, a global










The function on the left side of the equality sign is increasing in π̄; and
recall that it is increasing in p1. It follows that p̂1 is decreasing in π̄.
The rest of the proof is by contradiction. Assume that p∗1 > p̂1(π̄). Con-
sider r̂(π̄) such that: π(p̂1(π̄), r̂(π̄)) = π̄. The firm is indifferent between
(p∗1, r
∗) and (p̂1(π̄), r̂(π̄)). By the definition of p̂1(π̄), p̂1(π̄)− r̂(π̄) < p∗1−r
∗.
Note that the country’s payoff can be written as:
v∗(p1, y) =
α(1− γp1)
1 + αy − αγp1
(1− y)− α
and this expression is such that dv
∗
dp1
< 0 and dv
∗
dy
< 0. But then country
1 strictly prefers (p̂1(π̄), r̂(π̄)) over (p∗1, r




The lemma shows that, for a given level of profit for the firm, the contract
that maximizes the country’s payoff is not necessarily the one with the
lowest net price. Such a contract involves a list price high enough for that
the country prefers instead a contract with a larger net price and a lower list
price. Next, we study the relation between the list price and the quantity
traded.
Lemma 3.3.3. Consider a PO-IR contract (p∗1, r
∗), and let π̄ be the firm’s
profit for this contract. Let p̃1(π̄) be the list price that maximizes the quan-
tity traded along the firm’s isoprofit curve π̄. If (p∗1, r
∗) is PO-IR, then:
p∗1 ≥ p̃1(π̄)
Furthermore, p̃1(π̄) is decreasing in π̄, and p̂1(π̄) ≥ p̃1(π̄).
Proof. Consider a PO-IR contract (p∗1, r
∗), and let π∗(p∗1, r
∗) = π̄. The
quantities q1 demanded by country 1 that give the firm the same level of
profit π̄ are along the curve of equation:
q1(p1, π̄) =
α[1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
1− αγp1
and (p∗1, r
















The sign of dq1
dp1
is that of its numerator. The function between squared
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brackets is decreasing in p1, and it equals zero at p1 = pM2 . Therefore,
either q1(p1, π̄) is single-peaked in p1, or it is strictly decreasing in p1. In
any case, a global maximum of q1(p1, π̄) exists on [0, pM2 ]. We set p̃1(π̄) =









= αγπ̄ + γ(1− α)
The left side of the equality is a decreasing function of p1.11 It follows that










where the function on the left of the equality sign is decreasing in p1 (see










where the function on the left of the equality sign is decreasing in p1. Recall
that 1− γ ≥ π̄− θπ2(p1), as the denominator of expression (15) is positive.
And π̄ ≥ θπM2 ≥ θπ2(p1), where the first inequality holds as the firm’s
participation is satisfied if the contract is PO-IR; and p1 ≤ pM2 by Lemma
3.3.1. It follows that p̂1(π̄) ≥ p̃1(π̄).
The rest of the proof is by contradiction. Assume that p∗1 < p̃1(π̄). Con-
sider the contract (p̃1(π̄), r̃(π̄)) with r̃(π̄) such that π(p̃1(π̄), r̃(π̄)) = π̄.
The firm is indifferent between (p∗1, r
∗) and (p̃1(π̄), r̃(π̄)). If p∗1 is part
of a PO-IR contract, then p∗1 ≤ p̂1(π̄) by Lemma 3.3.2. Thus, we have




≤ 0, since we assume π2(.) is








fore, the net price is lower and the quantity traded is larger with contract
(p̃1(π̄), r̃(π̄)) than with (p∗1, r
∗). The country’s payoff can be written as:
v∗(y, q1) = (1− y)q1 − α
and note that dv
∗
dy
< 0 and dv
∗
dq1
> 0. But then country 1 strictly prefers
(p̃1(π̄), r̃(π̄)) over (p∗1, r
∗). Which contradicts that (p∗1, r
∗) is Pareto optimal.
For a fixed level of profit for the firm, the country’s payoff is not neces-
sarily the largest for the contract that maximizes the quantity traded. The
net price associated with such a contract is large enough for that the coun-
try prefers a contract with a lower net price, a larger rebate and a larger
list price. The two lemmas together imply the following relation between
the rebate and the list price in a PO-IR contract.
Proposition 3.3.2. Consider two contracts (p1, r) and (p
′
1, r
′). If p1 > p
′
1
and both contracts are PO-IR, then it must hold that r ≥ r′.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.3. In the set of PO-IR contracts,
larger list prices are associated with larger rebates. If two contracts fail to
satisfy this relation, then the one that has the largest list price (hence the
lowest rebate) is Pareto dominated. A Pareto improvement can be achieved
with a contract that has a larger net price, a lower list price and a lower
rebate, and that involves a greater quantity traded. Below, we characterize
the set of PO-IR contracts between the first country and the firm.
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Proposition 3.3.3. A contract (p1, r) between country 1 and the firm is
PO-IR if it is on the Pareto frontier of equation:








(1 + α− αγp1)
(17)









θ[πM2 − π2(p1)](1− αγp1)
α[1− γp1 − θ(πM2 − π2(p1))]
≥ r ≥ p1 − 1
The quantity traded for such a contract is given by the expression:













and it is strictly increasing in p1. The optimal contribution for some PO-IR
contract can be expressed as:
τ ∗(p1, r) =
θ ∂π2(p1)
∂p1
(1 + α− αγp1)− αγ (1− α + αγp1)
α2γ
and it is strictly decreasing in p1.








Note that the firm’s participation constraint is the firm’s isoprofit π̄ = θπM2 .
This isoprofit curve intersects the Pareto frontier for some value of p1 less
than pM2 . Also, note that as p1 approaches p
M
2 , the rebate in expression
(17) approaches p1+ 1−αα . Given that p1− r ≥ 0 by the firm’s participation
constraint, it follows that r = p1 if and only if p1 = pM2 and α = 1.
Further details are provided in Appendix B.4. The area of mutually
advantageous trades, which is delimited by the parties’ participation con-
straints, shrinks as the firm’s disagreement payoff increases. Also, a larger
disagreement payoff for the firm shifts the Pareto frontier to the right: for
a fixed secret rebate, its associated PO-IR list price is higher.
Corollary 3.3.1. There exists a PO-IR contract (p∗1, r
∗) such that r∗ = p∗1







and α = 1.
The result follows directly from Proposition 3.3.3. Unless the whole
population in country 1 is sick, the country pays the firm a strictly positive
price. The next theorem clarifies the relation between the list price, the
rebate and the net price in the set of PO-IR contracts.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let X1 be the set of all PO-IR contracts. In this set,
larger list prices are associated with larger rebates and lower net prices.
The theorem above completes the analysis initiated in Proposition 3.3.2,
and makes explicit the relation between secret rebate, list price and net
price in the set of PO-IR contracts. More details are provided in Appendix
B.5. In what follows, we give precision on each party’s preferred PO-IR
contract.
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Corollary 3.3.3. In the set X1 of PO-IR contracts, country 1’s payoff is
maximized for the contract that has the largest list price, the largest rebate
and the lowest net price; and the firm’s profit is maximized for the contract
that has the lowest list price, the lowest rebate and the highest net price.
Proof. In the set of PO-IR contracts, the contract that gives the firm the
lowest profit, θπM2 , can be found at the intersection of the Pareto frontier
in (17) and the firm’s participation constraint in (13). Let us call this
contract (p′1, r
′). Take any other PO-IR contract (p1, r) such that p1 < p′1.
By Theorem 3.3.2, we have r < r′ and y′ < y. As (p1, r) satisfies the firm’s
participation constraint, and as the Pareto frontier is strictly increasing in
p1, it follows that π(p1, r) > πM2 . Since (p1, r) is Pareto optimal, it must
be that the country prefers (p′1, r
′) over (p′1, r
′). The result follows.
Note that some PO-IR contracts may include a negative rebate when
the country’s lowest indifferent curve, v̄ = −α (and whose equation is
r = p1 − 1), intersects the Pareto frontier at a list price less than 1. A
negative secret rebate means that the country subsidizes a low list price.
In the proposition below, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of PO-IR contracts with negative rebates.











θ (1 + α(1− γ))2
,
where q2 is country 2’s demand and ε2 its price elasticity.
12




We gather our results in the next propositions. First, let us define p# as
the list price along the Pareto frontier such that r(p#) = 0. We define p as
the lowest PO-IR list price.13 As the Pareto frontier is strictly increasing in
p1, note that p < p# if and only if p# < 1. Note that p# ≤ 1 is equivalent
to the condition in Proposition 3.3.4, and that this condition always holds
when the monopoly price in country 2 is less than 1.14 Also, p > 1
γ
is
equivalent to the no-trade condition in Proposition 3.3.1, and it implies
that the monopoly price in country 2 is larger than 1
γ
, the list price for
which country 1’s demand is null.
Proposition 3.4.1. (1) If p# ≤ 1, then there exist PO-IR contracts that
have a non-positive rebate. (2) If p# > 1 and p ≤ 1
γ
, then all PO-IR
contracts have a strictly positive rebate.
When the monopoly price in country 2 is sufficiently low (see statement
1), PO-IR contracts that have the largest net prices include negative re-
bates. We conclude that the firm uses a positive rebate to hide the net
price paid by country 1 from country 2, and the country uses a negative
rebate as a subsidy in exchange for a low list price. Note that country 1
pays more for the drug than country 2 whenever the list price in the first
country is less than p# (i.e., when the rebate is negative); and the converse
holds when the list price in country 1 is larger than p#. Therefore, the
13This is the list price at the intersection between the iso-net price curve of equation
r = p1 − 1 and the curve whose equation is given by expression (17).
14To see why: if pM2 ≤ 1, then condition in Proposition 3.3.4 is always satisfied, as
∂π2(p1)
∂p1
(which is equivalent to expression on the left side of the quality sign) is negative.
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rebate enables the firm to price discriminate the two countries. When both
positive and negative rebates are possible, the first market is sufficiently
profitable relative to the second one, and the firm prefers to charge country
1 a higher price than country 2 (as the firm’s preferred contract has the
lowest rebate, which is negative in this case).
For larger values of the monopoly price in country 2 (see statement 2),
country 1 never agrees on a negative rebate, as this would violate its par-
ticipation constraint (y1 ≥ 1). Rebates are then used exclusively for hiding
the price paid by country 1 from country 2, and the first country always
pays less for the drug than the second country. In Figure 20, we provide
a graphical representation of this case. The purple point represents the
contract that the country prefers (that with the largest rebate, the largest
list price and the lowest net price), and the blue point corresponds to the
contract the firm prefers (that with the lowest rebate, the lowest list price
and the largest net price).
Proposition 3.4.2. If p > 1
γ
, then country 1 and the firm do not trade.
For even larger values of the monopoly price in country 2, the firm never
gains from trading with the first country.
We see two necessary conditions for that the negotiation leads to an
agreement on a large rebate. The first condition is that the market in
country 2 is sufficiently profitable, which precludes trades with country
1 that involve relatively low list prices (thus low rebates by Proposition
3.3.2). The second necessary condition is that country 1 has an important
negotiating power, that allows it to influence the outcome of the negotiation
towards the one it prefers: namely, a contract with a large rebate, a high
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Figure 20: The set of PO-IR contracts is X1, in red on the graph
3.5 Conclusion
We presented a model where two countries negotiate in turn with a mo-
nopolist pharmaceutical firm, and we suppose that a country and the firm
settle on a contract that is both Pareto optimal and individually rational
for them. The second country to negotiate is assumed to apply a simple
form of international price referencing, i.e. the latter never accepts to pay
more than the list price it observes in the other country. The interdepen-
dence between the prices paid by the two countries can be turned off if the
first country and the firm negotiate a secret rebate, which enables to hide
the real price the latter pays for the drug.
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We solve for the contracts that are both Pareto optimal and individually
rational for the firm and the first country. We find that larger list prices
are associated with larger rebates, lower rebated prices, lower social charges
and greater quantities traded. Also, the relative profitability of each market
taken in isolation influences the possibility of mutually advantageous trades
between the first country and the firm, as well as the amount of secret re-
bate they can negotiate. In particular, we show that large rebates are to be
expected when the second market is relatively profitable and when the first
country has an important negotiating power. The firm benefits from using
a secret rebate because it prevents low rebated prices to propagate in the
second negotiation; as for the first country, the benefits of larger list prices









In this chapter, we rationalize the use of international price referencing
and secret rebates in the negotiations on drug prices between public payers
(countries) and a monopolist pharmaceutical firm. We put forward the hy-
pothesis that the firm’s propensity to accept offers from countries depends
on its private information about the launch date of a superior substitute.
To understand better why countries may gain from negotiating a secret
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rebate, we analyze a transparency regime where the details of the deals are
made public. We show that countries base their offers on the transaction
prices they observe in other countries. We find that the countries which
negotiate first are always strictly better-off when they can avoid this in-
formation leakage. Finally, we argue that a natural arrangement between
the firm and these countries is to use a secret rebate that conceals the real
price they pay.
The pharmaceutical industry distinguishes itself from other industries
on many grounds. When a medicine is listed for reimbursement, health
authorities negotiate a price with the manufacturer, and the price at which
the drug is listed for reimbursement, called the list price, is made public at
the time of the market release. An institutional payer uses international
price referencing (IPR) when it bases its price offer to the firm on the list
price of similar medicines in other countries. According to Vogler, Paris
and Panteli (2018, [69]), the vast majority of European countries uses IPR
for at least some drugs, as well as China, Japan, Canada and Brazil among
others. IPR creates price interdependencies across countries, which makes
the order of launches a strategic variable for the manufacturer (Vogler and
al. 2019, [71], Grepperud and Pedersen 2020, [41], Marinoso and Olivella
2005, [34]).
A particularity of the pricing of medicines is its lack of transparency. The
(official) list price at which a drug is available in a country may give little
to no information about the real price paid to the manufacturer, because
of the use of secret rebates. Generally, a rebate is a subsidy offered to the
buyer, which can be seen as money that the manufacturer pays back to the
retailer under certain conditions like sales volume. A rebate is secret when
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it is only known to the parties involved in its negotiation. Rebates are used
in other industries than the pharmaceutical one, notably in the automobile
and electronics industries. Yet, rebates on pharmaceuticals and rebates
on other types of goods do not seem to fill the same functions. In other
industries, manufacturers offer rebates to retailers primarily for avoiding
inventory hoardings.1 In the pharmaceutical industry, it is argued that re-
bates are offered by manufacturers in reaction to IPR, as a way to conceal
the real price a country pays to those which will negotiate later on.2
Secret rebates create informational asymmetries between payers about
the price each of them pays for a same product. Informational asymme-
tries between a drug manufacturer and a payer seem to exist as well. In
the theoretical literature, Marinoso and Olivella (2005, [34]) investigate the
effect of an asymmetry of information about the production cost of a drug
on official prices and the timing of launches in different countries. We take
on a different approach, for the reason that it is now common knowledge
that the production cost of most drugs is close to null (see Hill, Barber and
Gotham 2018, [44]). A potential source of informational asymmetry, that
we think relevant for the case of innovative drugs, involves the duration
of the manufacturer’s monopoly. A manufacturer may know whether its
product can be easily improved upon, thus how long it may take before the
launching of a superior therapeutic substitute (often referred to as me-too
or follow-on drugs).3 In many cases, me-too drugs are the result of parallel
1See Goodman and Moody (1970, [38]), Chevalier and Curhan (1976, [17]), Blattberg
and Levin (1987, [8]), Gerstner and Hess (1991 [35], 1991b [37], 1995 [36]) and Ault et al.
(2000, [2]) for more details about the reasons for and use of rebates in other industries.
2This argument can be found notably in Vogler, Paris and Panteli (2018, [69]).
3What has been studied is the effect of me-too drugs on price competition. See
DiMasi and Paquette (2004, [25]), Lu and Comanor (1998, [57]), Ekelund and Persson
(2003, [29]), Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002, [56]), DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski,
(2003, [24]) and Régnier (2013, [61]) among others.
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development, and have more or less identical clinical outcomes to pioneer
drugs.4 Despite their lack of therapeutic added value, me-too drugs are
granted market authorization for the sake of broadening the range of al-
ternatives to patients and stimulating price competition. Lichtenberg and
Philipson (2002, [56]) find that competition by me-too products decrease
incumbents’ profits as much as competition from generics after patent ex-
piry; however, the authors attribute the loss in innovators’ profits to a
reduction in their market share, and not to price competition. Lu and
Commanor (1998, [57]) corroborate this finding, and show for the US that
the average effect of adding an extra competitor is a price reduction on the
order of 2%.5
We believe that the knowledge of the manufacturer of a pioneer drug
about the duration of its monopoly influences its willingness to accept
lower offers against earlier deals during the negotiations with countries.
Assuming that our premise is true, we have three research questions. First,
we want to understand how transparency on the prices that countries pay
for a same product would affect the outcomes of the negotiations. Second,
we intend to rationalize the use of IPR by countries. Third, we wish to
rationalize the use of secret rebates, particularly from a country’s perspec-
tive.
We present a theoretical model where two countries negotiate sequen-
tially with a monopolist pharmaceutical firm. A negotiation unfolds with
first the country making an offer, then the firm. A deal is sealed as soon
4Me-too drugs do not infringe on the patent of pioneer drugs. According to Régnier
(2013, [61]), me-too drugs need only be marginally differentiated from a pioneer drug to
be granted a market authorization.
5The average number of substitutes in their data is around 3 to 4. This suggests
that the transition from monopoly to four to five firms with products that are not too
differentiated triggers a price reduction of the order of 6%.
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as one of the parties accepts the offer from the other one. We suppose
that the firm holds private information about the launch date of a superior
substitute, which affects its willingness to accept a lower price in exchange
for an earlier deal. We first examine the case of price transparency, i.e. the
country which negotiates last knows, before starting its own negotiation
with the firm, the transaction price in the other country. In this case, we
find that IPR is produced endogenously in an equilibrium of our model;
in particular, we show that the optimal offer made by the last country de-
pends positively on the price paid by the first one. As a consequence, if it
is farsighted, the firm gets an additional incentive to reject the offer made
by the country which negotiates first. Next, we investigate the outcome
of the negotiations when the first country can offer a secret rebate. We
find that the latter is strictly better-off in this instance: the first country
to negotiate uses a secret rebate that prevents any informational spillover
about the firm’s type, which cancels the firm’s incentive to reject on the
ground that the second country offers a higher offer the larger the transac-
tion price with the first country. The second country is strictly worse-off,
as the price in the first country is uninformative about the firm’s type. We
succeed in highlighting a clear series of implications that rationalizes both
the use of IPR and secret rebates: informative prices lead the last country
to base its offer to the firm on the price it observes in the reference country.
By anticipation, the firm is tougher in its first negotiation. For the first
country that negotiates, secret prices are a means to cancel out the nega-
tive effect caused by the combination of IPR and the firm’s farsightedness,
and is therefore strictly better-off if it can use a secret rebate.
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Our result about the mitigated social effects of price transparency con-
tributes to the related literature. Danzon and Towse (2003, [22]) argue
that transparency and differential pricing cannot be compatible, and may
be detrimental to poor countries. The authors argue that, as countries
use IPR and may engage in parallel trade, manufacturers would have the
incentive to set a single price between the rebated prices that the countries
would have gotten, had secret rebates been allowed. This would ultimately
benefit high-income countries and hurt low-income ones. We find that
transparency is detrimental to the countries which negotiate first and ben-
eficial to those which negotiate last.
The work presented in this chapter complements that in Chapter 3.
There, we take as given that the country which negotiates in second posi-
tion uses IPR. Here, we offer to rationalize this behavior. In the set-up we
propose, the firm holds information that is relevant for a country to know
when formulating its offer (which is the firm’s type). As this information
is not directly observable, the second country uses the transaction price
in the first country as an indicator of some partial information about the
firm’s type. We show that the optimal offer of the second country depends
positively on the price that the first country pays: IPR is produced en-
dogenously in an equilibrium of our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 features the
model for just one country and a monopolist pharmaceutical firm. Sec-
tion 4.3 extends the model to the case of two countries and a myopic firm.
In Section 4.4, we solve the game for two countries and a farsighted firm.
Section 4.5 studies a version of the game where secret rebates are allowed.
Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Negotiation between a country and a firm
under asymmetric information
In this section, we model the negotiation between just one country and an
incumbent pharmaceutical firm. We consider for now that the negotiation
is only about the list price, i.e. there is no rebate on the table, as there is
just one country therefore nobody to hide the details of the deal from.
The negotiation between the firm and the country lasts for up to two pe-
riods, that we shall denote by τ 1 and τ 2. The market for the drug sold by
the firm ends at some date t posterior to the end of the negotiation, and we
define t as the launch date of a superior therapeutic substitute, also called
me-too or follow-on drug. This date arrives before the expiry date L of
the incumbent’s patent. Generally, a me-too drug may not infringe on the
incumbent’s patent, and might be granted a market authorization before
the patent on the pioneer medicine expires, which is what we assume here.6
We suppose that t is privately known by the incumbent. Throughout, we
refer to t as the firm’s type, and t is an element of the set T = [0, 1] of all
possible types. The country has a prior belief that the firm’s type follows
the cumulative distribution G on the support T . We restrict attention to
cumulative distributions that are concave.
Assumption 1
The country’s prior belief about the distribution of the firm’s type, G(t), is
6The therapeutic substitute we are referring to cannot be a generic, as it is common
knowledge that generics enter once the incumbent’s patent on the pioneer drug expires.
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continuous, twice-differentiable and G′′ < 0 everywhere on [0, 1].
The timeline is:
τ 1 < τ 2 < 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 < L.
We suppose that the country’s willingness to pay for a fixed exogenous
quantity of the drug for one period is commonly known to equal 1. The
quantity demanded is exogenous and set to 1. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that neither the firm nor the country discount time.
The negotiation between the incumbent and the country occurs as fol-
lows. The country moves first by offering a price pC in period τ 1. Then,
the firm accepts or rejects this offer. If accepted, the deal is sealed and the
negotiation ends. If the firm rejects, the negotiation continues in period τ 2.
This time, the firm makes a counter-offer pF to the country. The country
either accepts or rejects. If the firm and the country found common ground
on a price p ∈ {pC , pF} at date τ ∈ {τ 1, τ 2}, then the former receives p and
the latter receives 1 − p at each period between τ and t. Otherwise, both
parties get a zero payoff until t.7
At date t, a competitor is ready to launch a me-too drug. We do not
model explicitly the negotiation process through which prices are deter-
mined past t. Instead, we make the following simplifying assumptions
about the continuation payoffs of the incumbent and the country.
7In reality, when negotiations fail, the drug may be sold in the country however it
is not listed for reimbursement. In most European markets, failure to list a drug for
reimbursement dampens the companies’ profits (see Marinoso et al. (2011, [33]): "being
excluded from the public funding may be almost as bad as not being authorized to sell the
drug at all."). For a country, failure to list a drug for reimbursement limits drastically
its accessibility.
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First, we assume that the competitor overtakes the incumbent. One
could think that the me-too drug offers superior therapeutic benefits, thereby
making the pioneer drug completely obsolete.8 The firm’s payoff is given
by the net present value of its market profits. If the negotiation was suc-
cessful, the firm receives p at each period between the date at which the
agreement was reached, τ , up until t, which gives:
πF = p(t− τ) (19)
If no deal was sealed with the country, then the firm’s payoff is null.
Second, we suppose that the pricing of the me-too drug is linked to that
of the pioneer drug. This assumption of ours is motivated by the empirical
findings of Lu and Comanor (1998, [57]), diMasi and Paquette (2004, [25]),
Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002, [56]) and Régnier (2013, [61]), who show
that the price paid to the manufacturer of a pioneer drug determines the
long-run trajectory of prices of comparable medicines. In particular, Lu
and Comanor (1998, [57]) find that the market release of a me-too drug,
over the period where the pioneer drug is still patented, leads to a price
reduction on the order of 2%.9 For simplicity, we consider that the country
buys the me-too drug at the same price as the pioneer drug. If the country
did not trade with the incumbent firm prior to t, then we suppose that the
competitor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer which results in the price of 1.
8In reality, the profit made by the incumbent after the launch of a me-too drug
by a competitor is not necessarily null, however it decreases significantly. According
to Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002, [56]) competition between therapeutic substitutes
reduces the incumbent’s profit as least as much as competition from generics. Also,
additional costs must be spent in marketing and promotion, which further reduces the
incumbent’s profit after the launch of a therapeutic substitute (see Hollis (2004, [45])).
9Similar results are found by diMasi and Paquette (2004, [25]), Lichtenberg and
Philipson (2002, [56]) among others. Régnier (2013, [61]) shows that me-too drugs may
limit the penetration of generics after the pioneer drug is no longer patent protected.
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After date L, the country can buy the generic version of the pioneer drug
for free. The country’s objective is then to maximize its surplus over the
period that starts from the date at which an agreement is reached with the
incumbent, τ , until the date at which its generic version is accessible, L.
The country’s payoff is given by the following expression:
VC = (L− τ)(1− p), (20)
for some agreement on a price p ∈ {pC , pF} at date τ ∈ {τ 1, τ 2}. If the
country does not trade with the incumbent, then its payoff is null.
4.2.1 Strategies and beliefs
This version of the model features a sequential Bayesian game with contin-
uous type t for the firm and both continuous and discrete sets of actions for
the two parties. We first make explicit the strategies of the firm and the
country, as well as the beliefs of the latter about the former’s type. Then,
we define what a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is in our game.
Let P = [0, 1] be the set of all possible values for the price p. A price is an
element of P that implies a partition of the country’s per period willingness
to pay, where p is the firm’s per period profit and 1−p is the country’s per
period surplus. Let SC be the set of all strategies for the country. Formally,











when for τ = τ1, sτC : P → P and for τ = τ
2, sτC is the response of the
country to the firm’s counter-offer. Without loss of generality, we assume
throughout that the country always accepts if it is indifferent between ac-









for the firm of type t, when for τ = τ 1, sτF (t) : P → {A,R} is a response to
the offer made by the country; and for τ = τ 2, sτC(t) is the firm’s counter-
offer pF (t). A strategy profile s determines expected payoffs for each player,
where the expectation is taken over the set of all possible types for the firm
with respect to the country’s beliefs.
There are two information sets encountered each time the country moves.
At τ = τ 1, the country’s belief that the firm’s type is less than or equal to
t is its prior belief G. If the country reaches its second information set, the
country updates its belief by Bayes’ rule.
Definition 4.2.1 In a weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) s∗ =
(s∗C , s
∗
F (t)) of this game, strategies and beliefs must satisfy the two following
conditions:
1. sequential rationality : s∗ specifies the best-response at every informa-
tion set, and it is optimal in expectation given the country’s beliefs;
2. consistency : if the second information set is reached, i.e. the firm
plays R at τ = τ 1, the country’s belief at τ = τ 2 about the firm’s
type is updated using Bayes’ rule.
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4.2.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria for the one country
case
Consider the second information set where the country chooses to accept
or reject the firm’s counter-offer. It is immediate that the country always
plays A. Given this, the firm’s optimal strategy at τ 2 is to counter-offer
the price of 1, regardless of its type. Next, we show that the optimal offer









Any price offer from the country that is outside the interval is strictly dom-
inated. Any price offer that is strictly less than the lower bound is always
rejected thus it gives the country a null payoff. Such a price offer is strictly
dominated by any offer larger than the upper bound of P ∗ and strictly less
than 1: the firm accepts it with probability one and the country’s per pe-
riod surplus is strictly positive. Any price strictly above the upper bound
is accepted for sure; therefore such a price is strictly dominated by any
price offer which is strictly lesser, yet greater than the upper bound of the
interval.
A price offer p in the relevant interval is accepted by the firm of type t
at τ 1 if and only if:
t ≤
τ 2 − τ 1p
1− p
= T (p), (21)
where T (p) is monotone increasing in p, and it is increasing in the time-
lapse between the two rounds of the negotiation, τ 2 − τ 1. We call T (p) the
threshold type below which the firm accepts p and above which it rejects it.
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An offer p in the appropriate interval is accepted with probability G(T (p)),





τ 2 − τ 1p
1− p
)
(L− τ 1)(1− p) (22)
where E(VC) denotes the country’s expected payoff. The expected payoff
is concave in the country’s price offer, p, by Assumption 1.10 Our next as-
sumption guarantees the existence of an interior solution to the country’s
problem.
Assumption 2
The prior belief G and the date τ 1 satisfy:
1 > G′(1)(1− τ 1)
The country’s problem is similar to that of a monopsonist seeking to













(S ′(.) is the first derivative of the supply function S with respect to p.) The





is single-peaked. Concavity in t would require a stronger assumption than that in
Assumption 1: G(t)G′′(t)(t − τ1) + G′(t)G(t) − (G′(t))2(t − τ1) < 0. We do not find
necessary to impose this more stringent assumption.
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where the price is parameterized by the firm’s type via the relation in (21).
The elasticity is decreasing in τ 1, and it is monotone decreasing in t if and
only if:
G′′(t)G(t)[t− τ 1]− (G′(t))2[t− τ 1] +G(t)G′(t) ≤ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, 1]
The condition above is more stringent than Assumption 1. Assumption
1 guarantees that the elasticity is decreasing in t for values of t that are
not too large. 11 Note that Assumption 2 is equivalent to assuming that
eS(t = 1) < 1. We present our results in the proposition below.
Proposition 4.2.1. The country’s problem in (22) has a unique interior
solution, p∗, which solves:
eS(p
∗) = 1
Let t∗ be the type of firm which is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
p∗. The firm accepts p∗ if its type belongs to [0, t∗], and it rejects p∗ if its
type belongs to (t∗, 1].
See Appendix C.1 for the proof. For this version of our game, there
exists a unique PBE. We start with the best-responses at each round of
11The elasticity eS(p(t)) is decreasing in t if and only if G
′′(t)G(t)[t−τ1]−(G′(t))2[t−
τ1]+G(t)G′(t) ≤ 0, i.e. the country’s payoff as a function of the firm’s type t is concave
in t.
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the negotiation. At τ 1, the country’s optimal offer is p∗; the firm’s best-
response is to accept any offer pC ≥ t−τ
2
t−τ1




At τ 2, the firm’s optimal counter-offer is 1, for all possible histories. The
country accepts any counter-offer, for all possible histories.
The belief system is the following. At the first information set, the
country’s belief is its prior G. If the second information set is reached, the




If the second information set is not reached, then any belief is consistent.
4.3 Negotiations between two countries and a
myopic firm
Assume there are now two countries, C and D. Let us denote by ε the
relative market size of country D. In this section, we make the simplifying
assumption that the firm is myopic in that it does not take into account the
future profits made in country D when carrying out the negotiation with
country C. In the next section, we relax this assumption. We still suppose
that only list prices are negotiated, and not secret rebates. For country D,
this is without loss of generality: for the last country negotiating with the
firm, secret rebates have no use, as there is nobody to hide the details of
the deal from. For country C, it is also without loss of generality, to the
extent that the latter achieves the same outcome with or without rebate
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since the firm is myopic.
Country C first negotiates with the firm, then country D. Each has
potentially two periods of negotiation with the firm. Country i ∈ {C,D}
negotiates with the firm at dates τ 1i and τ
2
i . Both countries have the com-
mon prior belief that the firm’s type t is distributed according to cdf G on
the support T . The time line is now:






D < 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 < L.
The market for the drug sold by the incumbent firm ends at some date
t posterior to the end of both negotiations. Each of the two negotiations
unfolds in the same way as the negotiation between C and F in the previous
section, and payoffs are defined in the analogous way.
There are two information sets where information is useful: I1 is the first
of them, at which country C at date τ 1C makes an offer to the firm; and
I2 is analogous to I1 but for country D. The countries always accept the
firm’s counter-offer if their own offer has been rejected. Note that at the
information set I1, C’s belief is its prior G; while at I2, D’s belief is obtained
by updating its prior using the information released by the outcome of the
first negotiation. Due to the sequential rationality criterion, in equilibrium
country D at date τ 1D either observes the price p
∗ or the price of 1 in country
C (see Proposition 4.2.1).
As there are now two countries, we relabel the threshold type function
in (21) as TC(p), whose equation is:
TC(p) =





We start with the case where the firm accepted country C’s offer, p∗. Coun-






on the support [0, t∗] for the firm’s type t, where t∗ is the type of firm
indifferent between accepting and rejecting country C’s offer p∗. If instead






on the support (t∗, 1].
Consider some offer p extended by country D. This offer is accepted by
the firm of type t if and only:
t ≤





The function TD(p) is interpreted in the same way as in the previous section:
for a given price offer p, it gives the type which is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting p. For the same reason as in the previous section,
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depending on whether the country believes that the firm’s type is above or
below t∗. The supply faced by country D is:












where the price p is parameterized by t via the relation in (25). Note that
the supply faced by country D following a rejection of C’s offer, SR, is
relatively more elastic than SA, the supply country D faces when the firm
accepted country C’s offer. Note as well that the supply country C faces
is more elastic than SA, as −τ1C > −τ
1
D.















 ε(L− τ 1D)(1− p)

















 ε(L− τ 1D)(1− p)
In both cases, D’s expected payoff is concave in its offer, due to Assumption
1. The results about D’s optimal offer in each case are presented in the
proposition below.
Proposition 4.3.1. Following an acceptance of country C’s offer, country
D’s problem has an interior solution, pa, that solves:
eSA(pa) = 1
The type of firm which is indifferent between accepting and rejecting pa is
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ta. Any type t ∈ [0, ta] accepts pa, and any type t ∈ (ta, t
∗] rejects it.
Following a rejection of country C’s offer, country D’s optimal offer pr is
interior to PR if and only if:






. The type of firm which is indifferent between accept-
ing and rejecting pr is tr. Both pr and tr are increasing in the value of t
∗.
Any type t ∈ [t∗, tr] accepts pr, and any type t ∈ (tr, 1] rejects it.
See Appendix C.2 for the proof. When the firm accepts country C’s offer,
the second country does not base its offer on the information released by the
first negotiation. Only when country C got its offer rejected does country
D take the information about the firm’s type into account. Should country
D not observe the outcome of the first negotiation, the offer it would have
formulated (which is equal to pa) would have been rejected with probability
one. The outcome of the first negotiation signals country D that it must
adjust its offer upwards if it wants to avoid rejection. Country D is always
strictly better-off when it can observe the outcome of the first negotiation,
and country C is neither positively nor negatively impacted by the second
negotiation.
This version of our model where the firm is myopic can be thought of
as a game with two pharmaceutical companies whose types are perfectly
correlated, and one operates in country C and the other in D. Such a game
has a unique PBE, that we characterize below. We begin with each party’s
best-response at every date. At τ 1C , country C offers p
∗ (Proposition 4.2.1).
The firm accepts any price pC ≥
t−τ2C
t−τ1C





At τ 2C , the firm counter-offers pF = 1, for all possible histories. Country C
always accepts pF = 1, for all possible histories. At τ 1D, country D offers
pa if the history of the game is h1 = (p∗, A, 1, A), and pr if the history of
the game is h2 = (p∗, R, 1, A). And for any history different from h1 and
h2, country D offers pD =
τ2D
τ1D




rejects any price pD <
t−τ2C
t−τ1C
. At τ 2D, the firm counter-offers pF = 1, for all
possible histories. Country D accepts pF = 1, for all possible histories.
The belief system is the following. At I1, country C’s belief is its prior
belief G. If the second information set of country C is reached, i.e. the
history of the game at τ 2C is (p
∗, R), the country’s belief is GR in (24). If
the second information set is not reached, then any belief of the country
is consistent. At I2, country D’s belief is GA in (23) if the history of the
game at τ 1D is h1 = (p
∗, A, 1, A); GR in (24) if the history of the game at
τ 1D is h2 = (p
∗, R, 1, A); and the country believes that the firm is of type 0
with probability one for any other history. If the second information set of






If the second information set of country D is not reached, then any belief
is consistent.
In conclusion, country D applies a form of IPR in equilibrium. The
latter bases its offer on the transaction price it observes in country C when
C’s offer was rejected. Therefore, country D uses IPR for increasing the
probability of acceptance of its offer to the firm, which enables it to pay a
lower price on expectation.
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4.4 Two countries and a farsighted firm
Let us now assume that the firm is farsighted: it takes into account that
the outcome of its negotiation with the first country influences the offer
made by the second one. While negotiating with country C, the firm now
seeks to maximize its total payoff:
ΠF = p(C)[t− τ(C)] + εp(D)[t− τ(D)],
where p(C) is the price paid by the first country and τ(C) the date at which
they reach an agreement if they indeed do; p(D) and τ(D) are similarly
defined for the second country.
The subgame that folllows country C’s offer is a signaling game played
by the firm and country D. Through its decision to accept or reject the first
country ’s offer, the firm releases partial information about its type, and the
second country’s offer must be optimal given this signal in an equilibrium.
We refer to the subgames that start at the firm’s first decision node as
"subgames p". In the next section, we provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of equilibria in these subgames.
4.4.1 Sufficient conditions for existence
Throughout, we shall refer to p as country C’s offer, and to tf as the type
of firm which is indifferent between accepting and rejecting p. For the case
where tf = 0, we call pD country D’s optimal offer given the signal tf = 0,
and we denote by tD the threshold type associated with this offer. Abusing
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language, we may refer to tD as D’s best response to tf = 0. Let tf the
lowest value of tf to which country D’s best response is tD = 1.12 Then





[tD, 1]. Recall that D’s best response following a rejection of p is strictly
larger than tf , and that for tf = 1, we have tD = 1.
In what follows, we look for conditions on the parameters of our model
such that for all offers p from country C, there exists tD ∈ [0, 1] and a
strategy for the firm in the first negotiation such that the firm and country
D best respond to each other.
Sufficient conditions for pooling equilibria in subgames
In a subgame that follows a price offer p from country C, there are two
possible pooling equilibria: all types accept or all types reject. We provide
sufficient conditions for the existence of each of these two types of pooling
equilibria in subgames.
First, note that country D’s belief in a PBE equals its prior belief G
in the unique subgame p (either accept or reject the offer). In a pooling
equilibrium, the outcome of the first negotiation is uninformative to country
D; hence, its best response, in terms of threshold type, is tD. In a PBE,
country D’s belief is not restricted in an off the equilibrium path subgame.
From the firm’s perspective, the worst possible case is that country D




12The type tD solves: G
′(tD)(tD−τ
1
D)−G(tD) = 0, and tD is equal to ta in Proposition
4.3.1. Recall that ta < 1. And t̄f solves: G
′(1)(1− τ1D)− 1 = G(t̄f ).
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which the firm is (at least weakly) better-off rejecting, regardless of its type.
Pooling equilibrium where all types reject C’s offer
Following the rejection of some price p < 1, country D’s best response is tD.
We now elucidate the conditions under which the firm is always better-off
rejecting country C’s offer, regardless of its type.
Let ∆(t) be the payoff gain from rejecting country C’s offer p; this is the
firm’s payoff when it rejects p minus its payoff when it accepts p. By our





if it observes that the firm accepted p, and extends the offer p
D
otherwise. We get:
∆(t) = t− τ 2C + ε(t− τ
1























for any type t ≤tD, and:
∆(t) = (t− τ 2C)− p(t− τ
1
C)
= (1− p) (t− TC(p))
for any t > tD. The payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, is unambiguously
increasing everywhere on [tD, 1]. The function ∆ is monotonic in t on
[0, tD], and whether it is increasing or decreasing depends on the sign of:
1− p− ε(1− p
D
)
We need make sure that no type prefers to accept p. If the payoff gain
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function from rejecting, ∆, is monotone increasing in t, then the condition
is the most stringent on the lowest type, t = 0. This type prefers to reject










−τ 1C(tD − τ
1
D)
Suppose now that the payoff gain function from rejecting, ∆, is decreasing
in the firm’s type on the interval [0, tD]. Then the type which gains the









We gather our results in the proposition below.
Proposition 4.4.1. A pooling equilibrium in the subgame following offer
p by country C where the firm always rejects regardless of its type exists if






















i.e., the payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, is monotone increasing in the firm’s


















i.e., the payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, is single-peaked in the firm’s type
and achieves a minimum at t = tD, and all types prefer to reject p.
Note that the larger country D’s offer p
D
, the larger the range of prices
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p that allow the existence of a pooling equilibrium where all types reject.
Pooling equilibrium where all types accept C’s offer
Following the acceptance of some price p, country D’ best-response, in
terms of threshold type, is tD. We investigate the conditions under which
always accepting p is optimal for the firm, regardless of its type.
Consider the firm’s payoff gain from rejecting C’s offer p. Recall that




. The payoff gain from
rejecting p must be negative, for all types. For any t ≤tD, the payoff gain
from rejecting is:




















For any t >tD, this is:
∆(t) = (t− τ 2C)− p(t− τ
1
C)
= (1− p) (t− TC(p))
Note that the function ∆ is monotone and strictly increasing in the firm’s
type. Therefore, the type that has the greatest incentive to reject C’s offer
is type 1. And:




We gather the results in the proposition below.







Our choice of beliefs for country D off the equilibrium path may be
disputable in the context of an all-accept pooling equilibrium. We try to
remedy to this by considering the following beliefs: following a rejection of
p, country D believes that the firm is of type 1. This off the equilibrium
path belief leads to the smallest set of prices p for which an all-accept
pooling equilibrium exists. In such a profile, the net gain from rejecting p
equals, for any t ≤ tD:






























which is increasing in t. For types larger than tD, the payoff gain function
from rejecting is:


















− (τ 2C − pτ
1
C) + ε




If the above function is increasing in t, then the type which has the greatest
incentive to reject C’s offer is type 1. If instead the function is decreasing
in t, then type tD is the type that has the greatest incentive to reject; and









(τ 2D − τ
1
D)(1− tD)




We state our result below.
Proposition 4.4.3. A pooling equilibrium where all types accept p, and
country D believes that t = 1 with probability 1 following a rejection of p,











i.e., the payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, is increasing monotone in the firm’s
















(τ 2D − τ
1
D)(1− tD)




i.e., the payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, is single-peaked in the firm’s type
and achieves a maximum at tD, and all types prefer to accept p.
In Appendix C.3, we show that there exists an all-accept pooling equi-
librium that satisfies the intuitive criterion.
A characterization of interior equilibria in subgames p
We first clarify our definition of an interior equilibrium.
Definition 4.4.1 An equilibrium in subgame p is interior if the set of
types that accept p and the set of types that reject p are both non-empty.13
Let pA and pR be the prices offered by country D, upon observing that
offer p has been respectively accepted or rejected. Let tA and tR be the
13This definition carries a slight abuse of terminology, since while non-empty, either
set may be of measure zero.
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threshold types that are indifferent between accepting pA and pR, respec-
tively. In any equilibrium of a subgame p, we may, without loss of gener-








Recall that any offer from D that is strictly less than the lower bound is
strictly dominated by any offer larger than the upper bound, yet strictly less
than one; and any offer strictly larger than the upper bound is dominated
by any lesser offer that is yet greater than the upper bound.
Below, we provide a series of lemma that enables us to assess sufficient
conditions for the existence of interior equilibria in sugbgames.
Lemma 4.4.1. In any interior equilibrium of a subgame p, it must be that:
∆(tA) ≤ 0 ≤ ∆(tR)
i.e, type tA accepts p and type tR rejects p.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. If ∆(tA) > 0, then a firm of type tA
rejects C’s offer p. By the continuity of ∆, so did the types in a neighobor-
hood of tA. Therefore, one of the two following deviations is profitable to
country D. If pA is accepted with some positive probability, then a slighlty
lower offer p′A is accepted with the exact same probability as pA. Thence
D’s payoff is strictly larger, which makes p′A a strictly profitable deviation.








is accepted with some strictly positive probability, and therefore constitutes
a strictly profitable deviation. Thus, it must be that ∆(tA) ≤ 0. A similar
argument holds for proving that ∆(tR) ≥ 0.
Lemma 4.4.2. In any interior equilibrium of a subgame p, the inequality
tA < tR holds.
Proof. We first prove that tA ≤ tR. Suppose by contradiction that tR < tA.
The equation of the payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, for types in the interval
[tR, tA] is then:












< 1, ∆ is strictly increasing in t on [tR, tA]. In an interior
equilibrium, ∆(tR) ≥ 0 and ∆(tA) ≤ 0 must hold by our previous lemma.
Yet tR < tA; a contradiction. Next, suppose by contradiction that tA =
tR, so that pA = pR. Since ∆(tA) ≤ 0 and ∆(tR) ≥ 0 must hold in an
equilibrium, it must be that tA = tR = TC (p) . Therefore country C’s offer
is the same as when the firm is myopic. In particular, p < 1, so that:
∆(t) = (1− p) t−
(




is strictly increasing in t, for any t ∈ [0, 1]; and it is negative for any t < tA
and strictly positive for any t > tA. Hence the set of types that accept
includes [0, tA) and is included in [0, tA]; also, the set of types that reject
includes (tR, 1] and is included in [tR, 1] . This in turn implies that pA < pR,
a contradiction.
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The next result follows immediately from Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
Lemma 4.4.3. In any interior equilibrium of a subgame p, the inequality
tR ≥ TC (p) holds.
Proof. Note that max{tA, tR} = tR, and ∆(tR) ≥ 0 if and only if tR ≥
TC(p).
We can establish the following result.
Lemma 4.4.4. If condition A:
ε ≤
τ 2C − τ
1
C
























hold, then the payoff gain from rejecting, ∆, is monotone and strictly in-










Meaning, no subgame p has an interior equilibrium where the firm plays a
mixed strategy at its first decision node, where it decides whether to accept
or reject p.
Proof. In an interior equilibrium, we know from Lemma 4.4.2 that the
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D(pR − pA) if t ≤ tA








D) if t ∈ [tA, tR]
t(1− p)− (τ 2C − pτ
1
C) if t ≥ tR
Still by Lemma 4.4.2, ∆ is strictly increasing in t for any t ≤ tA, and it is
unambiguously strictly increasing in t for any t ≥ tR. Hence, ∆ is strictly
monotone only if ∆ is strictly increasing in t over the interval [tA, tR]. Note
that by Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, ∆ cannot be strictly decreasing in t over
the aforementioned interval. Hence it must be that 1− p− ε(1− pR) ≥ 0.
We now show that when the two conditions stated in the lemma hold, then
∆ cannot be a constant of t, for any t ∈ [tA, tR]. Suppose by contradiction
that it is. Then:

















D (1− p− ε(1− pR))



















for any t ∈ [tA, tR]. Furthermore, it must be that ∆(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [tA, tR]
according to Lemma 4.4.1, which is equivalent to:
p =







τ 1D − τ
1
C
and p ∈ [0, 1] by our first condition on the parameter value of ε. By Lemma
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Since we are in an interior equilibrium, note that tR ≥ tD must hold.
Otherwise, country D would not play a best-response following a rejection
of p. Replacing p by its value when 1− p− ε(1− pR) = 0 in the expression





















where the inequality holds by condition B. A contradiction to the fact that
tR ≥ tD.
In Appendix C.4, we show that condition B is necessary for the existence
of PBE in pure strategies in some subgames p. So far, our results imply
that when conditions A and B in Lemma 4.4.4 hold, the payoff gain from
rejecting is increasing in the firm’s type: meaning, an offer from country
C is accepted by low types and rejected by higher types. In particular, in
an interior equilibrium of a subgame p, it must be that the firm of type
1 prefers strictly to reject C’s offer (otherwise, all types would prefer to






then no interior equilibrium exists in subgame p.
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In any interior equilibrium of subgame p, there exists a type tf ∈ [0, 1]
such that all types in [0, tf ) accept and all types in (tf , 1] reject. Since:
∆(0) = −
(




− ετ 1D (pR − pA) ,








When p ≤ p̄, ∆(0) ≤ 0 and tR ≥ max {t◦D(p), TC (p)} hold, we define a type
tf as follows:
tf = BRF (pA, pR) ⇔ ∆(tf ) = 0
and it is such that the firm’s best reponse is to accept p if t ≤ tf , and to
reject p if instead t ≥ tf . From our previous analysis, there exists a unique
type t in [0, tR] such that t = tf . For all p such that ∆(tf = 0) < 0, we
extend BRF to BRF (pA, pR) = 0. Overall, BRF is well-defined, as long as














This condition on the price pR result from the conditions in Lemmas 4.4.3
and 4.4.4. Let PA (tf ) and PR (tf ) be the best response functions of country










on [tf , 1] (28)
respectively. Consider the composite best response function:
Φ (tf ) ≡ BRF (PA (tf ) , PR (tf ))
from [0, 1] to [0, 1] . For any p ∈ [0, 1] , and given our result in Lemma 4.4.3,
the function Φ is well defined on the interval [tf , 1], where tf is given by:
tf = 0 if
















We can now assess the existence of interior equilibria in subgames given
some conditions on the values of C’s offer, p.
Proposition 4.4.4. The threshold type tf is part of an interior equilibrium
of subgame p if and only if it is a fixed point of the mapping Φ and:












Moreover, it must be that tf ≥ tf . Under conditions A and B in Lemma





unique fixed-point in this interval.
Proof. If pR and pA are best responses to tf and tf is a best response to
(pA, pR), then tf must be a fixed-point of Φ. By Lemma 4.4.3, tR ≥ TC (p)
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must hold in an interior equilibrium; hence, tf ≥ tf must be satisfied
in an interior equilibrium. Last, if the fixed-point represents an interior











is the offer made by D when it observes that p was
accepted (in such a case, D infers that the firm’s type is 0 with probability
1). If p < p, then tf = 0 is a fixed point, however it is not part of an
interior equilibrium because for such prices, even type 0 prefers to reject





so that Φ is well defined on [tf , 1]. Since:
Φ(tf ) ≥ tf and Φ(1) ≤ 1,
then by the intermediate values theorem, Φ has at least one fixed-point in
this interval. Since PA and PR are weakly increasing in tf , and BRF is
weakly decreasing in pR, it follows that Φ is weakly non-increasing on its
domain. Thus the fixed-point is unique.
4.4.2 Country D’s optimal offers
Let us first assume that the firm accepted country C’s offer p, i.e. country
D observes the price of p in country C. Then country D believes that the
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firm’s type is distributed according to cdf GA in expression (27), on the
support [0, tf ]. Recall the alternative interpretation of our model. Country





for TD the threshold function in (25), and is trying to maximize a payoff of








tf − τ 1D
]





where t ∈ [0, tf ]. Let us now consider the case where the firm rejects
country C’s offer. Country D believes that the firm’s type is distributed
according to cdf GR in expression (28) on the support (tf , 1]. The supply





















The results about the optimal offers of country D are gathered below.
Proposition 4.4.5. Following an acceptance of country C’s offer, country
D’s problem has an interior solution if and only if tf > tD, with tf the
type of firm which is indifferent between accepting and rejecting country
C’s offer. Country D’s optimal offer pA then solves:
eSA(pA) = 1







. Let tA be the threshold
type associated with country D’s offer pA. The firm of type t accepts pA if
t ≤ tA, and rejects pA otherwise.
Following a rejection of country C’s offer, country D’s problem has an
interior solution if and only if tf < tf . In this case, country D’s offer pR
solves:
eSR(pR) = 1
Otherwise, country D’s optimal offer is pR =
1−τ2D
1−τ1D
. Let tR be the threshold
type associated with country D’s offer pR. The firm of type t accepts pR if
t ≤ tR, and rejects pR otherwise.
The proof follows the same lines as that of Proposition 4.3.1, therefore it
is omitted. Next, we clarify the effect of tf on country D’s expected payoff.
Remark 4.4.1. (1) If tf ≤ tD, then country D’s expected equilibrium
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payoff is strictly decreasing in tf if and only if:
G′(tf )(pR − pA) < G(tf )
(1− pA)
(tf − τ 1D)
i.e., the marginal cost on country D from decreasing the number of types
which accept C’s offer is less than the marginal benefit to country D of
paying a lower price in the case where C’s offer is accepted.
(2) If tf > tD, then country D’s expected equilibrium payoff is strictly
decreasing in tf .
The proof is provided in Appendix C.5. In this version of the game where
the firm is farsighted, country D uses a form of IPR in equilibrium: it bases
its offer to the firm on the price it observes country C pays. Country D may
use IPR for different ends, depending on whether the firm rejects or accepts
C’s offer. In the first case, IPR allows country D to increase the probability
of acceptance of its offer to the firm. Should the price paid by country C
be confidential, country D would have offered pa (see Proposition 4.3.1),
and the firm would have rejected it for sure. The second case happens in
equilibrium only if the threshold type in country C, tf , is sufficiently low
(lower than tD). By observing the price paid by country C, country D can
revise its offer downwards without decreasing the probability of acceptance.
4.4.3 Country C’s optimal offer
In this section, we determine country C’s optimal offer. From our previous
analysis, we know that when conditions A and B in Lemma 4.4.4 hold,
an equilibrium in a subgame p is monotone: the firm’s payoff gain from
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rejecting, ∆, is strictly increasing in t for all t ∈ [0, 1]).

















Any offer p strictly larger than the upper bound is dominated by an offer
strictly lower than p, yet greater than the upper bound. And any offer
strictly less than the lower bound is strictly dominated by an offer larger
than the upper bound, yet strictly lower than 1. The type of firm which is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting p ∈ P ∗f is:
Tf (p) =




D − PR(tf )τ
1
D)
1− p− ε (1− PR(tf ))
(30)
with PR(tf ) country D’s best response following a rejection of p. Recall that
for some fixed offer p and associated threshold type tf , D’s best-response













The denominator in expression (30) is strictly positive by Lemma 4.4.4.
The numerator is positive for any price offer in P ∗f . An alternate expression
of the threshold type tf associated with some offer p is:
tf = TC(p)− ε
(tf − τ
2





and note that tf ≤ TC(p) for any p in the relevant interval.14 Country C’s
problem is to choose a price offer that maximizes its payoff:
(1− p)Sf (p)
where Sf (p) is the supply faced by country C, and whose equation is:
Sf (p) = G (Tf (p)) (L− τ
1
C)
for Tf (p) the threshold type function in (30). Note that country C faces a
shorter supply when the firm is farsighted than when it is myopic. In the
farsighted case, the elasticity of the supply faced by C is:





















(tR − τ 1D)
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The value of the elasticity is positive, for any type t ∈ [0, 1], and any tR ∈
(t, 1]. Z is always positive in an equilibrium, and it is strictly increasing
in t (by condition A in Lemma 4.4.4 and the fact that tR is an increasing
function of t.) More details are provided in Appendix C.6. The relative
elasticity of the supply Sf compared to S, the supply faced by C in the
myopic case, depends on the relation between tR and tf . Note that for all







by country D’s best response. Therefore, Tf (p) ≤
TC(p) for any price offer p.
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values of t ∈ [t̄f , 1], country D’s optimal offer pR is constant at:
1− τ 2D
1− τ 1D
For such values of t, the supply Sf is relatively more elastic than S. The
next remark presents some comparative statics on the threshold type tf .
Remark 4.4.2. The threshold function in expression (30) is increasing in
p and decreasing in ε. Moreover, the supply function Sf (p) converges uni-
formly to the supply function S(p) in the myopic case. Also, its first deriva-
tive with respect to p, S ′f (p), converges uniformly to S
′(p), the derivative of
the myopic supply function.
Proof. Given that ∂∆
∂p
< 0 and ∂∆
∂ε
> 0 and ∂∆
∂tf





< 0. Since ∂Φ
∂tf
< 0, it follows that t∗f is increasing in p and decreasing
in ε.
Our results about country C’s optimal offer are gathered in the proposi-
tion below.
Proposition 4.4.6. Under conditions A and B, country C’s problem has
a unique solution p∗f ∈ P
∗
f , and it is interior if and only if:
eSf (p
∗








. Let t∗f be the type of firm which is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting country C’s equilibrium offer p∗f . For t
∗ the analo-
gous threshold type for the myopic case, and tr the threshold type associated
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See Appendix C.7 for the proof. We compare country C’s payoff between
the farsighted case and the myopic case.
Remark 4.4.3. Country C’s expected payoff is lower in the farsighted case
than in the myopic case.
Proof. Consider some fixed price offer p. At the beginning of this section,
we established that: Tf (p) ≤ TC(p) for any p in the relevant interval.
Meaning, a same price offer is always more likely to be accepted in the
myopic case than in the farsighted one. For some given offer p, country
C’s expected payoff in the myopic case is: G(TC(p))(1 − p), and in the
farsighted case this is: G(Tf (p))(1 − p). By our later argument, we have
G(TC(p))(1− p) ≥ G(Tf (p))(1− p) for all p in the relevant interval. Then
G(TC(p
∗))(1 − p∗) ≥ G(TC(p
∗
f ))(1 − p
∗
f ) ≥ G(Tf (p
∗
f ))(1 − p
∗
f ), where p
∗ is
country C’s optimal offer in the myopic case.
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4.4.4 A characterization of the weak Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria
We summarize our results from the two previous sections below.
Proposition 4.4.7. Under conditions A and B, for every p ∈ [0, 1] , an
essentially unique equilibrium exists in subgame p. Consider p and p given
by expressions (29) and (26), respectively.
1. If p < p, it is a pooling equilibrium where all types reject p. If the
firm rejects p, country D believes that t is distributed according to its
prior belief G and offers p
D
= PR (0) . If the firm accepts p, country















tf = 0 if






































and holds belief GR in (28) when p is rejected.
3. If p > p, it is a pooling equilibrium where all types accept p. Upon
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observing that p is accepted, country D’s belief is its prior belief G and
offers p
D
= PA (1). If the firm rejects p, country D may believe that




beliefs are also possible, and it is possible to support this equilibrium
with beliefs that satisfy the intuitive criterion.
4.5 Two countries when the firm is farsighted,
with a secret rebate
In the previous sections, we showed that the price in country C releases
information about the firm’s type, and influences country D’s offer. In
particular, country D’s offer depends positively on the price that country
C pays. If the firm is farsighted and the details of the deal with country
C cannot be hidden from D, the firm gets an additional incentive to reject
the first country’s offer. Indeed, we showed that any given price offer that
country C may extend is more likely to be rejected when the firm is far-
sighted, which leads to a reduction in C’s payoff.
In order to avoid this penalty in the presence of a farsighted firm, the
first country could make the price that country D observes completely un-
informative about the firm’s type. To this end, country C may offer a
pair of prices (p, r) such that: p is the component of the contract that is
observable to country D if the firm accepts the proposal, and we refer to p
as the list price; and r is the secret rebate that D never knows. An offer
from C that consists of a list price equal to 1 and a secret rebate permits to
isolate the two negotiations completely: whether the firm accepts or rejects
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this contract, country D always observes the price of 1 in the first country,
therefore the latter does not learn anything about the firm’s type.
Under the restriction that the list price must equal 1, country C’s op-
timal offer is r = 1 − p∗, where p∗ is the optimal offer in the myopic case
(characterized in Proposition 4.2.1). If the firm rejects, then it counter-
offers a list price of 1 without a rebate. Note that the firm, even if it is
farsighted, accepts this offer with rebate under the same condition as when
it is myopic (Section 4.2). Indeed, country D’s offer is the same regardless
of the firm’s decision to accept or reject the contract (p = 1, r∗) that coun-
try C proposes. It follows that allowing the use of secret rebates makes
country C as well-off as when the firm is myopic and prices are transparent
(Section 4.3), and strictly better-off than in the case where the firm is far-
sighted and prices are transparent (Section 4.4). Overall, what penalizes
country C is the combination of the firm’s farsightedness and country D
using a form of IPR in its negotiation.
Irrespective of whether the deal with rebate is accepted or rejected by
the firm, country D learns nothing about the firm’s type, and is therefore
worse-off compared to the two previous sections (myopic or farsighted firm
with price transparency). This finding suggests that price transparency is
beneficial to country D. Since there is no informational spillover when the
first country conceals its true offer with a secret rebate, the second coun-
try’s belief in the subgame that follows country C’s proposal is its prior
belief. Note that D’s optimal offer in this case is equal to the price pa in
Proposition 4.3.1, and the associated threshold type is equal to ta.
It is worthwhile noting that the firm is weakly worse-off than in Section
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4.3 (myopic case).15 First, the firm accepts country C’s offer with rebate
if and only if its type is less than t∗ in Section 4.3. Next, all firms whose
type belongs either to [0, t∗] or [tr, 1] are indifferent between an offer made
of a list price of 1 and a rebate equal to 1− p∗, and a direct offer p∗ with-
out rebate (Section 4.3). (Recall that tr is the threshold type defined in
Proposition 4.3.1 in the myopic case). The types less than ta accept the
two countries’ offers, and those between ta and t∗ accept C’s and reject
D’s. The types in the interval [tr, 1]reject both countries’ offers, thus they
get the same profit as in Section 4.3 as well. However, the types in the in-
terval (t∗, tr] are strictly worse-off than in Section 4.3. These types strictly
prefer to accept the offer pr that D would have made, had rebates not been
allowed, than to wait until period τ 2D and earn the price of 1.
In conclusion, there exists a PBE of our game with rebates that precludes
any informational spillover on the second country. The best-responses of
each party in this PBE are the following. At τ 1C , country C offers a pair of
two prices, (p = 1, r = 1 − p∗), where the rebated price p∗ corresponds to
the country’s optimal offer in Section 4.2. The firm of type t accepts any
offer such that:
pC − r ≥
t− τ 2C
t− τ 1C
and rejects any offer such that:
pC − r <
t− τ 2C
t− τ 1C
15Almost nothing can be said about the difference in the firm’s expected payoff in the
farsighted case and the secret case. Note that for very small ε, our result that the firm
is better-off with price transparency than under secrecy holds.
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At τ 2C , the firm counter-offers the list price of 1 and no rebate, for all possible
histories. Country C accepts the counter-offer, for all possible histories. At




and this price is equal to pa, if the history of the game is either h1 = ((p =
1, r = 1 − p∗), A, 1, A) or h2 = ((p = 1, r = 1 − p∗), R, 1, A). For any
other history, country D offers pD =
τ2D
τ1D
. The firm of type t accepts any
price offer pD ≥
t−τ2D
t−τ1D
, and rejects any price offer pD <
t−τ2D
t−τ1D
. At τ 2D, the
firm counter-offers the price of 1, for all possible histories, and country D
accepts the counter-offer, for all possible histories.
The belief system is as follows. At I1, country C’s belief is its prior belief
G. If the second information set of country C is reached, its belief is GR(t)
in (24). If the second information set is not reached, then any belief of
the country is consistent. At I2, country D’s belief is its prior belief G
if the history of the game is either h1 = ((p = 1, r = 1 − p∗), A, 1, A) or
h2 = ((p = 1, r = 1 − p
∗), R, 1, A). Country D believes that the firm is of
type 0 with probability one for any other history. If the second information
set of country D is reached, its belief is:
G(t)−G(ta)
1−G(ta)
on the support (ta, 1], where ta is the threshold type associated with country
D’s optimal offer. If the second information set of country D is not reached,
then any belief is consistent.
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4.6 Conclusion
We studied the outcomes of the sequential negotiations of two countries
with a monopolist pharmaceutical firm. We assumed that the firm holds
private information about the duration of its monopoly, which affects its
willingness to accept lower offers against earlier deals. The model high-
lights four main ideas.
First, that a form of international price referencing (IPR) emerges nat-
urally when prices agreed with countries that reached earlier agreements
carry information that is valuable to subsequent countries. In particular,
we find that a country which can observe the transaction price in another
country formulates an offer that depends positively on this transaction
price.
Second, that IPR is beneficial to the countries which negotiate last and is
detrimental to those which negotiate first. In an equilibrium of our model,
the countries that come last in the order of the negotiations benefit from
IPR, and apply it to increase the probability of acceptance of their own
offers. As the corresponding optimal offers depend positively on the prices
obtained by those which negotiated first, the firm has an additional incen-
tive to reject these countries’ offers.
Third, that in order to avoid this penalty, secret rebates emerge as a nat-
ural arrangement between the countries that negotiate first and the firm.
Fourth, that when the firm is farsighted, secret rebates benefit the countries
which negotiate first and are detrimental to those which negotiate last.
149
Bibliography
[1] Nizar Allouch. On the private provision of public goods on networks.
Journal of Economic Theory, 157:527–552, 2015.
[2] Richard W Ault, T Randolph Beard, David N Laband, and Richard P
Saba. Rebates, inventories, and intertemporal price discrimination.
Economic Inquiry, 38(4):570–578, 2000.
[3] Robert J Aumann. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strate-
gies. Journal of mathematical Economics, 1(1):67–96, 1974.
[4] Robert J Aumann. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian
rationality. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages
1–18, 1987.
[5] Robert J Aumann and Roger B Myerson. Endogenous formation of
links between players and of coalitions: An application of the Shapley
value. In Networks and Groups, pages 207–220. Springer, 2003.
[6] Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal. A noncooperative model of net-
work formation. Econometrica, 68(5):1181–1229, 2000.
150
[7] Coralio Ballester, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, and Yves Zenou. Who’s
who in networks. wanted: The key player. Econometrica, 74(5):1403–
1417, 2006.
[8] Robert C Blattberg and Alan Levin. Modelling the effectiveness and
profitability of trade promotions. Marketing Science, 6(2):124–146,
1987.
[9] Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange, and Rachel Kranton. Rumors and
social networks. International Economic Review, 59(2):421–448, 2018.
[10] Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, et al. Communication networks with
endogenous link strength. Games and Economic Behavior, 66(1):39–
56, 2009.
[11] Francis Bloch, Matthew O Jackson, and Pietro Tebaldi. Centrality
measures in networks. Available at SSRN 2749124, 2019.
[12] Phillip Bonacich. Power and centrality: A family of measures. Amer-
ican journal of sociology, 92(5):1170–1182, 1987.
[13] Yann Bramoullé and Rachel Kranton. Public goods in networks. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 135(1):478–494, 2007.
[14] Yann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton, and Martin D’amours. Strategic
interaction and networks. American Economic Review, 104(3):898–
930, 2014.
[15] Yann Bramoullé, Dunia López-Pintado, Sanjeev Goyal, and Fernando
Vega-Redondo. Network formation and anti-coordination games. In-
ternational Journal of game Theory, 33(1):1–19, 2004.
151
[16] Nathan Canen, Matthew O Jackson, and Francesco Trebbi. Endoge-
nous networks and legislative activity. Available at SSRN 2823338,
2019.
[17] Michel Chevalier and Ronald C Curhan. Retail promotions as a func-
tion of trade promotions: A descriptive analysis. Sloan Management
Review (pre-1986), 18(1):19, 1976.
[18] Chun-Hung Chiu, Tsan-Ming Choi, and Christopher S Tang. Price,
rebate, and returns supply contracts for coordinating supply chains
with price-dependent demands. Production and Operations Manage-
ment, 20(1):81–91, 2011.
[19] Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Communication and coordination in social
networks. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(1):1–16, 2000.
[20] Patricia M Danzon. Price discrimination for pharmaceuticals: Welfare
effects in the US and the EU. International Journal of the Economics
of Business, 4(3):301–322, 1997.
[21] Patricia M Danzon. Differential pricing of pharmaceuticals: theory,
evidence and emerging issues. PharmacoEconomics, 36(12):1395–1405,
2018.
[22] Patricia M Danzon and Adrian Towse. Differential pricing for pharma-
ceuticals: reconciling access, R&D and patents. International journal
of health care finance and economics, 3(3):183–205, 2003.
[23] Patricia M Danzon, Y Richard Wang, and Liang Wang. The impact
of price regulation on the launch delay of new drugs evidence from
152
twenty-five major markets in the 1990s. Health economics, 14(3):269–
292, 2005.
[24] Joseph A DiMasi, Ronald W Hansen, and Henry G Grabowski. The
price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs. Journal
of health economics, 22(2):151–185, 2003.
[25] Joseph A DiMasi and Cherie Paquette. The economics of follow-
on drug research and development. Pharmacoeconomics, 22(2):1–14,
2004.
[26] Lorenzo Ductor, Marcel Fafchamps, Sanjeev Goyal, and Marco J
van der Leij. Social networks and research output. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 96(5):936–948, 2014.
[27] Bhaskar Dutta, Anne Van den Nouweland, and Stef Tijs. Link forma-
tion in cooperative situations. International Journal of Game Theory,
27(2):245–256, 1998.
[28] Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. Persuasion on networks. CEPR
Discussion Paper No. DP13723, 2019.
[29] Mats Ekelund and Björn Persson. Pharmaceutical pricing in a reg-
ulated market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(2):298–306,
2003.
[30] Jaime Espín, Joan Rovira, Antoinette Calleja, Natasha Azzopardi-
Muscat, Erica Richardson, Willy Palm, and Dimitra Panteli. How can
voluntary cross-border collaboration in public procurement improve
access to health technologies in Europe. Policy brief, 21, 2016.
153
[31] Jaime Espín, Michael Schlander, Brian Godman, Pippa Anderson,
Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz, Isabelle Borget, Adam Hutchings, Steven
Flostrand, Adam Parnaby, and Claudio Jommi. Projecting phar-
maceutical expenditure in EU5 to 2021: adjusting for the impact of
discounts and rebates. Applied health economics and health policy,
16(6):803–817, 2018.
[32] Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal. The law of the few. American
Economic Review, 100(4):1468–92, 2010.
[33] Begoña Garcia Mariñoso, Izabela Jelovac, and Pau Olivella. External
referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation. Health Economics,
20(6):737–756, 2011.
[34] Begoña Garcia-Mariñoso and Pau Olivella. Informational spillovers
and the sequential launching of pharmaceutical drugs. Technical re-
port, Mimeo City University, London, 2005.
[35] Eitan Gerstner and James D Hess. A theory of channel price promo-
tions. The American Economic Review, pages 872–886, 1991.
[36] Eitan Gerstner and James D Hess. Pull promotions and channel co-
ordination. Marketing Science, 14(1):43–60, 1995.
[37] Eitan Gerstner, James D Hess, et al. Who benefits from large rebates:
Manufacturer, retailer or consumer. Economics Letters, 36(1):5–8,
1991.
[38] David A Goodman and Kavin W Moody. Determining optimum price
promotion quantities. Journal of Marketing, 34(4):31–39, 1970.
154
[39] Sanjeev Goyal and Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez. R&D networks. Rand
Journal of Economics, pages 686–707, 2001.
[40] Sanjeev Goyal and Fernando Vega-Redondo. Network formation and
social coordination. Games and Economic Behavior, 50(2):178–207,
2005.
[41] Sverre Grepperud and Pedersen Pål Andreas. Positioning and nego-
tiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing. European Journal of
Political Economy, page 101853, 2020.
[42] Jeanne Hagenbach and Frédéric Koessler. Strategic communication
networks. The Review of Economic Studies, 77(3):1072–1099, 2010.
[43] Peter Herman. Endogenous network formation and the provision of a
public good. Available at SSRN 2690322, 2014.
[44] Andrew M Hill, Melissa J Barber, and Dzintars Gotham. Esti-
mated costs of production and potential prices for the WHO essential
medicines list. BMJ global health, 3(1):e000571, 2018.
[45] Aidan Hollis. Me-too drugs: is there a problem. WHO report, 2004.
[46] Nicolas Houy and Izabela Jelovac. Drug launch timing and interna-
tional reference pricing. Health economics, 24(8):978–989, 2015.
[47] Matthew O Jackson. A survey of network formation models: stability
and efficiency. Group formation in economics: Networks, clubs, and
coalitions, 664:11–49, 2005.
155
[48] Matthew O Jackson and Asher Wolinsky. A strategic model of so-
cial and economic networks. Journal of economic theory, 71(1):44–74,
1996.
[49] Izabela Jelovac. On the relationship between the negotiated prices of
pharmaceuticals and the patients co-payment. In VI EHEW meeting,
Marseille, volume 8, 2002.
[50] Izabela Jelovac and Catalina Bordoy. Pricing and welfare implica-
tions of parallel imports in the pharmaceutical industry. International
journal of health care finance and economics, 5(1):5–21, 2005.
[51] Sumit Joshi, Ahmed Saber Mahmud, and Sudipta Sarangi. Network
formation with multigraphs and strategic complementarities. Journal
of Economic Theory, page 105033, 2020.
[52] Markus Kinateder and Luca Paolo Merlino. Public goods in en-
dogenous networks. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
9(3):187–212, 2017.
[53] Margaret K Kyle. Pharmaceutical price controls and entry strategies.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(1):88–99, 2007.
[54] Marie Lalanne and Paul Seabright. The old boy network: The impact
of professional networks on remuneration in top executive jobs. 2016.
[55] Hau L Lee and Meir J Rosenblatt. A generalized quantity discount
pricing model to increase supplier’s profits. Management science,
32(9):1177–1185, 1986.
[56] Frank R Lichtenberg and Tomas J Philipson. The dual effects of intel-
lectual property regulations: within-and between-patent competition
156
in the US pharmaceuticals industry. The Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 45(S2):643–672, 2002.
[57] Z John Lu and William S Comanor. Strategic pricing of new pharma-
ceuticals. Review of economics and statistics, 80(1):108–118, 1998.
[58] Dov Monderer and Lloyd S Shapley. Potential games. Games and
economic behavior, 14(1):124–143, 1996.
[59] Steven Morgan, Jamie Daw, and Paige Thomson. International best
practices for negotiating reimbursement contracts with price rebates
from pharmaceutical companies. Health Affairs, 32(4):771–777, 2013.
[60] Steven G Morgan, Sabine Vogler, and Anita K Wagner. Payers expe-
riences with confidential pharmaceutical price discounts: a survey of
public and statutory health systems in North America, Europe, and
Australasia. Health Policy, 121(4):354–362, 2017.
[61] Stephane Régnier. What is the value of me-too drugs? Health care
management science, 16(4):300–313, 2013.
[62] William H Sandholm. Population games and evolutionary dynamics.
MIT press, 2010.
[63] F Michael Scherer. How US antitrust can go astray: the brand name
prescription drug litigation. International Journal of the Economics
of Business, 4(3):239–256, 1997.
[64] R SELTEN. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium
points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory,
4:25–55, 1975.
157
[65] Marco Slikker and Anne Van Den Nouweland. Network formation
models with costs for establishing links. Review of Economic Design,
5(3):333–362, 2000.
[66] Eva Tardos and Tom Wexler. Network formation games and the po-
tential function method. Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 487–516,
2007.
[67] Adrian Towse, Michele Pistollato, Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz, Zeba Khan,
Satyin Kaura, and Louis Garrison. European Union pharmaceutical
markets: a case for differential pricing? International Journal of the
Economics of Business, 22(2):263–275, 2015.
[68] José Luis Valverde and Eduardo Pisani. Globalisation of the Pharma-
ceutical Industry. IOS Press, 2016.
[69] Sabine Vogler, Valérie Paris, and Dimitra Panteli. Ensuring access to
medicines: How to redesign pricing, reimbursement and procurement?
World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, 2018.
[70] Sabine Vogler and Kenneth R Paterson. Can price transparency con-
tribute to more affordable patient access to medicines? PharmacoEco-
nomics Open, 1(1):145–147, 2017.
[71] Sabine Vogler, Peter Schneider, and Nina Zimmermann. Evolution of
average European medicine prices: implications for the methodology
of external price referencing. PharmacoEconomics Open, 3(3):303–309,
2019.
158
[72] Sabine Vogler, Nina Zimmermann, Claudia Habl, Jutta Piessnegger,
and Anna Bucsics. Discounts and rebates granted to public payers for






A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3.2
The proof is by contradiction. The network g is strict Nash, and there
are two components C and D in g that are wheels. By Corollary 2.3.3
statement 1, C and D are not comparable via R; and a player j has a path
to anyone in X if and only if j ∈ X, for any component X ∈ {C,D}. Note
that all players in X have the same reach, for any component X ∈ {C,D}.
Let i be any agent in C; and let j be any agent in D. If κi(g) ≥ κj(g),
then it follows immediately that g′j = i is a strictly profitable deviation,
as: κl(g′j, g−j) = κi(g) + 1 > κj(g), and |g
′
j| ≤ |gj|. Following a similar
argument for the case where κi(g) < κj(g), the deviation g′i = j for player
i is strictly profitable. A contradiction that g is strict Nash.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3.5
This is a direct proof. I denote the agents in the wheel component as
Nw = {i1, . . . , inw} where 3 ≤ nw ≤ n, and the wheel is characterized
as i1 → i2 . . . → inw → i1. In a non-exhaustive wheel, the statement
holds trivially for any singleton. Because players in a wheel component are
symmetric, let me consider agent i1. Assume that i1 has a deviation g′i1
such that |g′i1 | ≥ |gi1 | and g
′
i1
6⊆ gi1 . Let g
′ = (g′i1 , g−i1) be the network that







. (Recall that gi1 = i2 in g.) Note that the players whose reach is
affected by i1’s deviation all belong to Nw. I distinguish between two cases:
1. g′i1 ⊂ Nw. It follows immediately that gi1 yields a larger payoff than
g′i1 , as κj(g
′) ≤ κj(g) for all j ∈ N , and the inequality holds strictly
for all agents in Nw \ {i2}.
2. g′i1 6⊂ Nw, i.e. ∃k ∈ g
′
i1
such that gk = ∅. Let k any such element of
g′i1 , and consider g̃i1 = (i1∪g
′
i1
)\{k} an alternate deviation for player




note that: κi2(g̃) = κi2(g
′)− 1, κi3(g̃) = κi3(g
′), and κim(g̃) > κim(g
′)

















φ (nw − 1 + |g̃i1 |)− φ
(





and this is always positive when φ is concave and nw ≥ 3. These two
conditions are met by Proposition 2.3.1 and if Assumption A holds.
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Therefore g′i1 is never a best-response of i1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3.6
The proof is by contradiction. Let me denote as G+1i the set of deviations
for player i such that i adds one link to the set of links i has in g:
G+1i (g) = {g
′
i ∈ Gi : |g
′
i| = |gi|+ 1}





i that maximizes the ratio in Lemma 2.3.6; and let me re-write
ĝi has gi ∪ L, with |L| = l > 1. Let me first analyze the case where g is a
non-exhaustive wheel. I call Nw the set of agents who belong to the wheel
component of g. Given the architecture of g and if i ∈ Nw, the value of the




[φ(nw + l − 1)− φ(nw − 1)]
(The value of the ratio is strictly less than A if ∃ k ∈ L such that k ∈ Nw.)
Next, consider any deviation g̃i ∈ G
+1
i of the form g̃i = gi ∪ {j} with
j 6= Nw. The value of the ratio in Lemma 2.3.6 is:
B = nw[φ(nw)− φ(nw − 1)]
As φ is concave, A is always less than B, and the result follows.
Assume instead that i /∈ Nw. For any strategy ĝi = gi∪L with |L| = l >
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1, the ratio in Lemma 2.3.6 is at most equal to:
C =
φ(nw − 1 + l)− φ(0)
l
and it is equal to C if ∃k ∈ L such that k ∈ Nw. Take any deviation
g̃i = j ∈ Nw. The ratio is equal to:
D = φ(nw)− φ(0) > C
by the concavity of φ. The result follows. The proof for the empty network
follows the same line, and is therefore omitted.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Claim 1. Consider a fixed value c of the cost of a link. A maximum of
the potential function for c either corresponds to a wheel network, a non-
exhaustive wheel or the empty network.
Proof. First, consider all strategy profiles g = (g1, . . . , gn) such that
∑
i∈N gi ≥
n. In any such network g, v(g) = nφ(n − 1). The architecture that mini-
mizes the total cost of network formation is a wheel network.
Next, consider all strategy profiles g such that
∑
i∈N gi = m, where m
is an integer such that n > m ≥ 3. I segregate the set of all networks
g that have the aforementioned property into two sets: the set G1, that
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contains all networks with strictly less than n components; and the com-
plement of this set is G2, and it contains all nonempty networks with n
components. In any network in the set G1, the maximum reach of an
agent is m − 1. An architecture that gives this maximal reach to a max-
imum number of players (which is constrained by the number of links m)
is the non-exhaustive wheel with nw = m, and note that for this network,
v(gn.e.w) = mφ(m − 1) + (n −m)φ(0). Note that this architecture is that
which minimizes the cost of network formation. Hence if a maximum of the
potential belongs to G1, then it is a non-exhaustive wheel. Among all net-
works in the set G2, it is immediate that the architecture that maximizes
v is a chain network on m+ 1 agents: i1 → i1 . . . → im+1. In this network,
note that v(g) = (n−m)φ(0)+
∑m
h=1 φ(h). Fixing m, it is immediate that
the non-exhaustive wheel on m agents yields a larger collective return than
the chain on m+ 1 agents when φ is concave and m ≥ 3.
Now, consider all networks that have either 1 or 2 links in total. For 2
links, it is immediate that the architecture that maximizes the collective
return is a chain on 3 agents. I show that no network that has either 1
or 2 links can maximize the potential function. For this, recall first that
a maximum of the potential is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Take any
chain network on 2 or 3 agents. If it is Nash, then c ≤ φ(h) − φ(0) with
h ∈ {1, 2}, for h the reach of the root component. Let me first consider
the case of the chain on 3 agents. Take any player i who has no link in this
network. If i forms a link to the root of the chain, then the collective return
increases at least by φ(h+1)−φ(0), and the deviation is strictly profitable.
If the chain is just on 2 agents, there is just one link in the network, that I
refer to as i → j. If this is a Nash equilibrium then c ≤ φ(1)−φ(0). Recall
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that n ≥ 3. Consider the strategy gj = k, for any k 6= i, for agent j. The
collective return increases by φ(2) − φ(0). Hence the deviation is strictly
profitable given the value of c, and the network is not Nash - hence it is
not a maximum of the potential for the value c of the cost of a link.
Claim 2. For any value of the cost c, a maximum of the potential is either
a wheel network or the empty network.
Proof. I take on the notations introduced in Proposition 2.3.1 for referring
to the wheel network (gw), non-exhaustive wheels (gn.e.w) and the empty
network (ge). First, P (gw) = nφ(n − 1) − nc, P (gn.e.w) = nwφ(nw − 1) +
(n− nw)φ(0)− nwc with 3 ≤ nw < n and P (ge) = nφ(0). Note that:
P (gw) ≤ P (ge) ⇔ c ≥ φ(n− 1)− φ(0)
Assume that c ≥ φ(n− 1)− φ(0). Note that:
P (ge)−P (gn.e.w) = nw (c− [φ(nw − 1)− φ(0)]) ≥ nw (φ(n− 1)− φ(nw − 1)) > 0
Hence the maximum of the potential is achieved in the empty network when
c ≥ φ(n− 1)− φ(0).
Next, consider the values of c such that c < φ(n− 1)− φ(0). Note that:
P (gw)−P (gn.e.w) = n (φ(n− 1)− φ(0))−nw (φ(nw − 1)− φ(0))−(n−nw)c
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and
c < φ(n−1)−φ(0) ⇒ P (gw)−P (gn.e.w) > nw (φ(n− 1)− φ(nw − 1)) > 0
Hence the maximum of the potential is achieved in a wheel network when
c < φ(n− 1)− φ(0).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Statement 1. Consider any non-exhaustive wheel on nw agents. Take the
payoff of any isolated singleton i in this network; this is:
ui(g
n.e.w) = nwφ(nw − 1) + (n− nw)φ(0)
Recall that if this non-exhaustive is strict Nash, then the wheel network is
strict Nash as well. If i had been part of a wheel network instead, then his
payoff would be:
ui(g
w) = nφ(n− 1)− c
If gn.e.w is strict Nash, then:






















and the right side of the inequality is strictly positive, as φ(n− 1)−φ(0) >
φ(nw − 1) − φ(h), for any h such that 0 ≤ h ≤ nw − 1 and any nw such
that 3 ≤ nw ≤ n− 1.
Statements 2 and 4. Consider any non-exhaustive wheel on nw agents.
If it is strict Nash, then 3 ≤ nw ≤ n− 1. In a non-exhaustive wheel, those
in the wheel component get a strictly lower payoff than any of the isolated
singletons. The lowest payoff of an agent in the network equals:
nwφ(nw − 1) + (n− nw)φ(0)− c





For the value of cnw , see Proposition 2.3.2. The expression above is increas-
ing in nw. Hence, the lowest payoff an agent can earn in a non-exhaustive
wheel is when nw = 3 and c = c3, which is:
(n− 2)φ(0) + φ(1) + φ(2)
Recall that if a non-exhaustive wheel is strict Nash, so is the empty net-
work. (ce < c3, and recall that cnw is increasing in nw.) Any agent in the
empty network earns the payoff of nφ(0). The result follows. A similar
argument holds for proving that the wheel network Pareto dominates the
empty network for any c ∈ (ce, cw).
Statement 3. Consider any strict Nash network that has the architecture
of a non-exhaustive wheel on nw agents. Consider any isolated singleton
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i in this network. His current payoff is when nw = n − 1, and the payoff
differential in this case is:
nwφ(nw − 1) + (n− nw)φ(0)
Recall that if any non-exhaustive wheel is strict Nash, then the wheel net-
work is also strict Nash. The minimum payoff that i could get in a wheel
network, given the values of the cost for which the non-exhaustive wheel is
strict Nash, is:





The payoff differential for agent i is equal to:
nwφ(nw − 1) + (n− nw)φ(0)− (nφ(n− 1)− c
nw)




[φ(nw − 1)− φ(h)]− n[φ(n− 1)− φ(0)]
Note that this is an increasing function of nw. Hence, the largest payoff
gain that i can have in being in a non-exhaustive wheel instead of being in
a wheel network is:





For some non-exhaustive wheels not to be Pareto dominated by the wheel
network, the above expression needs to be positive.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
The proof is by contradiction. The strategy profile g = (g1, . . . , gn) is a
maximum of the potential, however there exist two components in g, C
and D, such that |C| and |D| are both strictly larger than 1. Note that
either C R D or C and D are not comparable. In any case, there is at least
one of these two components, that I designated as being D, that does not
have access to the other: d(i, j; g) = ∞ for any i ∈ D and j ∈ C. Consider
any player i ∈ D and any player j ∈ C. Let the network g′ be given by the
following strategy profile:
1. g′i = ∅ : in g
′, agent i has no link at all,
2. g′j = gi ∪ gj : in g
′, agent j forms the same links as in g, and forms
the links that i has in g,
3. for all k such that i ∈ gk, g′k = gk \ {i} ∪ {j} : all of the agents who
form a link towards i in g redirect their link towards j in g′,
4. g′k = gk for the rest of the agents.
In g′, there are strictly less infinite distances than in g. Let me just focus
on the distances between the agents in C and D. In g, if C and D are not
comparable via R, there are at least 2|C| × |D| infinite distances, as none
of the two components can access the other. In g′, there are 2[|C|+ |D|−1]
infinite distances: no agent in C have access to i, i does not have access to
anyone in C ∪D \ {i}, and none of the agents in D \ {i} have acess to i.
Note that 2|C|× |D|−2[|C|+ |D|−1] is always positive when |C|, |D| > 1.
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The rest of the distances between the agents in C and D are weakly shorter
in g′. Hence v(g′) ≥ v(g). If C R D in g, then there are |D| × |C| infinite
distances, due to the agents in D who cannot access those in C. In g′, there
are |C| + |D| − 1 infinite distances, as i is isolated from the agents in C
and D, Therefore the number of infinite distances is lower in g′ than in g;
and the rest of the distances are weakly shorter in g′ than in g. Again, we
have v(g′) ≥ v(g). Note that the network g′ are weakly less links than the
network g, as g′j ≤ gj (the inequality holds strictly if gj ∩ gi 6= ∅). Thus
the potential is strictly higher in g′ than in g. A contradiction.
A.7 Definition of flower networks
My definition of a flower network is inspired from that of Bala and Goyal
(2000, [6]). The main difference with theirs is about the size of the petals.
Definition A.7.1 A flower network gf (n, x) on n agents and x links par-
titions the set N into a central individual, say agent n, and a collection
P = {P1, . . . ,Pq} where Pk ∈ P is nonempty. A set Pk ∈ P of agents is re-
ferred to as a petal. Let m be the number of petals, l = |Pk| the cardinality
of petal Pk and denote the agents in Pk as {k1, . . . , kl}. A flower network is
then defined by setting n → k1 → k2 . . . → kl → n for each petal Pk ∈ P ,
and no other agent than kj has a link towards kj+1, where (kj, kj+1) belong
to the same petal Pk, for any 0 ≤ j ≤ l given that k0 = n = kl+1. The
number of petals is m = x − (n − 1) and the maximum difference in the
petals cardinalities is 1. The cardinality of the smallest petal is s = ⌊ n
m
⌋.
There are m(s+1)−x petals whose cardinality is l = s and the rest of the
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x−ms petals have cardinality l = s+ 1.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2.5.3 (Code)
The software is R. The list of packages to download is:
l i b r a r y ( combinat )
l i b r a r y ( compi le r )
l i b r a r y ( igraph )
l i b r a r y ( abind )
l i b r a r y ( i t e r p c )
l i b r a r y ( Matrix )
l i b r a r y ( graph )
l i b r a r y ( PairViz )
l i b r a r y ( adagio )
l i b r a r y ( i t e r p c )
l i b r a r y ( data . t ab l e )
l i b r a r y ( l a t t i c e )
l i b r a r y ( genera lCorr )
l i b r a r y ( ml too l s )
l i b r a r y ( dplyr )
It suffices to copy paste this code and to make it run on R.
# 1. n denotes the number o f agents , and K the number o f l i n k s
n = 5 #6
K = 5 #from 3 to 2(n−1)






# 2. Get a l l adjacency matr i ce s that have K e n t r i e s equal to 1 .
func <− f unc t i on (n , m) t (combn(P, K, func t i on ( a ){ z=in t e g e r (n ) ; z [ a ]=1; z } ) )
Z <− func (P,K)
get_A <− f unc t i on (n , i ){ M <− matrix (NA, n , n)
diag (M) <− 0
M[ lower . t r i (M, diag=F) & i s . na (M) ] <− as . vec to r (Z [ i , 1 : L ] )
M[ upper . t r i (M, diag=F) & i s . na (M) ] <− as . vec to r (Z [ i , H:P ] )
re turn (M)}
# Compile .
g <− cmpfun (get_A)
g
A <− l i s t ( )
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow (Z) ){
A [ [ i ] ] <− graph . adjacency ( g (n , i ) )}
#4. For each adjacency matrix , get the d i s t anc e matrix .
# Then , get the number o f d i s t an c e s having l ength L ,
# f o r L between 0 and n−1. Add an entry f o r i n f i n i t e d i s t an c e s .
d i s t <− f unc t i on (n , i ) {G <− s h o r t e s t . paths (A [ [ i ] ] , mode="out ")
f r e q <− as . vec to r ( as . data . t ab l e ( t ab l e (G) ) )
re turn ( f r e q )}
# Compile :
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dt <− cmpfun ( d i s t )
dt
M <− l i s t ( )
R <− l i s t ( )
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow (Z) ){ R [ [ i ]]<− t ( dt (n , i ) )
i f (R [ [ i ] ] [ 1 , l ength (R [ [ i ] ] [ 1 , ] ) ]==" In f ")
{ M[ [ i ] ] = matrix ( data= c (R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , 1 : l ength (R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , ] ) − 1 ] ,
rep (0 , n+1−l ength (R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , ] ) ) ,R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , l ength (R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , ] ) ] ) ,
nrow=1, nco l=n+1)}
e l s e
{ M[ [ i ] ] = matrix ( data=c (R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , ] , rep (0 , n+1−l ength (R [ [ i ] ] [ 2 , ] ) ) ) ,
nrow=1 , nco l=n+1)}
colnames (M[ [ i ] ] ) <− c ( 1 : n−1, " I n f ")
rownames (M[ [ i ] ] ) <− c ("Number o f d i s t an c e s o f l ength y")
M[ [ i ] ] <− mapply (M[ [ i ] ] [ 1 , ] , FUN=as . numeric ) }
#6. In order to cut the computing time , the remaining code i s run
# on the networks that have d i f f e r e n t d i s t ance d i s t r i b u t i o n .
# Get the d i s t anc e d i s t r i b u t i o n s .
Dif f_dt <− unique (M)
CDF <− l i s t ( )
Cumulative_Distrib <− f unc t i on ( i ){ C =Diff_dt [ [ i ] ] [ 1 ]
f o r ( k in 1 : n+1) C[ k ] = sum(C[ k−1]+Diff_dt [ [ i ] ] [ k ] )
r e turn (C)}
# Compile
CD <− cmpfun ( Cumulative_Distrib )
CD
f o r ( i in 1 : l ength ( Dif f_dt ) ){CDF[ [ i ] ] <− CD ( i ) }
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Matrix_CDF <− t ( matrix ( data=un l i s t (CDF) , nrow=n+1, nco l=length (CDF) ) )
colnames (Matrix_CDF) <− c ( 1 : n−1, " I n f ")
rownames (Matrix_CDF) <− c ( 1 : l ength (CDF) )
MCDF <− Matrix_CDF
#7. I f i r s t compute the d i s t ance d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the f l owe r .
#As n=K=5, t h i s i s ( 5 , 10 , 15 , 20 , 25 , 25 ) .
#Then I get the d i f f e r e n c e between each row o f MCDF,
#and the d i s t anc e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the f l owe r .
#Al l r e s u l t s are gathered in the matrix "Compare " .
X=rep ( c (5 , 10 , 15 , 20 , 25 ,25) , nrow (MCDF) )
Benchmark <− matrix ( data=c (X) , byrow=T, nrow=nrow (Matrix_CDF) )
colnames (Benchmark ) <− c ( 1 : n−1, " I n f ")
rownames (Benchmark ) <− c ( 1 : l ength (CDF) )
Compare <− MCDF − Benchmark
#8. Now we can see which networks are cand idate s f o r equ i l i b r i um .
# Keep the networks that are not dominated by the wheel .
s e l e c t <− Compare [ ! apply (Compare , 1 , f unc t i on (x ) a l l (0 >= x) &
sum(x ) <0 ) , ]
s e l e c t
#For n=K=5, " s e l e c t " has l ength 1 .
# 9 . Find back the adjacency matr i ce s o f the equ i l i b r i um cand idate s .
r1 <− which ( apply (Compare , 1 , f unc t i on (x ) a l l . equal (x , s e l e c t ) ) == "TRUE")
r2 <− which ( sapply (M,
func t i on (x ) i d e n t i c a l (x , D i f f_d i s t r i b [ [ r e turn1 [ [ 1 ] ] ] ] ) ) )
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B.1 Indifference curve of country 1
Claim: The indifference curve of country 1 in expression (14) is increasing
convex in p1.





α[1− γp1 + (v̄ + α)][(v̄ + α)(1− γ) + (1− γp1)] + γ(v̄ + α)[1 + α(1− γp1)]
α[1− γp1 + (v̄ + α)]2
The sign of the derivative is given by the sign of the numerator. As long
as p1 ≤ 1γ , i.e. the quantity demanded is strictly positive, all terms in the





2γ2(v̄ + α)[1− α(v̄ + α)]
α[1− γp1 + (v̄ + α)]3
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The sign is that of the numerator. It is positive if country 1’s payoff v̄ does
not exceed 1
α
− α. We show that this is always true for any contract that
satisfies p1 − r ≥ 0. The expression of country 1’s payoff is:
v∗(p1, r) =
α(1− γp1)
1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1
[1− (p1 − r)]− α.
The contract where p1 = r = 0 maximizes country 1’s welfare: v∗(0, 0) = 0.
For any payoff level v̄ that country 1 can achieve by contracting with the
firm, we have that: v̄ ≤ v∗(0, 0) ≤ 1
α
− α. The result follows.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
First, we specify the largest profit the firm could earn by trading with
country 1. By Lemma 3.3.1, p1 ≤ pM2 in any PO-IR contract. Given this




≥ 0 for all values of y ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the highest profit
the firm could get is when y = 1; hence p1 ≥ 1 as we do not allow for
negative rebates. Consider the firm’s total profit if the latter trades with
both countries, fixing p1 − r = 1. The expression of the firm’s profit for
y = 1 is:
π∗(p1; y = 1) =
α(1− γp1)
1 + α− αγp1
+ θπ2(p1).











The first term is negative, while the right term is weakly positive because
p1 ≤ p
M
2 . Re-arranging this right term by setting π2(p1) = p1q2(p1) for
q2(p1) the demand function on the second market, one gets:




(1 + α− αγp1)2
+ θ [(1− |ǫ2(p1)|)q2(p1)] .
Let us call p̄ the price that equalizes the first derivative to zero. If the sign




means that the firm would do actually better by not selling anything on
the first market.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Claim: If A = (pA1 , r
A) and B = (pB1 , r





PO-IR contracts, then it must be that rA ≤ rB.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that A and B are two Pareto
optimal contracts. WLOG, we set pB1 > p
A
1 . By contradiction, we consider
that rA > rB. First, note that yA = pA1 − r
A, the net price associated with
contract A, is strictly lower than yB = pB1 − r
B, the net price associated
with contract B. It is immediate that country 1 prefers A over B. Hence it
must be that the firm’s profit is strictly larger under the terms of contract
B, otherwise A would Pareto dominate B. Other things being equal, the
firm’s profit in expression (11) is increasing in the list price and decreasing
in the rebate. Therefore, π̄B = π(pB1 , r
B) > π̄A = π(pA1 , r
A). Also, the
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1 + αy − αγp1
is both decreasing in the list price and the net price, holding the rest of
the variables constant. Let C = (pB1 , r
C) be the contract such that the list
price is the same as in contract B, and the rebate rC is such that the firm
is indifferent between contracts C and A (i.e. π(pB1 , r
C) = π̄A). In other
words,






α[1− γpB1 − (π̄
A − θπ2(pB1 ))]
where the function corresponds to the expression of the firm’s isoprofit in
(15) for the level of profit π̄A. Let yC be the net price associated with
contract C, i.e. yC = pB1 − r
C . If contract A is Pareto optimal, then it
must be that the country strictly prefers A over C, as the firm is indifferent








By Lemma 3.3.3, A is Pareto optimal if pA1 ≥ p̃(π̄
A). Since pB1 > p
A
1 , this
means that the quantity traded is lower with contract C than with contract




A)). Also, as π̄A < π̄B, we have by Lemma 3.3.2
that p̂1(π̄A) ≥ p̂1(π̄B). Now if B is Pareto optimal, then it must be that
pB1 ≤ p̂1(π̄





A). Thus that yC < yA.
Next, consider contract D = (pA1 , r
D) such that the list price is the same
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as in contract A, and the firm is indifferent between contracts B and D.
(π(pA1 , r
D) = π(pB1 , r
B) = π̄B.) It follows that rD is given by:






α[1− γpA1 − (π̄
B − θπ2(pA1 ))]
If B is Pareto optimal, then the country must strictly prefer B over D as








where yB = pB1 − r
B and yD = pA1 − r
D. Note that the quantity traded is







B)). To see why, recall from Lemma 3.3.3 that if B is
Pareto optimal, then pB1 ≥ p̃1(π̄
B); and that if A is also Pareto optimal,
then pA1 ≥ p̃1(π̄
A). Also by Lemma 3.3.3, we know that p̃1(π̄A) ≥ p̃1(π̄B),
as p̃1(.) is a decreasing function of the firm’s profit level and π̄A < π̄B. By
transitivity, we have: p̃1(π̄B) ≤ p̃1(π̄A) ≤ pA1 < p
B
1 . Note that the net price
associated with contract D is greater than that associated with contract





B) if B is PO-IR, it follows that yD > yB.
We go back to the inequalities in (31) and (32). We use the expression
of the firm’s isoprofit curve in (15) to express all net prices yA, yB, yC and











(π̄ − θπ2(p1))(1− αγp1)










α[1− γpA1 − (π̄







α[1− γpB1 − (π̄







α[1− γpB1 − (π̄







α[1− γpA1 − (π̄
B − θπ2(pA1 ))]
Now, in the expression of the traded quantity in (8), we replace the rebate
r by the expression in (15). For some level of profit π̄, this gives:
q1(p1, π̄) =
α[1− γp1 − (π̄ − θπ2(p1))]
1− αγp1
(33)























































1 )] ≥ 0 (34)
where the last inequality holds as the profit on the second market is strictly
increasing in the list price in country 1, this because both pA1 and p
B
1 are
less than pM2 if A and B are PO-IR (by Lemma 3.3.1). We re-write the













where the first inequality is here to remind the reader that the quantity
that would be traded under the terms of contract D is larger than the
quantity that is traded with contract B. Gathering the inequalities in (34)














B) ≥ 0 (36)
(The last inequality to zero is always verified as for the same list price pB1 ,
the rebate is larger in contract C than in contract B, and we know that
holding all other variables constant, the quantity traded as expressed in (8)
is increasing in the value of the rebate.)
Now, let us re-formulate each side of the inequality in (36), by expressing
the quantity traded as in (33). For the expression on the left side of the
183
































B) by (35). Since we set that pB1 > p
A
1 and that 1 − αγp
A
1 >


















D). Which contradicts the (36). Therefore, if country
1 prefers A over C, then it must prefer D over B. Note that contract D, in
comparison with contract B, has a larger net price however the quantity
traded is greater.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3




γ(1− p1 + r)[1− α + α(p1 − r)]
(1− γp1)[1 + α(1− γp1)]
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The ratio is negative valued: the country trades larger list prices against








[1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1]
2 − γ(p1 − r)[1− α + α(p1 − r)]
(1− γp1)(1− αγp1)







γ(1− p1 + r)[1− α + α(p1 − r)]






[1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1]
2 − γ(p1 − r)[1− α + α(p1 − r)]
(1− αγp1)
The first ratio is positive valued, as p1 ≤ 1γ and 1 ≥ p1 − r ≥ 0. The






αγ[1− α + α(p1 − r)]
[1 + α(p1 − r)− αγp1]2
Expressing r as a function of p1 and the rest of the variables:
r =
αγ[1− α + αp1]− θ
∂π2(p1)
∂p1






(1 + α− αγp1)
)
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Next, we express the quantity traded as a function of the rebate given in






− r + (1− γ)p1
Then, in the above expression, we replace r by (17). This gives :











Given that p1 ≤ min{ 1γ , p
M
2 } in a PO-IR contract, it follows that q1(p1) ≤ 1
if p1 is PO-IR. Last, we show that q1(p1) is increasing in p1. For this, let



















The first term is positive by our assumption that π2 is concave in the price
and p1 ≤ 1γ by country 1’s participation constraint. The second term is
also positive since p1 ≤ pM2 if p1 is PO-IR, by Lemma 3.3.1. To sum up,
q1(p1) is increasing in p1, and it is positive for any p1 that is PO-IR. We
now make explicit the equation of the optimal private contribution for a





(1 + α− αγp1)− αγ (1− α + αγp1)
α2γ
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To prove our claim that τ ∗(p1) is decreasing in p1, we take its first derivative
















with all three terms within brackets that are negative (recall the firm’s




by country 1’s participation constraint on the list price).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
The Pareto frontier is of equation:








(1 + α− αγp1)
From the expression of country 1’s demand in (8):













(1 + α− αγp1)
≥ 0
Since p1 ≤ pM2 if p1 is PO-IR, and since 1+α−αγp1 ≥ 0, it follows that the
denominator is increasing in p1 and positive. The numerator is decreasing
in p1 and positive. Thus, the ratio is decreasing in p1 and positive. As a
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consequence, a PO-IR rebate is increasing in p1.
We still need to prove that the net price is a decreasing function of the
list price p1. If a contract (p1, r) is PO-IR, then the net price is expressed
as:








(1 + α− αγp1)





(1 + α− αγp1)








































































On the right side of the inequality, the term within squared brackets is
strictly positive, by our assumption that the firm’s profit on the second
market is concave in the price (and this price is p1 as p1 ≤ pM2 in any
PO-IR trade between country 1 and the firm, by Lemma 3.3.1). Therefore
the right side is negative. The left side is positive since the term between




C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2.1





τ 2 − pτ 1
1− p
)
(1− p)(L− τ 1)
The FOC is given by:
∂E(VC)
∂p
= (L− τ 1)
{(
















= (L− τ 1)








by Assumption 1 and p ∈ P ∗. Thus the country’s expected payoff is concave
in p, and has a unique global maximum on P ∗. The global maximum is
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interior iff:
G′(1)(1− τ 1)− 1 < 0
which is guaranteed by Assumption 2. Let us call p∗ the solution of the
country’s problem; p∗ solves:
[T (p∗)− τ 1]G′(T (p∗)) = G(T (p∗)) ⇔ eS(p
∗) = 1
where T (p∗) = t∗. Note that eS(p) crosses 1 only once at p∗. Also, notice






= G′′(t∗)G(t∗)[t∗−τ 1] < 0 ∀τ 1
by Assumption 1.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3.1
We start with the case where country C pays p∗ for the drug. Country D’s




























































by Assumption 1 and p ∈ PA. Thus the country’s expected payoff is concave
in p, and has a unique global maximum on PA. The global maximum is
interior iff:
G′(1)(1− τ 1D)− 1 < G
′(1)(1− τ 1C)− 1 < 0
which is always true by the fact that τ 1D > τ
1
C and Assumption 2. Let us




′(TD(pa)) = G(TD(pa)) ⇔ eSa(pa) = 1
where TD(pa) = ta. Note that eSa(p) crosses 1 only once at pa, and that
ta < t
∗.
Assume instead that country C pays the price of 1 for the drug. Country
















 (1− p)ε(L− τ 1D)

































for the same reasons as those evoked previously. Country D’s optimal offer
is interior to PR iff:
G′(1)(1− τ 1D) < 1−G(t
∗)
By Assumption 1, a sufficient condition for which country D’s optimal offer
is interior is:
G′(1)(1− τ 1D)− [1−G(t
∗)] < G′(1)(1− τ 1C)






−G′′(tr)(tr − τ 1D)
> 0













is a decreasing function of p everywhere on PR. This result is
intuitive: the offer pa is accepted by types strictly lower than t∗. If the
firm rejected p∗, then its type is strictly larger than t∗. In this instance,






. The offer pa
is accepted with probability zero, which gives a null payoff to country D.
The offer p is accepted with probability one, and the country’s payoff is
strictly larger than zero.
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C.3 Beliefs that satisfy the intuitive criterion
One may wonder the conditions under which an all-accept pooling equilib-
rium that satisfies the intuitive criterion exists. We propose to tackle this
question here. The set of reasonable types which would gain from rejecting
p all verify that:
∆(t) =
[





























Since the expression is increasing in t, the set of reasonable types is of the
form [t̂, 1], with t̂ ∈ [0, 1]. We distinguish between two cases, depending on
whether type tD is in the set of reasonable types or not.
If tD is reasonable, then an all-accept pooling equilibrium can simply be
sustained by the belief that the firm’s type is tD with probability 1. In this
case, country D offers the same price regardless whether p was accepted or
rejected. And accepting p is indeed optimal for all types.
For the case where tD is unreasonable, we show that the belief for which
D assigns probability 1 on the firm’s type being 1 following a rejection of
p sustains an all-accept pooling equilibrium. (Note that type 1 is always
reasonable). Consider such a profile. To show that no type gains from
deviating, it suffices to prove that ∆ is non-positive at t = tD and t = 1.
This is immediately verified for t = tD, as we consider here that type tD is
unreasonable. For the firm of type 1, note that:








. As a result, no type has any incentive to deviate. Hence
we can claim the following:





there exists an all-accept pooling equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive cri-
terion.
C.4 Non existence of PBE in pure strategies
when condition B does not hold
Proposition C.4.1. Suppose that condition B in Lemma 4.4.4 does not






. Such subgames do not admit an equilibrium in pure strategies;
therefore, the game as a whole does not admit any PBE in pure strategies.
Proof. Let pR and pA be the (deterministic) prices offered by D following
rejection of p or acceptance of p, respectively. Let tR and tA be the types
indifferent between accepting or rejecting pR and pA, respectively. First,
note that a pooling profile where all types reject p is not an equilibrium in
this case. This profile would be an equilibrium only if tR =tD. However the
payoff gain from rejecting in this instance is:
∆(t) = (1− p) t−
[






and it is negative for all t < TC (p), as p <
1−τ2C
1−τ1C
. Similarly, there is no
pooling equilibrium where all types accept, because the payoff gain from
rejecting is strictly positive at t = 1.
We now look for interior equilibria, in pure strategies. Suppose first that
pR = pA. Then the continuation value of accepting or rejecting p to the firm
is the same. Thus the myopic behavior regarding acceptance or rejection
of price p is optimal. Therefore the firm accepts p if t ≤ TC (p) and rejects
otherwise. But this induces optimal prices pA and pR such that pA < pR,
contradicting our initial assumption. Therefore, this case is never produced
in an interior equilibrium. Next, suppose that pA < pR. For all t ∈ [tA, tR],
the payoff gain from rejecting is given by:





















Suppose first that tR > t◦D(p). For any t > tR, we have:
∆(t) = (1− p) t−
[





But then all types t ≥ tA prefer to reject p, as:
[tR − t
◦





where the last inequality holds as TC(p) < t◦D(p) and tR > TC(p) under
our current assumption. Yet, type tA must have accepted p, otherwise it
would be best for D to offer a strictly lower price. A contradiction follows;
hence pA < pR and tR > t◦D(p) is never part of an interior equilibrium.
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We continue to assume that pA < pR, however suppose now that tR ∈
[TC (p) , t
◦
D(p)]. Note that:






D[TC(p)− tR] < 0
thus ∆(t) < 0, as each of three terms are negative. Still for the case where
pA < pR, suppose last that tR < TC (p) . Then:
∆(tR) = (1− p) tR −
[




= (1− p)[tR − TC(p)] < 0
which is a contradiction. Next, suppose that pA > pR. Then all types t > tA
reject both pA and pR. The payoff gain from rejecting p to any firm of type
t > tA is:
∆(t) = (1− p) [t− TC(p)],
which is strictly positive for t > TC (p) . Since it must be that ∆(tA) ≤ 0,
therefore tA ≤ TC (p) must hold. For all t ∈ [tA, TC (p)) , we still have:
∆(t) = (1− p) [t− TC(p)],
which is strictly increasing in t. And for all t ∈ [tR, tA] , the payoff gain
from rejecting is written as:

























tR − τ 1D
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which is also strictly increasing in t. Note that:
∆(tA) =
(1− p)(tA − τ
1
D)
(tR − τ 1D)
[tA − TC(p)] ≤ 0
if the condition tA ≤ TC(p) for which all types larger than tA prefer to
accept p holds. But then ∆(t) < 0, which is impossible. So there cannot
be such an equilibrium. In conclusion, there is no equilibrium in pure
strategies in such subgames. This also implies that if condition B does not
hold, the game as a whole does not admit any PBE in pure strategies.
C.5 Proof of Remark 4.4.1







, and D’s offer does not depend on tf . Also,
tA < tf . The expected equilibrium payoff of country D is:














f(tf ) = [G(tR(tf ))−G(tf )](1− PR(tf ))


















, then by the Envelop theorem ∂f
∂pR









= −ε(L− τ 1D)G
′(tf )(1− pR) < 0
We conclude that D’s expected equilibrium payoff is decreasing in tf for all







(this is a corner solution) following the acceptance of C’s offer, hence it
always holds that:
G′(tf )(tf − τ
1
D)−G(tf ) > 0 ∀tf ∈ [0, tD]
For these values of tf , country D’s expected equilibrium payoff is written
as:


















τ 2D − τ
1
D




Taking the first derivative wrt tf , we get:
∂E(VD)
∂tf
= ε(L− τ 1D)
{
G′(tf )(1− pA)−G(tf )
(τ 2D − τ
1
D)




= ε(L− τ 1D)
{
G′(tf )(1− pA)−G(tf )
(
1− pA









> 0 for any tf in the
appropriate interval.
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C.6 Elasticity of the farsighted supply
























1− p− ε(1− pR)
with pR = PR(tf ), and both the numerator and denominator are positive






(t− τ 1C)(1− pR)
(tR − τ 1D)(1− p− ε(1− pR))
dtR
dt
We want to express the elasticity as a function of the firm’s type; for this,
we parametrize the prices p, pR by types, using the relation in (30) for
expressing p as a function of t, and the relation in (25) for expressing pR
as a function of tR. We get the following:
1− p =














τ 2D − τ
1
D
tR − τ 1D
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and
1− p− ε(1− pR) =










(t− τ 1C)(tR − τ
1
D)
Replacing, we find that ∂T
f (p)
∂p




































−G′′(tR)(tR − τ 1D)












This expression is positive for any value of t and tR, as
∂T f (p)
∂p
(1 − p) is




















−G′′(tR)(tR − τ 1D)
> 0





is an alternative expression of the denominator of ∂T
f (p)
∂p
, where p parametrized
by t via the relation in (30), and pR via that in (25). Therefore, Z(tR) is
strictly positive, for any value of tR. Note that:
dZ(tR)
dp










the sign is this expression is that of the term between squared brackets,
and it is positive when condition A holds.
C.7 Proof of Proposition 4.4.6
We express country C’s problem as a function of the type t, by relating a





























































































(t− τ 1C)(t− τ
1
D)
(tR − τ 1D)
2
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1
D
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1
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1
D









τ 2D − τ
1
D






























(t− τ 1C)(t− τ
1
D)
(tR − τ 1D)
]}
The function on the first line is negative valued for all t ∈ [0, 1], as G′′(.) < 0
by Assumption 1 and the term between squared brackets is positive (see
Appendix C.6: Z(tR) is positive in equilibrium). We conclude that for a
sufficiently small ε, the FOC is a decreasing function of t, i.e. the country’s






























The denominator of the ratio is positive (see Appendix C.6 Z(tR) is pos-
itive). Thus the sign of the ratio is that of the expression between the
squared brackets on the numerator. Note that for any t ≥ t̄f , we have
tR(t) = 1 thus
dtR
dt
= 0. Recall that t∗ is the type of firm which is indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting country C’s optimal offer p∗ in the
myopic case. t∗ solves:
G′(t∗)(t∗ − τ 1C)−G(t
∗) = 0
Recall that G′(t)(t−τ 1C)−G(t) is a decreasing function of t. Let us refer to












t∗ − τ 1D
)
where tr is the threshold type associated with D’s best-response PR(t∗). We
compare p∗ and p∗f , C’s optimal offers in the myopic and farsighted cases,
respectively. Recall that for small parameter values of ε, the elasticity
eSf (t) equals one for one value of t, let us call it t1, and that eSf (t) is



































t∗ − τ 1D
tr − τ 1D
])
≥ 1
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